$133. the treaty, and interpret it accordingly. Thus, we must give to a disposition the full extent properly implied in the terms, if such appears to have been the intention of the parties; but its signification should be restrained, if it is probable that the parties at the time so understood it. 2nd. No mental reservations can be admitted. 3rd. Com mon expressions and terms are to be taken according to common custom. 4th. Technical terms, or terms proper to the arts and sciences, are generally to be interpreted according to the definition given to them by persons versed in such art or science. 5th. We should give to equivocal expressions the sense most suitable to the subject or matter to which they relate. 6th. The same term is not necessarily to be taken in the same sense wherever it appears in the same instrument. 7th. Every interpretation that leads to an absurdity should be rejected. 8th. An interpretation. that would render a treaty null and without effect should be rejected. 9th. Vague and obscure expressions should be interpreted in such a manner as to agree with the terms which are clear and without ambiguity. 10th. The whole treaty must be considered together, and an interpretation. given to each particular expression so as to agree with the tenor of the whole instrument. 11th. The words of a party should be construed in accordance with the general reasons and motives of the agreement. 12th. The interpretation may be restrictive or extensive, according to reasons and probable intention of the contracting parties. "Rutherforth, says Halleck further, has discussed this subject with his usual perspicuity and ability, but in a manner somewhat diffuse. * VATTEL. Droit des Gens. Liv. II. Chapt. 17. §§ 263–298. . XIX We will attempt but a brief outline of his remarks, referring the reader to his chapter on interpretation, the perusal of which will afford both pleasure and profit. A promise, he says, gives us a right to whatever the promiser designed or intended to make ours. But his design or intention, if it be considered merely as an act of his mind, cannot be known to anyone besides himself. When, therefore, we speak of his design or intention as the measure of our claim, we must necessarily be understood to mean the design or intention which he has made known or expressed by some outward mark; because a design or intention, which does not appear, can have no more effect, or can no more produce a claim, than a design or intention which does not exist. Hence, the way to ascertain our claims, as they arise from promises or contracts, is to collect the meaning and intention of the promiser or contractor, from some outward signs or marks. The collecting of a man's intention from such signs or marks is called interpretation." "The remarks of Dr. Paley, in his work on Moral and Political Philosophy, are well worthy of attention, being as applicable to questions of International Law as to questions in ethics. He says: Where the terms of promise admit of more senses than one, the promise is to be performed in that sense in which the promiser apprehended at the time that the promisee received it.' It is not the sense in which the promiser actually intended it, that always governs the interpretation. of an equivocal promise, because, at that rate, you might excite expectations which you never meant, nor would be obliged to satisfy. Much less is it the sense in which the promisee actually received the promise; for, according to that rule, you might be drawn into engagements which you never designed to undertake. It must, It must, therefore, be the sense, (for there is no other remaining,) in which the promiser believed that the promisee accepted the promise. This will not differ from the actual intention of the promiser, where the promise is given without collusion or reserve; but we put the rule in the above form to exclude evasion in cases in which the popular meaning of a phrase and the strict grammatical signification of the words differ; or, in general, wherever the promiser attempts to make his escape through some ambiguity in the expressions which he used. Zemures promised the garrison of Sebastia, that if they would surrender, no blood should be shed. The garrison surrendered, and Zemures buried them all alive. Now Zemures fulfilled the promise in one sense, and in the sense, too, in which he intended at the time; but not in the sense in which the garrison of Sebastia actually received it, nor in the sense in which Zemures himself knew that the garrison received it, which last sense, according to our rule, was the sense in which he was, in conscience, bound to have performed it." "Many efforts have been made by other writers to lay down precise and positive rules, and to frame formula for the various modes of interpretation. In order to facilitate this, a nomenclature of classes, modes and species of construction has been attempted, and numerous cases, actual or possible, have been resorted to for the purpose of elucidating these definitions, and of exhibiting the application of these rules. Thus, Leiber distinguishes between interpretation and construction, dividing the former into close, extensive, extravagant, limited or free, predestinated and authentic; and the latter in close, comprehensive, transcendent, and extravagant. The . XIX classifications, rules, and arbitrary formula which he has given under these heads, are more calculated to astonish and puzzle the reader, as a metaphysical curiosity, than to afford any real assistance in the interpretation or construction of treaties or laws. The same remark is applicable, in a qualified sense, to the numerous rules of the learned Domat. Others, again, as Mackelday and Phillimore, have adopted a more simple classification, and fewer and more general rules." "The best modern writers on interpretation. have confined themselves to stating the general principles which are to guide us in ascertaining the true meaning of a treaty, law or contract, avoiding all metaphysical distinctions, minute subdivision of terms and the use of arbitrary formulæ. Of this character are the rules laid down by Story, in his commentaries on the constitution of the United States. He regards some of the rules of Vattel as erroneous, but speaks in high terms of those given by Rutherforth, a summary of which is found in the preceding pages. Savigny regards the civil law rules of interpretation-which are substantially those of Domat--as affording little aid beyond that which an intelligent and dispassionate consideration of each particular case would fournish. Sedgwick thinks it 'as vain to attempt to frame positive and fixed rules of interpretation as to endeavour, in the same way, to define the mode by which the mind shall draw conclusions from testimony. Nor do I believe it easy to prescribe any system of rules of interpretation for cases of ambiguity, in written language, that will really. avail to guide the mind in the decision of doubts.' But while we fully agree with Savigny and Sedgwick, that metaphysical classifications, 133 . XIX. ] minute sub-divisions and arbitrary formulæ, are not calculated to facilitate the interpretation and construction of laws, it must not be inferred that all rules established for that purpose should be rejected. On the contrary, general rules, which restrain from latitudinarian construction, and from extravagant and false interpretation, have received the approval of the most learned jurists and most distinguished publicists of all ages. Indeed, the very necessity and importance of such rules, for the interpretation of constitutional and statutory laws, have led some authors into the extravagant nomenclature and minute classification which are here objected to. Sedgwick, notwithstanding his objection to rules, very justly remarks that there must be some general principles to control' the construction and interpretation of laws, the subject being too important to be left to the mere arbitrary discretion of the judiciary.' "And if the necessity of well-established rules for the interpretation of laws be generally admitted, it certainly will hardly be denied that such rules are equally important in connection with international jurisprudence. Some of the bloodiest wars that have been inflicted upon the human race have originated in a conflict of opinions respecting the interpretation of treaty stipulations. Moreover, it not unfrequently happens, that when one Nation seeks an excuse for quarrelling with another, or for encroaching on another's rights, some old and long forgotten treaty is brought forth from the dusty archives, or some new interpretation is introduced, with corresponding allegations of a violation of its stipulations. It is not pretended that any rules of interpretation, however complete or well established they may be, will entirely prevent such |