1816. They admitted the hundred to be liable for the value of furniture and china found broken, and the casks staved, upon the BOLTON. denied their liability for the SMITH 2. premises; but they plate, money, and clothes, concerning which no evidence had been given, except that they were upon the premises a short time previous to the demolition of the house. LE BLANC, J.-I agree with you, in point of law, that the hundred are not liable for things that are not demolished by the rioters, or destroyed by the demolition of the house-that they are not liable for any thing stolen or taken away. The defendant's counsel called no witness, and LE BLANC, J. told the jury, that their province was to estimate the damage by demolition which had been the immediate consequence of the riot. That the difficulty would be, to ascertain what were the things which had been either wholly or in part destroyed. That there was no actual proof of the removal of any of the articles; but it was difficult to conceive how the plate, clothes, or money in the till, could be destroyed in the demolition of the house. That the amount of the damage actually proved was 851. The jury gave the plaintiff 100%. Scarlett and Alderson, for plaintiff. In a case tried at Westminster sittings, after Hilary term, 1816, Lord Ellenborough, Chief Justice, held, that in order to sustain this action against the hundred, circumstances must be proved from which the jury may infer that the object and intent of the mob was totally to demolish the house, &c. The words of the act begin, shall begin to demolish, &c" And, therefore, that where the mob, after breaking the windows, and doing other damage to the house, had retired without demolishing it, and without any disturbance having been given to their operations, the hundred was not liable. But slight evidence is sufficient to raise the presumption of an intent to demolish; and therefore, in the same case, it having been afterwards proved that there were military patroling the streets in the neighbourhood of the house in question, that the rioters were dis persed in various parties, which kept up a communication by signals, and that previous to their retiring from the house it was observed that a signal was received by the party demolishing; his Lordship directed the jury that these were facts from which they might fairly infer that the rioters were checked in their proceedings by the proximity of the troops, and had begun their operations with an intent to demolish. They accordingly found for the plaintiff. For cases upon this act vide Ratcliffe v. Eden, Dougl. 699. Hyde v. Cogan; and Wilmot v. Horton, there cited. Pritchett v. Waldron, 5 T. R. 14. Reid v. Clarke, 7 T. R. 496. Burrows v. Wright, 1 East, 615. Greasley v. Higginson, 1 East, 631. There is likewise a very elaborate and learned note upon the construction of this act, William's edition of Saunders, Vol. 2, 377a. 1816. SMITH v. BOLTON. 1816. LANCASTER LENT ASSISES, 56 GEO. III. 1816. A. and Co. of Liverpool employ R. and Co. as their R. and Co. BREED and Others v. GREEN and Another. MONEY ONEY had and received. The plaintiffs had employed the defendants as their agents and bankers there: consignees in London, to sell goods, and dispose of the proceeds according to their directions. don with J. and They had at first been directed to pay the proceeds L. But A. and into the banking-house of Esdaile and Co., after keep an ac count in Lon Co. have no ac and L. A. count with J. wards into the house of Jones, Loyd, and Co. and Co. direct Plaintiffs had no account of their own with either of their agents in these houses, but Roscoe and Co. were their banktheir account' ers at Liverpool, who kept an account with Esdaile at the house of and Co., which account they had just transferred to London to pay monies to J. and L. As no account of A. and Co. had Jones, Loyd, and Co. The particular transaction their own with arose out of the sale of some American stock. J. and L. but through the medium of R. and Co. of Li their agents habit of paying On the 20th of January, 1816, the plaintiffs verpool, and as wrote to the defendants, desiring them to sell the had been in the stock, and to pay the proceeds to Jones, Loyd, of A. and Co., adding "for our account." On the 23d, account of R. the defendants answered that they had accepted the and Co at the order, and would pay in the proceeds the next day, and Co. to the house of the London bank ers of R. and Co.; held, that the direction of A. and Co. to their agents to pay to "their account" was sufficiently complied with, by a payment made to the account of R. and Co. as the agents had been in the habit of doing. 1816. BREED V. GREEN and "for their account." On the 25th they wrote as follows: "We have paid the money, agreeably to your desire, into the hands of Jones, Loyd and Co. and Others We inquired if you had an account open with them that we might have it placed thereto; but, being Another. told you had not, we desired it to be placed to the credit of your account with Roscoe and Co. We trust we did right; this being in fact the only manner in which Jones, Loyd, and Co. would take it at all." Several orders were read, in which plaintiffs had directed the defendants to pay money to Esdaile's house, to be placed to the credit of their account with Roscoe and Co., and the defendants had never paid, on any occasion, money to the sole account of the plaintiffs at either house. In one or two instances it appeared that money had been paid to the credit of the bankers' (Roscoe and Co.'s) account, when it had been directed to be paid to the credit of the plaintiffs', or one of their partners. During the whole time that defendants were the agents of the plaintiffs, Roscoe and Co. were their bankers at Liverpool, and defendants paid the proceeds of the sales which they made for the plaintiffs into the house of Jones, Loyd, and Co., in the same manner in which they had been accustomed to pay at Esdaile's; that is to say, to the account of Roscoe and Co. at Jones, Loyd, and Co. On the 25th of January Roscoe's house suspended payments. At that time the money was in the hands of Jones, Loyd, and Co. to their credit. They apprised Roscoe's house of the payment, and received for answer that the money was to be struck out of their credit, as they had received plaintiffs' order not to place it to their account. 1816. BREED and Others v. GREEN and Upon plaintiffs' applying for the money to Jones, Loyd, and Co., they refused to pay it, alleging that they had received it to the credit of Roscoe and Co., with whom they had an unsettled account, and they must hold it for the benefit of all parties. Raine, for the plaintiffs, contended, that defendants had acted contrary to the orders they had received, and were therefore bound to refund. It was their duty, either to have rejected the order to pay altogether, or to have executed it according to the specific directions which were sent. Scarlett, contrà.-There was an express direction to pay the money into some account, which must mean an existing account. Now the plaintiffs had no account with Jones, Loyd, and Co., but through the house of Roscoe and Co. LE BLANC, Justice.-If the plaintiffs intended to have an account opened with the London bankers, they ought to have given specific directions; they should have spoken in language plain and intelligible, which could not have misled. As they have not given any such specific directions, the defendants were justified in paying the money as they had been in the habit of doing. Upon his Lordship expressing this opinion, the plaintiffs' Counsel chose to be nonsuited. |