1815. A MAY and Others v. CHRISTIE. CTION July 1. sured claims and receives the return pre mium due upon the ar rival of the policy is adJusted upon that footing, without an ex press stipula again to the any contin gency of the adventure. upon a policy of insurance on goods on Where the asboard the Jonge Anthony, from London to Amsterdam or Rotterdam; the policy was effected at fifteen guineas per cent., two to be returned on arrival. The vessel had been seized by the Dutch vessel, and the Government; but upon the plaintiff's agent entering into a bond to the Attorney General of the he cannot, Dutch Government, that in case the goods should press be confiscated the bond should be in force, she was tion, resort liberated. In July 1810 the ship and cargo were underwriter in condemned; and the plaintiffs were called upon to satisfy their bond, which they accordingly did. After the arrival of the vessel, and before the condemnation, the plaintiff's broker applied to the defendant for the return premium of five guineas, which he immediately paid; his initials were put to the policy in the usual way, to signify that it was adjusted, and then struck out. The bond was mentioned to him before he settled; he said, he was glad that the vessel had arrived, as he heard some ships had been seized. The cargo sold for more than its estimated value, and the plaintiffs claimed an average loss. 1 Lens, serjeant, for defendant.-The plaintiffs have claimed and received a return of premium with a knowledge of all the circumstances. If they had a private reservation or contingent right, they ought to have communicated it. But claiming 1815. MAY v. CHRISTIE. upon the foundation of arrival, without any further explanation to the defendant, it is a tacit admission and Others that they have no other claim. If they intended to claim upon the contingency of a loss, the broker should have taken the premium without prejudice. He could not receive the premium on arrival, but on the express footing of arrival. They never intimate they have any other demand. It is therefore a determination of the adventure. The Solicitor General, contrà. GIBBS, C. J.-The return of five per cent. on arrival means, that if the adventure be safely terminated, and the underwriter free from all danger of loss, and discharged from all other claims, he will return to the assured a portion of the premium which he has received. The plaintiffs have no right to call on the underwriters unless the risk be at an end; whilst they are subject to any danger they cannot be called upon to return the premium. The return premium is only due when the adventure is wound up. If any thing of risk, as respected that bond, remained outstanding, it should have been communicated to the defendant when the return premium was claimed. It should then have been demanded as matter of favour, and not of right; because it is not due of right until the risk is closed. If the plaintiffs intended to reserve a contingent claim upon the underwriters after they received the return of premium, they should have stipulated for it. His Lordship left it to the jury, whether the whole adventure was to be considered as closed by the acceptance of the return of premium, or whether it was received with a reservation that the underwriters should still be liable if the bond were put in force. The jury, which was a special jury, found for the defendant. The Solicitor General, Best, serjeant, and Gaselee, for plaintiffs. Lens and Vaughan, serjeants, and Taddy, for defendant. [Attornies, J. and J. Gregson, and Kaye and Co.] PEARCE and Others v. CoWIE. July 1. The words "all sorts of THIS HIS was an action on a policy of insurance on a Portuguese vessel owned by a British subject, at and from Amelia island to Liverpool. vessel took in her cargo at Amelia island. With include cotton The the exception of some tierces of rice on board it consisted of cotton. The ship, on account of bad weather, was obliged to put back to Amelia island, wool," in the 43 G. 3. c. 155., s. 13., do not wool; especially when the words wool and cotton wool, are used in another clause, and in the same section of the act, as distinct commodities. Therefore, the importation of cotton from Amelia island, in a Portuguese vessel, owned by a British subject, the captain and Crew of which are Portuguese, is contrary to the Navigation Act. The 55th G. 3. c. 8. is not an exposition of the 43d. 1815. PEARCE where she was found to have sustained so much damage that it became necessary to sell her. and Others The plaintiffs claimed a total loss. v. COWIE. Best, serjeant, and Richardson, for defendant. -The voyage is illegal by the Navigation Act. A ship of this description, the master and crew of which are foreigners, cannot bring any such commodities from a Spanish settlement in South America. The plaintiffs will rely on the 43 G. 3. c. 153. s. 13.; but that act only authorizes them to import into Great Britain all sorts of wool. The act proceeds to give a liberty to import into Ireland "all sorts of barilla, &c., and wool and cotton wool." There is therefore an obvious distinction made by the Legislature; the bulk of this ship's cargo was cotton wool, and not the wool which the act permits to be imported into Great Britain. Wool, standing alone, means wool from the back of the sheep, and not cotton wool. The Solicitor General, for plaintiffs.-The Act says "all sorts of wool," which includes cotton wool. The word wool, in respect to Ireland, is not used in the same meaning as in respect to England. The term wool, it is contended, applies to the animal: that may be, as regards Ireland; but "all sorts of wool," includes both animal wool, as well as cotton wool. The 55 G. 3. c. 8. continues the act of the 43d, and is an exposition of it. It makes it lawful to import into Great Britain all sorts of wool, and cotton wool. Its intent is to continue the privileges of the 43d, and not to give new privileges. It cannot be said to be a continuing act, if it gives new powers. The 55th recites the 43d, and shews, that in the former act cotton wool was virtually included in the term wool. It is therefore an explanation of the 43d. GIBBS, C. J.-Cotton wool is not included in the term wool in the act of the 43d of the King. Wool is produced from the animal; cotton wool grows from the ground: when applied to wool, it means unmanufactured wool. An irresistible argument is furnished by the two branches of the act as respects Ireland and England. Why should cotton wool be specifically mentioned in the clause to import into Ireland? It would have been included in "all sorts of wool." The legislature evidently meant to distinguish. The 55th, I think, clearly shews that cotton wool was not comprehended in the words "all sorts of wool" used in the 43d. 1815. PEARCE and Others v. COWIE, Plaintiffs nonsuited. The Solicitor General, Lens, serjeant, and Scarlet, for the plaintiffs. Best, serjeant, and Richardson for the defendant. [Attornies, Windle, and Crowder and Co:] The illegality in the present case arose out of the system of the navigation laws; a sys tem to be referred generally to |