1815. EVEREST v. GLYN. by the steward, and accepted by the defendant's attorney; each admission was written on a separate parchment, and had its proper stamp affixed. The charges were, for the first admission, 8l. 3s. 2d.; and for the remaining five, 6l. 1s. 2d., severally. The estates were holden by different quit rents, and upon some of them a heriot was reserved. There was no evidence of any custom in the manors to warrant the charges in question. A witness was called who acted as steward for twelve different manors; he stated that the custom was, when a tenant was admitted to several estates under one title, to recite the title at length in the first admission, and then to enumerate the different estates to which the tenant was admitted at the same time, reciting the particular quit rents and service attached to each. If the recital were long, and it became necessary to abstract and copy deeds, his custom was, to charge 1s. per folio, in addition. Being shewn the plaintiff's bill of charges, he pronounced them to be excessive; and he said, that he should have charged 6l. 5s. for the first admission, and 8s. 8d. for the subsequent ones; that he should have included them all in one parchment, and affixed one stamp. He thought 201. a reasonable recompence to the plaintiff. Lens and Bosanquet, serjeants, for the defendant, made two objections: First, That the plaintiff was not entitled to charge distinct and entire fees for each admission. Secondly, The rate of charge. This question affected all the copyhold property in the kingdom. The most reasonable course was, to admit the tenant generally, reciting his title, whether by descent or purchase, in the first admission, with an "And also," to such other estates as he claimed in the same right. This was proved by one of the plaintiff's witnesses. It is strictly equitable; for where a copyholder is admitted to several copyholds under a will, as in the present case, he only takes one estate. The fees, moreover, depend upon the custom of the manor: the custom, with respect to fees, is as much the life of copyhold as any other custom. In the absence of all custom, the steward may resort to a quantum meruit; but the plaintiff is bound to prove, either that a particular custom did exist to warrant the charges; or that there was no custom on the subject in the manor; which would let in a calculation of charges agreeable to equity and reason. They cited a MS. case, before Lord Kenyon, in Hilary Term, 29 G. 3. Searle v. Marsh, in which his Lordship determined, that where there were separate copyholds, claimed in one right, the admissions should be separate, and not blended; nevertheless, to warrant a distinct and entire charge for the separate admissions to each, a custom should be shewn; and, upon the ground of custom only, would he permit the plaintiff to recover. With respect to the several stamps, all might be affixed to one copy; and as the death was only once presented, proclamation once made, and the other ceremonies of admission once gone through, it would be sufficient to consolidate them into one entire charge upon the first admission, adding a moderate sum for the enumeration of the other estates to which the tenant was admitted at the same time. 1815. EVEREST v. GLYN. 1815. EVEREST v. GLYN. Best, serjeant. The attorney has received the separate admissions in Court. He cannot afterwards dispute them. Searle v. Marsh only decided that where there was a custom it must be followed. The defendant has not proved a custom to controul the plaintiff's charges; therefore the plaintiff may resort to a quantum meruit. Attree v. Scutt, 6 East, 476. It is the duty of the steward to make separate admissions, and consequently he must be paid. In the case cited, Lord Kenyon thought the admissions should be separate, and the custom gave the fees. GIBBS, C. J. This case is most important as it affects the interests of copyholders. The defendant has succeeded to certain copyholds on his father's death: his title cannot be perfected without admission: and he must receive a copy of those admissions for the convenience of disposing of his property, if so inclined. The steward is the proper officer to enter the admissions, and to deliver them out to the party; and he is entitled to a reasonable compensation for his trouble. This compensation may be regulated by custom; or, in the absence of custom, by principles which vary with circumstances and times. No evidence has been given to shew the custom of this manor, in regard to the steward's fees. But it is said, the plaintiff cannot recover upon the quantum meruit. The defendant, by paying money into Court, has answered this objection; but I am of opinion, that if the plaintiff do not prove a custom, he may, notwithstanding, resort to a quantum meruit. Whether the plaintiff be entitled to charge distinct and entire fees for each admission is a question of law. I shall leave it to the Jury to say what will be a reasonable compensation to the plaintiff for the admissions, if entitled to make out separate admissions to each estate. And it will remain on my note to state to the Court for their opinion, whether the plaintiff be entitled to distinct and entire. fees for each admission. The Jury found 20l. a reasonable compensation to the plaintiff, if entitled to make out separate admissions; but if entitled to charge separate fees for each admission, they found a verdict, with 107. damages for the plaintiff. Best, serjeant, and Bowen, for plaintiff. Lens and Bosanquet, serjeants, for defendant. [Attornies, Redit and Williams.] In the ensuing Michaelmas Term this case was moved on behalf of the plaintiff, and a rule Nisi obtained. The Chief Justice delivered the opinion of the Court:-That the plaintiff was not entitled to distinct and entire fees on each ad- 1815. EVEREST V. GLYN. 1815. June 15. After action brought, the defendant pays the plain tiff the debt and costs in THE HOLLAND V. JOURDINE. HIS was an action to recover the amount of an attorney's bill; plea the general issue. The defendant's counsel admitted the bill to be due, and the cause, and the defence was, a receipt given by the defendant for the same after action brought for the debt and costs in the takes a receipt The plaintiff nevertheless proceeds in the action, and the defendant neral issue. no defence un cause. Onslow, serjeant, for the plaintiff, contended, pleads the ge- that it was not evidence under the general issue; the receipt having been given after action brought. The mode of taking advantage of such payment must be, by an application to the Court, or a special plea. der this plea, and plaintiff is entitled to no minal damages. Best, serjeant, for the defendant, admitted that payment after action brought could not be given in evidence under the general issue; but, in the present case, the debt and costs are included in the receipt which the defendant gives. GIBBS, C. J.-It is no answer to the action under the general issue. The defendant might have applied to the Court. The Court of King's Bench have suffered what has passed between suing out of the writ and filing the declaration to be given in evidence without pleading it. But the payment of debt and costs, which arises after action brought, should be introduced by plea. The plaintiff, however, can only claim nominal damages. |