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those against whom the deed is fraudulent. The principle of Bamford v. Baron was this, that those who assent to a deed shall not be permitted to impeach it as fraudulent, and if not fraudulent, it is no act of bankruptcy. I say nothing as to the objection that the trustees did not execute the deed. It is besides the present question ; but the petitioning creditor having assented to that deed as far as it went, cannot now object to such deed as fraudulent.
Lens, serjeant, and Spankie, for plaintiffs.
The Solicitor General and Onslow, serjeant, for defendants.
[Attornies, Windus and Holloway.--Abbott.]
Such estoppel, it seems, ap- signment by partners, by deed, plies only to the petitioning of all their property, in trust creditor, 4 East, 235. There.. for their creditors, with a pro: fore, if a commission be sued viso to be void, if all their creout upon such a deed, upon ditors for above 201. should the petition of a creditor who not execute, or a commission has not concurred in it, and of bankrupt should issue withwho, together with others who in a certain time, is an act of had concurred in it, was chosen bankruptcy. Dutton v. Morassignee, it is no objection to rison, i Rose. Cases in Bankan action brought by them, as ruptcy, 213. And such a deed assignees, that some of them
is operative, though it conhad concurred in such deed. tained a proviso to be void if Tuppendall and others the trustees think fit. 4 East, Burges, 4 East, 230. An as. 230.
WITHERs and Others v. Lys and Another.
An order sent
? by the vendor to the wharf- ver a quantity of rosin. inger to delic ver the goods to the vendee, The plaintiffs had sold, through the medium of is sufficient to pass the pro- their broker, thirty tons of rosin to one Bromer, perty to the vendee, pro- before his bankruptcy. The broker's note was as vided nothing
follows: remains to be done but to make the delivery; but if
“ Messrs. Withers and Co.: Sept. 2d, 1812.any thing remain to be I have this day sold to David Bromer thirty tons done, for example, weigha of London made rosin, more or less, at 13s. per property does cut. lying in mats at the wharf of Lys and Co. pot the right of
payment by a bill at six months.”—Signed by the stoppage in broker. transitu is not defeated, till that be done.
On the 21st of September the plaintiffs sent an order to the defendants, who were wharfingers (and which order they entered in their books) to weigh and deliver the rosin ; upon which they gave notice to Bromer that they had received such order from the plaintiffs. Shortly afterwards Bromer became insolvent, and the rosin still lying at the wharf, the plaintiffs gave them notice not to deliver it. No bill of exchange had been given by Bromer.
The question was, whether delivery had taken place. There had been a suit in Chancery relative to the property, and the Master of the Rolls
had advised an action, and recommended the case to be tried upon admissions.
The Solicitor General and Taddy, for the defendants, contended, that in the present case the property passed to Bromer, and that the plaintiffs, the vendors, had lost their right of stoppage in transitu. When the order was sent to the wharfingers, and they entered it, the property was immediately divested out of the plaintiffs. It is true, indeed, that the order was to weigh and deliver, &c. But this would not bring the case within the principle of those cases, which had been decided upon the ground that weighing was necessary, in order to ascertain and distinguish the quantities which the vendee claimed. Here the rosin was lying in mats; it had been sold as thirty tons, more or less. The weighing, therefore, was not necessary to constitute the delivery, because the mats were to be delivered, whether they contained more or less. It did not appear that more than thirty tons were in the possession of the wharfingers. The contract passed the whole of the rosin; though of course, till the rosin was weighed, it was uncertain for what sum the bill of exchange was to be drawn. They submitted, moreover, that in the present case a question might arise, and had indeed been largely discussed in Chancery, on the statute of 1 James 1. Was not this rosin in the visible ownership and disposition of the bankrupt?
GIBBS, C. J.-I consider this case as having already been decided in principle, both in the King's Bench and Common Pleas; and whatever difference
there may be between those cases and the present, there is no essential distinction. The principle upon which both courts have decided is this, that the order sent by the vendor to the wharfinger to deliver the goods, is sufficient to pass the property to the vendee, provided nothing remains to be done but to make the delivery. If it be necessary by the terms of the contract, or by the order to the wharfinger, that any thing should be done previous to the delivery, the transfer is not complete till that thing be done. It is impossible to say, in the present case, that something was not to be done. The order was to weigh and deliver ; that act, therefore, which was to precede delivery, not having taken place, the property did not pass to Bromer. The statute of James the First has no application in the present case. The delivery not being perfected, it is impossible to say that the goods were in the visible ownership, or under the order and controul of the bankrupt.
Verdict for defendant.
Vaughan and Blossett, serjeants, for plaintiffs.
The Solicitor General and Taddy, for defendants.
(Attorneys, Church, and Tomlinson and Co.]
The right of stoppage in the Courts of Law, as a merely transitu has been largely in- equitable right; but is justly terpreted by recent decisions. adopted as within the spirit It is no longer vigilantly guard. and principle of the common ed, and jealously admitted, by law. It is a principle of law,
that the sale of goods passes sit, aut satis eo nomine factum,
tract: the former may be exOur oldest law books, follow- ercised by the vendor against ing therein the letter of the
the will of the vendee; the civil law, consider the pay- latter requires the consent and ment of the price, (day not concurrence of both parties. being given) as a condition
To assist the equity of this precedent implied in the con
right, the cases turn on very tract of sale. Ilob. 41. But nice distinctions. The first previous to the actual delivery, consideration will be, by whom or what is equivalent, the law this right may be exercised. avails itself of every circum- 2d, Under what circumstances, stance to put the unpaid ven- after the goods have passed dor in the repossession of his out of the possession of the property, upon the insolvency vendor. 3d, What shall defeat of the vendee. The vendor,
the right. therefore, has a right, for just
1.-By whom this right may be cause, to retract the intended
exercised. delivery, and to resume possession of his goods by any
1st, The vendor, though he means not criminal. The civil purchase the goods of another law, with respect to the right for commission, may stop them of lien on goods, extends far. in transitu. 3 East, 93. So, ther than the law of England; the consignor of goods for sale, by which, as we have above on the joint account of himself stated, the liep, giving the and the consignee, in the event right of stoppage in transitu, of the insolvency or bankruptcy is gone, where possession ac- of the latter. 6 East, 371. tual or constructive has been But the mere surety for the taken ; but the lien of the civil payment of the price by the law prevailed, even against ac- vendee, though he may have tual possession. Quod vendidi accepted bills drawn upon him non aliter fit accipientis quam by the consignee for that pursi aut pretium nobis solutum pose, cannot. I B. and P. 563.