1815. STEIGLITZ v. EGGINTON. deed by the deed itself; not by an instrument dehors. His Lordship doubted whether it would be sufficient; but he called upon the plaintiffs to support the execution of the defendants "for self and partner." They proposed to prove that one of the Eggintons gave authority to the other to execute the deed for him; and that the partner, who did not execute, had subsequently acknowledged the agreement. Lens and Gaselee contended that this was a substantial execution. GIBBS, C. J.-The authority to execute must be by deed. If one partner, who does not execute, acknowledge that he gave an authority, I must presume that it was a legal authority; and that must be under seal and produced. One man cannot authorise another to execute a deed for him but by deed. No subsequent acknowledgment will do. The defendants have pleaded that it is not their deed. The plaintiffs afterwards proceeded on the common counts, and recovered a verdict. Lens, serjeant, and Gaselee, for plaintiffs. Vaughan and Parke, for defendants. [Attornies, Gregsons Rosser and Son.] If A. execute a deed for himself and his partner, by the authority of his partner, and in his presence, it is a good execution, though only sealed once. Ball v. Dunsterville, 4 T. R. 313. In that case, the Court relied principally on the deed having been executed by one partner, for himself and the other, in the presence of the other. See Lord Lovelace's case, Sir W. Jones, 268. One partner cannot bind another by deed. Harrison v. Jackson, 7 T. R. 207. So, one who executes a deed for another under a power of attorner, must ex v. EGGINTON. Rep. 76. Frontier v. Small, STEIGLITZ 2 Ld. Raym. 1418. 1 Strange, 705. White v. Cuyler, 6 T. R. 176. But though the act done must be the act of the principal, and not of the attorney who is authorised to do it; yet, if the deed be executed in the principal's name, it matters not in what form of words such execution is denoted by the signature of the names; as if opposite the seal be written "for J. B. (the principal.) M. W. (the attorney) L. S." Wilks v. Back, 2 East, 142. 1816. FIRST SITTINGS IN HILARY TERM, 56 GEO. III. 1816, AT WESTMINSTER. January 24. that, after ac tion brought and notice of trial, the bill, TH POOLE. SMITH. In an actionHIS was an action by the indorsee of a bill by the indorsee of a bill of ex- of exchangé against the acceptor. The bill change against the acceptor, had been drawn more than six years, and the it appeared action was commenced in 1813. A few days previous to the trial, the bill, (which was indorsed in blank) had been picked out of the pocket of the attorney's clerk, and had not since been found. There was evidence that it had been shewn to the acceptor after the action was brought, who admitted the acceptance to be his hand-writing, but than six years, said he had no obligation to pay, inasmuch as bethe plaintiff was not en- tween him and the drawer it had been satisfied by cover without other bills. which was indorsed in blank, had been lost. Held, that although the bill had been drawn more titled to re producing it at the trial. The Chief Justice thought that this evidence was not enough without producing the bill. Best, serjeant. The plaintiff had a clear right of action notice of trial was given: the bill had been drawn several years, and the statute of limitations can be pleaded to any action which may be henceforward brought upon it. GIBBS, C. J.-Upon the ground of the non-production of the bill, I think I am called upon to nonsuit the plaintiff. The rule is an extremely salutary one, and ought not to be relaxed. This was an undefended cause. Best, and Marshall, serjeants, and C. Marshall, for the plaintiff. 1816. POOLE SMITH [Attorney, Rowe.] In case a bill be lost, the finder may confer a title by transferring it; in the same manner if it be stolen. Miller 1. Race, Burr. 452. So, in Lawson v. Weston it was decided, that the holder for value of a bill indorsed in blank by the payee, was entitled to recover against the acceptor, although the bill appeared to have been stolen from some prior holder, who immediately advertised his loss. 4 Esp. 56. But if the bill be not assignable otherwise than by indorsement, the finder cannot transfer a title. Where however it is transferable by mere delivery, and has been lost; or where, being transferable by indorsement, it has been lost after a blank indorsement, no VOL. I. action can be brought upon it. And the offer of an indemnity will not render such action maintainable. See Pierson v. Hutchinson, 2 Camp. 211., in which Lord Ellenborough held, that an action at law could not be maintained against the acceptor of a bill of exchange which was lost, after being indorsed, although a bond of indemnity had been tendered to the defendant. In ex parte Greenway, 6 Vesey, 1812, Lord Eldon, C. said, “he could never understand by what authority Courts of law compelled parties to accept an indemnity." Where a bill or note has been destroyed, or where it is transferable by indorsement, and has been lost before in. L |