REMARKS

ON THE ESSAYS ON THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY AND NATURAL RELIGION, IN A LETTER TO A MINISTER OF THE CHURCH OF SCOTLAND.

REVEREND SIR:

THE intimations you have given me of the use which has, by some, been made of what I have written on the Freedom of the Will, &c., to vindicate what is said on the subject of liberty and necessity, by the author of the Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion, has occasioned my reading this author's essay on that subject, with particular care and attention. And I think it must be evident to every one, that has read both his Essay and my Inquiry, that our schemes are exceeding reverse from each other. The wide difference appears particularly in the following things.

*

This author supposes, that such a necessity takes place with respect to all' men's actions, as is inconsistent with liberty, and plainly denies that men have any liberty in acting. Thus in p. 168, after he had been speaking of the necessity of our determinations, as connected with motives, he concludes with. saying," In short, if motives are not under our power or direction, which is confessedly the fact, we can at bottom have NO LIBERTY." Whereas, I have abundantly expressed it as my mind, that man, in his moral actions, has true liberty; and that the moral necessity, which universally takes place, is not in the least inconsistent with any thing that is properly called liberty, and with the utmost liberty that can be desired, or that can possibly exist or be conceived of.‡

I find that some are apt to think, that in that kind of moral necessity of men's volitions, which I suppose to be universal, at least some degree of liberty is: denied; that though it be true I allow a sort of liberty, yet those who maintain a self-determining power in the Will, and a liberty of contingence and indifference, hold a higher sort of freedom than I do; but I think this is certainly a great mistake.

Liberty, as I have explained it, in p. 17, and other places, is the power, opportunity, or advantage, that any one has to do as he pleases, or conducting in any respect, according to his pleasure; without considering how his pleasure comes to be as it is. It is demonstrable, and, I think, has been demonstrated,. that no necessity of men's volitions that I maintain, is inconsistent with this. liberty; and I think it is impossible for any one to rise higher in his conceptions of liberty than this: if any imagine they desire higher, and that they conceive of a higher and greater liberty than this, they are deceived, and delude themselves with confused ambiguous words, instead of ideas. If any one should here say, "Yes, I conceive of a freedom above and beyond the liberty a man has of conducting in any respect as he pleases, viz., a liberty of choosing as he pleases." Such a one, if he reflected, would either blush or laugh at his own instance. For, is not choosing as he pleases, conducting, in some respect, according to his pleasure, and still without determining how he came by that pleasure? If he

P. 160, 161, 164, 165, and many other places.

↑ Inquiry, p. 17-20, 100, 101. 151–156, 163, 167, 177, 178–182

says, "Yes, I came by that pleasure by my own choice." If he be a man of common sense, by this time he will see his own absurdity; for he must needs see that his notion or conception, even of this liberty, does not contain any judgment or conception, how he comes by that choice, which first determines his pleasure, or which originally fixed his own will respecting the affair. Or if any shall say, "That a man exercises liberty in this, even in determining his own choice, but not as he pleases, or not in consequence of any choice, preference, or inclination of his own, but by a determination arising contingently out of a state of absolute indifference;" this is not rising higher in his conception of liberty; as such a determination of the Will would not be a voluntary determination of it. Surely he that places liberty in a power of doing something not according to his own choice, or from his choice, has not a higher notion of it, than he that places it in doing as he pleases, or acting from his own election. If there were a power in the mind to determine itself, but not by its choice or according to its pleasure, what advantage would it give? And what liberty, worth contending for, would be exercised in it? Therefore no Arminian, Pelagian, or Epicurean, can rise higher in his conceptions of liberty, than the notion of it which I have explained: which notion is apparently, perfectly consistent with the whole of that necessity of men's actions, which I suppose takes place. And I scruple not to say, it is beyond all their wits to invent a higher notion, or form a higher imagination of liberty; let them talk of sovereignty of the Will, selfdetermining power, self-motion, self-direction, arbitrary decision, liberty ad utrumvis, power of choosing differently in given cases, &c. &c., as long as they will. It is apparent that these men, in their strenuous affirmation and dispute about these things, aim at they know not what, fighting for something they have no conception of, substituting a number of confused, unmeaning words, instead of things, and instead of thoughts. They may be challenged clearly to explain what they would have: they never can answer the challenge.

The author of the Essays, through his whole Essay on Liberty and Necessity, goes on the supposition, that, in order to the being of real liberty, a man must have a freedom that is opposed to moral necessity; and yet he supposes, p. 175, that "such a liberty must signify a power in the mind of acting without and against motives, a power of acting without any view, purpose or design, and even of acting in contradiction to our own desires and aversions, and to all our principles of action; and is an absurdity altogether inconsistent with a rational nature. Now, who ever imagined such a liberty as this, a higher sort or degree of freedom, than a liberty of following one's own views and purposes, and acting agreeable to his own inclinations and passions? Who will ever reasonably suppose that liberty, which is an absurdity altogether inconsistent with a rational nature, to be a kind of liberty above that which is consistent with the nature of a rational, intelligent, designing agent?

