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1817.

ARBOUIN

v.

HANBURY

and Another

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der the transaction invalid. Crosby v. Crouch, 11 E. R. 256. Urgency on the part of the creditor for a security, provided there be no suspicion of collusion, has been held sufficient. In Smith v. Paine, 6 T. R. 154, Lord Kenyon says, "There is no occasion for a creditor under such circumstances to threaten an actual arrest ;" and in Crosby v. Crouch, Lord Ellenborough says, "that bona fide urgency for a security will exclude the security from being considered as a voluntary one and it is immaterial whether the debtor had or had not an act of bankruptcy in contemplation at the time, if the creditor pressed for payment or security, and thereby obtained such payment or security."

Where a trader, being pressed by a creditor for payment or security, one or other of which, he said, he would have, gave a bill of sale of certain wools and cloths in a mill, apparently the whole of his stock, and immediately left his business and home, and became a bankrupt; this, inasmuch as the act done did not redeem the trader even from any present difficulty, which is the ordinary motive for such an act, when really done under the pressure of a threat, is

evidence that it was not done under such pressure, but voluntarily, and with a view to prefer the particular creditor, in contemplation of bankruptcy; and is therefore void, as against the assignees of the bankrupt. Thornton v. Har

greaves, 7 E. R. 544. Sed quære this case, which depends upon the particular circumstances.

But, in a case where 4. on the 8th of October purchased goods of B. for the purpose of exportation; but finding that he must stop payment, and that he could not apply the goods to the purpose for which they were bought, he returned them to B. on October 16th: on the 17th, he stopt payment; but, expecting remittances from abroad more than sufficient to pay his debts, conceived that his creditors would give him time they refused; and he was made bankrupt on November 2nd. In an action by the assignees against B., for the value of the goods; it was holden by the Court of C. P. that the jury were warranted in finding, that the delivery of the goods to B. was not made in contemplation of bankruptcy. Fidgeon v. Sharp, 1 Marsh,

196.

So, where a creditor obtains a preference in contem

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1817.

YORK.

SUMMER ASSIZES, 57 GEORGE III.

July 19.

A. B. and C. are part

owners in a

ship. A. di

not to order

any repairs in their joint names, and

informs them

TH

GLEADON V. TINKLER and Others.

HIS was an action for the repair of a ship. Wilkinson, one of the defendants, had let rects B. and C. judgment go by default; Thorney, another of the defendants, had pleaded his bankruptcy; and a nolle prosequi was entered as to him. The question was, whether Tinkler was liable to the repairs. It was in evidence that he was the owner of a third part in the ship. The Captain, who was employed by Wilkinson and Thorney, had ordered the repairs; and the ship was debited, generally, in the plaintiff's books: no mention whatever was made of the name of Tinkler, but the and C. Held names of Wilkinson and Thorney, the other partners, appeared specifically.

that he will
no longer
consider them
as manag
ing owners.
Repairs were
done in their
joint names,
the di

rection of the
Captain em-
ployed by B.

that A. was

jointly liable.

The plaintiff's counsel, after having proved the repairs done, and that Tinkler had on several occasions acted as a part owner, rested their case here. The defendant's counsel then proposed to shew, that Tinkler had never personally con

1817.

GLEADON

บ.

cerned himself in ordering the repairs, and that Wilkinson and Thorney were the managing owners. They proposed likewise to give in evidence personal directions by Tinkler to Wil- TINKLER kinson and Thorney, by which he discharged them and Others. from acting as managing owners for the future; directing them not to pledge his credit for any repairs; adding, that he would not be answerable for any which they might order in the joint

name.

Littledale and Williams, for the plaintiff, objected to the admission of this evidence.

Hullock, serjeant, and Parke, for the defendants. Unless this evidence be admitted, how can the defendant, who is not liable upon an express undertaking, but merely as legal owner, shew that he revoked the authority of Wilkinson and Thorney to pledge his credit? This evidence is offered to shew a determination of the agency of the other two defendants, by the act of Tinkler, who was competent so to do.

Lord Chief Baron RICHARDS.-The plaintiff has no notice given to him that Tinkler had discharged the other defendants from pledging their joint credit. One partner, by the necessary relation of law, may bind the other in matters relating to their common interest. A court of equity will sometimes interfere to restrain one partner from using the name of the firm in certain transactions. But, in general, he

1817.

has this right. I do not think the evidence admissible.

GLEADON

v.

TINKLER and Others.

Verdict for Plaintiff.

Littledale and Williams for plaintiff.

Hullock, serjeant, and Parke, for defendants.

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