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construction of that license Gordon and Vaughan annexed 1815. was to protect a trade in any to the case of Shiffner v. Gorship except one bearing the don, 12 East, 302.
Gregg and French flag.
Thus in the case of the Eu. Another Sed vide Hagedorn v. Ba- ropa, where the condition of
Scott. zett, 2 Maule and Selw. 100. the license was, for the vessel Mennett v. Bonham, 15 East, to touch at Leith, and it was 477. Flindt v. Crokatt, ibid. not complied with, Sir Wil. 522. Fenton v. Pearson, 419. liam Scott condemned the vese Parkin v. Dick, 11 East, 502. sel. Edw. 32. And the senand the cases referred to in the tence was affirmed on appeal. argument in 2 Maule and Selw. It is a violation of a license to 104.
touch at an interdicted port, A license to 6 sail under under, a license for a direct ány flag except the French," voyage to this country. The was held to exclude French presumption being, that, at the ownerships. Edw. Adm. Cases, intermediate port, the vessel 44. But a similar license was might receive another destinaheld to protect the property tion, or might actually deliver of persons in countries unex- her cargo in that port. Edw. pectedly annexed to France, 42. Secus, if it be not known whilst engaged in British com- to be such at the time of sailmerce. ibid. 45. But a vessel ing, ibid. 40. carrying a cargo to the ports of The words in a license, “to the enemy, under a license to whomsoever the property may proceed thither in ballast, for appear to belong," have been the purpose of bringing a cargo held to protect the property of to this country, was held not an enemy. ibid. 20. to be protected. ibid. 11. A license to sail under any
A license to import a cargo flag except the French was not into this country, was deemed deemed to be vitiated by the sufficient to protect a vessel owner becoming a French subproceeding in ballast to the ject during the course of the port of shipment for that pur. transaction. ibid. 45. pose. ibid. 34. Whenever a So, in a case where permis. license is granted on a condi- sion has been given by a license tion, that condition must be to export a cargo, the original truly and faithfully performed. license is sufficient to protect Vandyck v. Whitmore, 1 East, the ship and cargo, not only 486. See likewise a note of eundo, but redeundo, where the
A license granted subsequently to the date of the capture was held to be no protec. tion. Case of the St. Ivun, Wacklin, Nov. 12, 1811.
In this case Sir William Scott observed, “ a license is in its very nature prospective, pointing to something which has not yet been done, and cannot be done at all without such permission. Where the act has already been done, and requires to be upheld, it must be by an express confirmation of the act itself, as by an indemnity granted to the party; but a license necessarily looks to that which remains to be done, and can extend its infuence only to future operations."
A license to import a cargo in one vessel was held to pro. tect the importation of the m'me cargo in two vessels; and
from a different port, it being shewn that it was impossible to make the shipment at the port specified in the license. Case of the Vrow Camelia. But a license to proceed to an enemy's port in ballast, for the purpose of bringing a cargo to this country, was held not to be a protection for a vessel carrying a cargo to the port of shipment. Case of the Wolfarth.
In cases in which the parties have used due diligence, but have been prevented by acci. dents not within their con. troul, from carrying their intentions into effect within the time, it has been holden that, though their licenses have ex. pired, they are entitled to protection. The case of the Goede Hoop, Nov. 7, 1809. Edw, 1. This case is most important on account of the masterly judgment of Sir William Scott, who therein discusses the rules of interpretation to be applied to licenses generally.
GEVERS and Another v. MAINWARING.
THIS was an action on the case. The decla- A broker is
a witness to 1 ration stated that the plaintiffs had employed prove a con.
tract; but in the defendant as their agent, to purchase 129 an action
brought bales of tobacco of the best quality, for a certain against the commission and reward, &c. : that in consideration principal for
o negligence and thereof he undertook to conduct himself skilfully misconduct in
" the course of and diligently as an agent; but that, on the con
ment in the trary, he purchased tobacco of a very inferior qua
certain bales lity, and of no use to the plaintiffs ; to their da- of tobac mage, &c. Plea: the general issue.
the broker, who made the contract for
him, cannot The plaintiffs having made out a case, the de- be called to
prove that fendant's counsel called the broker employed in the there was no purchase, for the purpose of proving that the to
misconduct in bacco was of the best quality.
the execution of it, without a release from
his principal. The Solicitor General objected to his competency. He is liable to the defendant if he misconducted himself in his employ. If he acted contrary to the orders he received, he is responsible to his principal
Lens, contrà.—The necessity and convenience of commerce require that his testimony should be admitted. The expediency of the thing relaxes, in this case, the ordinary rules of law.
GIBBS, C. J.-A broker may be received to prove that a contract was made ; but it is a dif
ferent case where the question is, whether the contract be properly executed. A sale may be proved by an agent from the necessity of trade; but in an action for the misconduct or negligence of a servant, such servant cannot be called to prove that there was no negligence. If the broker had no direction to purchase the best tobacco, you might call him to prove that he did purchase the best tobacco. But I reject him on the ground of his being called to prove that he was directed to purchase according to the contract, and that the tobacco was purchased in conformity with those directions.
The defendant refused to release the broker ; and the principal question, which it was intended to raise in this action, was not therefore determined.
Verdict for the plaintiffs.
The Solicitor General, Vaughan, serjeant, and Taddy for the plaintiffs.
Lens, Best, and Rough, serjeants, for the defendant.
[Attornies, Kaye and Co.--Bleasdale and Alexunder.]
Vide Green v. The New River Company, 4 T. R. 589. Miller v. Falconer, i Camp. 251. Martin v. llenrickson, 2 Ld. Raymond, 1007. S. C.
Salk. 287. The King v. Bray, Cases, tempore Hardw. 358. 3 Lev. 174.; and Gilbert's Law of Evidence, 122, &c. See likewise 15 East, 474.
STEIGLITZ and Another v. EGGINTON and Others,
EBT on an award; to which were added An authority
modo mold and hai; to execute a common counts for goods sold and delivered, &c. The defendants pleaded : 1. Non est by deed; and
if one partuer factum. 2. That they did not covenant and agree, acknowledge
that he gave &c. 3. That they did not submit themselves, &c. another part
ner authority There were other pleas, the substance of which
to execute a was the same as the foregoing.
deed for him, the presumpo tion is, that it
was a legal au. The plaintiffs were merchants at Petersburgh; thority, which
must be under and some differences having arisen between them seal and pro.
duced. An and the defendants, an agreement was entered
acknowledge into to submit to the award of Mr. Ludlam. The
sufficient agreement, which was under seal, was executed by one of the defendants for self and partner. On the part of the plaintiffs, it was executed by an agent of the name of Jonn ; but he had executed it in his own name, without stating that it was by procuration, or for the plaintiffs. A power of attorney had been given by the plaintiffs to Jonn to sign any instruments or documents relating to commercial affairs, in their names, either jointly or severally, or in the names of their attorney.
Vaughan and Parke objected to the execution. This deed may bind Jonn, but it cannot bind any other person. An attorney should execute in the name of his principal. The power of attorney is not sufficient; he must be connected with the