The author of the Essays seems to suppose such a necessity to take place, as is inconsistent with some supposable power of arbitrary choice;* or that there is some liberty conceivable, whereby men's own actions might be more properly in their power, and by which events might be more dependent on ourselves ;‡ contrary to what I suppose to be evident in my Inquiry. What way can be imagined, of our actions being more in our power, from ourselves, or dependent on ourselves, than their being from our power to fulfil our own choice, to act from our own inclination, pursue cur own views, and execute our own designs? Certainly, to be able to act thus, is as properly having our actions in our power, ◊ P. 181, 182.

P. 169.

† P. 191, 195, 197, 206.

P. 183.

1

and dependent on ourselves, as a being liable to be the subjects of acts and events, contingently and fortuitously, without desire, view, purpose or design, or any principle of action within ourselves; as we must be according to this author's own declared sense, if our actions are performed with that liberty that is opposed to moral necessity.

This author seems everywhere to suppose, that necessity, most properly so called, attends all men's actions; and that the terms necessary, unavoidable, im possible, &c., are equally applicable to the case of moral and natural necessity. In p. 173, he says, "The idea of necessary and unavoidable, equally agrees, both to moral and physical necessity." And in p. 184, "All things that fall out in the natural and moral world are alike necessary." P. 174, "This inclination and choice is unavoidably caused or occasioned by the prevailing motive. In this lies the necessity of our actions, that, in such circumstances, it was impossible we could act otherwise." He often expresses himself in like manner elsewhere, speaking in strong terms of men's actions as unavoidable, what they cannot forbear, having no power over their own actions, the order of them being unalterably fixed and inseparably linked together, &c.*

On the contrary, I have largely declared, that the connection between an→ tecedent things and consequent ones, which takes place with regard to the acts of men's Wills, which is called moral necessity, is called by the name of necessity improperly; and that all such terms as must, cannot, impossible, unable, irresistible, unavoidable, invincible, &c., when applied here, are not applied in their proper signification, and are either used nonsensically, and with perfect insignifi cance, or in a sense quite diverse from their original and proper meaning, and their use in common speech; and, that such a necessity as attends the acts of men's Wills, is more properly called certainty, than necessity; it being no other than the certain connection between the subject and predicate of the proposition which affirms their existence.

Agreeably to what is observed in my Inquiry, I think it is evidently owing to a strong prejudice in persons' minds, arising from an insensible, habitual perversion and misapplication of such like terms as necessary, impossible, unable, unavoidable, invincible, &c., that they are ready to think, that to suppose a certain connection of men's volitions, without any foregoing motives or inclinations, or any preceding moral influence whatsoever, is truly and properly to suppose such a strong, irrefragable chain of causes and effects, as stands in the way of, and makes utterly vain, opposite desires and endeavors, like immovable and impenetrable mountains of brass; and impedes our liberty like walls of adamant, gates of brass, and bars of iron: whereas, all such representations suggest ideas as far from the truth, as the east is from the west. Nothing that I maintain, supposes that men are at all hindered by any fatal necessity, from doing, and even willing and choosing as they please, with full freedom; yea, with the highest degree of liberty that ever was thought of, or that ever could possibly enter into the heart of any man to conceive. I know it is in vain to endeavor to make some persons believe this, or at least fully and steadily to believe it; for if it be demonstrated to them, still the old prejudice remains, which has been long fixed by the use of the terms necessary, must, cannot, impossible, &c.; the association with these terms of certain ideas, inconsistent with iberty, is not broken; and the judgment is powerfully warped by it, as a thing that has been long bent and grown stiff, if it be straightened, wil return to its former curvity again and again.

VOL. II.

P. 180, 188, 193, 194, 195, 197, 198, 399, 205, 206.

24

The author of the Essays most manifestly supposes that if men had the truth concerning the real necessity of all their actions clearly in view, they would not appear to themselves, or one another, as at all praiseworthy or culpable, or under any moral obligation, or accountable for their actions; which supposes, that men are not to be blamed or praised for any of their actions, and are not under any obligations, nor are truly accountable for any thing they do, by reason of this necessity; which is very contrary to what I have endeavored to prove, throughout the third part of my Inquiry. I humbly conceive it is there shown, that this is so far from the truth, that the moral necessity of men's actions, which truly take place, is requisite to the being of virtue and vice, or any thing praiseworthy or culpable: that the liberty of indifference and contingence, which is advanced in opposition to that necessity, is inconsistent with the being of these; as it would suppose that men are not determined in what they do, by any virtuous or vicious principles, nor act from any motives, intentions or aims whatsoever; or have any end, either good or bad, in acting. And is it not remarkable, that this author should suppose, that, in order to men's actions truly having any desert, they must be performed without any view, purpose, design, or desire, or any principle of action, or any thing agreeable to a rational nature? As it will appear that he does, if we compare p. 206, 207, with p. 175.

