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construction of that license Gordon and Vaughan annexed 1815. was to protect a trade in any to the case of Shiffner v. Gorship except one bearing the don, 12 East, 302.

Gregg and French flag.

Thus in the case of the Eu. Another Sed vide Hagedorn v. Ba- ropa, where the condition of

Scott. zett, 2 Maule and Selw. 100. the license was, for the vessel Mennelt v. Bonham, 15 East, to touch at Leith, and it was 477. Flindt v. Crokatt, ibid. not complied with, Sir Wil522. Fenton v. Pearson, 419. liam Scott condemned the ves. Parkin v. Dick, 11 East, 502. sel. Edw. 32. And the senand the cases referred to in the tence was affirmed on appeal. argument in 2 Maule and Selw. It is a violation of a license to

touch at an interdicted port, A license to sail under under, a license for a direct any flag except the French," voyage to this country. The was held to exclude French presumption being, that, at the ownerships. Edw. Adm. Cases, intermediate port, the vessel 44. But a similar license was might receive another destinaheld to protect the property tion, or might actually deliver of persons in countries unex- her cargo in that port. Edw. pectedly annexed to France, 42. Secus, if it be not known whilst engaged in British com- to be such at the time of sailmerce. ibid. 45. But a vessel ing, ibid. 40. carrying a cargo to the ports of The words in a license, "to the enemy, under a license to whomsoever the property may proceed thither in ballast, for appear to belong," have been the purpose of bringing a cargo held to protect the property of to this country, was held not an enemy. ibid. 20. to be protected. ibid. 11. A license to sail under any

A license to import a cargo flag except the French was not into this country, was deemed deemed to be vitiated by the sufficient to protect a vessel owner becoming a French subproceeding in ballast to the ject during the course of the port of shipment for that pur

transaction. ibid. 45. pose. ibid. 34. Whenever a So, in a case where permislicense is granted on a condi- sion has been given by a license tion, that condition must be to export a cargo, the original truly and faithfully performed. license is sufficient to protect Vandyck v. Whitmore, 1 East, the ship and cargo, not only 486. See likewise a note of eundo, but redeundo, where the

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1815. priginal purpose has been de. from a different port, it being

feated by the elements, or the shewn that it was impossible to Gregg and arts of the enemy. Case of make the shipment at the port Another the Jonge Frederick, May 10, specified in the license. Case 1810.

of the Vrow Camelia. But a SCOTT.

A license granted subse- license to proceed to an enequently to the date of the cap- my's port in ballast, for the ture was held to be no protec- purpose

of bringing a cargo to tion. Case of the St. Ivun, this country, was held not to Wacklin, Nov. 12, 1811. be a protection for a vessel

In this case Sir William carrying a cargo to the port of Scott observed, “a license is shipment. Case of the Wolin its very nature prospective, farth. pointing to something which In cases in which the parties has not yet been done, and have used due diligence, but cannot be done at all without have been prevented by acci. such permission. Where the dents not within their conact has already been done, and troul, from carrying their inrequires to be upheld, it must tentions into effect within the be by an express confirmation time, it has been holden that, of the act itself, as by an in- though their licenses have ex. demnity granted to the party; pired, they are entitled to probut a license necessarily looks tection. The case of the Goede to that which remains to be Hoop, Nov. 7, 1809. Edw. 1. done, and can extend its in- This case is most important on fluence only to future opera

account of the masterly judg. tions."

ment of Sir William Scott, A license to import a cargo

who therein discusses the rules in one vessel was held to pro- of interpretation to be applied tect the importation of the to licenses generally. mme cargo in two vessels; and



mage, &c.

who made the

VHIS THI was an action on the case. The decla

The decla- A broker is

a witness to ration stated that the plaintiffs had employed prove a.con

tract; but in the defendant as their agent, to purchase 129 an action bales of tobacco of the best quality, for a certain against the commission and reward, &c. : that in consideration principal for thereof he undertook to conduct himself skilfully misconduct in and diligently as an agent; but that, on the con- his employ. trary, he purchased tobacco of a very inferior qua- purchase of lity, and of no use to the plaintiffs ; to their da- of tobacco, Plea: the general issue.

the broker, contract for

him, cannot The plaintiffs having made out a case, the de- be called 10 fendant's counsel called the broker employed in the there was no purchase, for the purpose of proving that the to- misconduct in bacco was of the best quality.

of it, without a

his principal. The Solicitor General objected to his competency. He is liable to the defendant if he misconducted himself in his employ. If he acted contrary to the orders he received, he is responsible to his principal.

prove that

the execution

release from

Lens, contrà.-The necessity and convenience of commerce require that his testimony should be admitted. The expediency of the thing relaxes, in this case, the ordinary rules of law.

GIBBS, C. J.-A broker may be received to prove that a contract was made ; but it is a dif






ferent case where the question is, whether the contract be properly executed. A sale may be proved by an agent from the necessity of trade; but in an action for the misconduct or negligence of a servant, such servant cannot be called to prove that there was no negligence. If the broker had no direction to purchase the best tobacco, you might call him to prove tliat he did purchase the best tobacco. But I reject him on the ground of his being called to prove that he was directed to purchase according to the contract, and that the tobacco was purchased in conformity with those directions.

The defendant refused to release the broker ; and the principal question, which it was intended to raise in this action, was not therefore determined.

Verdict for the plaintiffs.

The Solicitor General, Vaughan, serjeant, and Taddy for the plaintiffs.

Lens, Best, and Rough, serjeants, for the defendant.

(Attornies, Kaye and Co.--Bleasdale and Alexander.]

Vide Green v. The New Salk. 287. The King v. Bray, River Company, 4 T. R. 589. Cases, tempore Hardw. 358. Miller v. Falconer, i Camp. 3 Lev. 174.; and Gilbert's 251. Martin v. Ilenrickson, Law of Evidence, 122, &c. See 2 L. Raymond, 1007. S. C. likewise 15 East, 474.


STEIGLITZ and Another v. EGGINTON and Others,

that he gave

EBT on an award; to which were added An authority DEB

common counts for goods sold and deli- te execute a vered, &c. The defendants pleaded : 1. Non est bydeed; and factum. 2. That they did not covenant and


acknowledge &c. 3. That they did not submit themselves, &c. another part There were other pleas, the substance of which to execute a

deed for him, was the same as the foregoing.

the presump tion is, that it

was a legal au. The plaintiffs were merchants at Petersburgh; thority, which and some differences having arisen between them seal and pro. and the defendants, an agreement was entered duced. An into to submit to the award of Mr. Ludlam. The ment is not

sufficient agreement, which was under seal, was executed by one of the defendants for self and partner. On the part of the plaintiffs, it was executed by an agent of the name of Jonn; but he had executed it in his own name, without stating that it was by procuration, or for the plaintiffs. A power of attorney had been given by the plaintiffs to Jonn to sign any instruments or documents relating to commercial affairs, in their names, either jointly or severally, or in the names of their attorney.

Vaughan and Parke objected to the execution. This deed may bind Jonn, but it cannot bind any other person. An attorney should execute in the name of his principal. The power of attorney is not sufficient; he must be connected with the

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