The author of the Essays supposes, that God has deeply implanted in man's nature, a strong and invincible apprehension or feeling, as he calls it, of a liberty and contingence, of his own actions, opposite to that necessity which truly attends them; and which in truth does not agree with real fact,† is not agreeable to strict, philosophic truth, is contradictory to the truth of things, and which truth contradicts,|| not tallying with the real plan; and that therefore such feelings are deceitful,** are in reality of the delusive kind. He speaks of them as a wise delusion,‡‡ as nice, artificial feelings, merely that conscience may have a commanding power ;§§ meaning plainly, that these feelings are a cunning artifice of the Author of Nature, to make men believe they are free, when they are not. He supposes that, by these feelings, the moral world has a disguised appearance. And other things of this kind he says. He supposes that all self-approbation, and all remorse of conscience, all commendation or condemnation of ourselves or others, all sense of desert, and all that is connected with this way of thinking, all the ideas which at present are suggested by the words ought, should, arise from this delusion, and would entirely vanish vithout it.*+

All which is very contrary to what I have abundantly insisted on and endeavored to demonstrate in my Inquiry, where I have largely shown that it is agreeable to the natural sense of mankind, that the moral necessity or certainty that attends men's actions, is consistent with praise and blame, reward and punishment ;* and that it is agreeable to our natural notions, that moral evil, with its desert of dislike and abhorrence, and all its other ill-deservings, consists in a certain deformity in the nature of the dispositions and acts of the heart, and not in the evil of something else, diverse from these, supposed to be their cause or occasion.*

I might well ask here, whether any one is to be found in the world of mankind, who is conscious to a sense or feeling, naturally and deeply rooted in hu mind, that in order to a man's performing any action that is praise or blame

*P. 207, 209, and other places. + P. 200. P. 152. § P. 183. **P. 203, 204, 211. tt P. 183. P. 209. SS P. 211. III P. 153. 199, 205, 206, 209. *Inquiry, Part IV. Sect. 4, throughout.

throughout, and p. 174, 175.

|| P. 186. T P. 203 ¶¶ 214. *† P. 160, 194 * Idem, Part IV. Sect I

worthy, he must exercise a liberty that implies and signifies a power of acting without any motive, view, design, desire or principle of action? For such a liberty, this author supposes that must be which is opposed to moral necessity, as I have already observed once and again. Supposing a man should actually do good, independent of desire, aim, inducement, principle or end, is it a dictate of invincible, natural sense, that his act is more meritorious or praiseworthy, than if he had performed it for some good end, and had been governed in it by good principles and motives? And so I might ask on the contrary, with respect to evil actions.*

The author of the Essays supposes that the liberty without necessity, which we have a natural feeling of, implies contingence; and speaking of this contingence, he sometimes calls it by the name of chance. And it is evident that his notion of it, or rather what he says about it, implies things happening loosely, fortuitously, by accident, and without a cause.* Now I conceive the slightest reflection may be sufficient to satisfy any one that such a contingence of men's actions, according to our natural sense, is so far from being essential to the morality or merit of those actions, that it would destroy it; and that, on the contrary, the dependence of our actions on such causes as inward inclinations, incitements and ends, is essential to the being of it. Natural sense teaches men, when they see any thing done by others of a good or evil tendency, to inquire what their intention was; what principles and views they were moved by, in order to judge how far they are to be justified or condemned; and not to determine, that in order to their being approved or blamed at all, the action must be performed altogether fortuitously, proceeding from nothing, arising from no cause. Concerning this matter I have fully expressed my mind in the Inquiry.

If the liberty which we have a natural sense of as necessary to desert, consists in the mind's self-determination, without being determined by previous inclination or motive, then indifference is essential to it, yea, absolute indifference, as is observed in my Inquiry. But men naturally have no notion of any such liberty as this, as essential to the morality, or demerit of their actions; but, on the contrary, such a liberty, if it were possible, would be inconsistent with our natural notions of desert, as is largely shown in the Inquiry. If it be agreeable to natural sense, that men must be indifferent in determining their own actions, then, according to the same, the more they are determined by inclination, either good or bad, the less they have of desert. The more good actions are performed from good dispositions, the less praiseworthy; and the more evil deeds are from evil dispositions, the less culpable; and in general, the more men's actions are from their hearts, the less they are to be commended or condemned; which all must know is very contrary to natural sense.

Moral necessity is owing to the power and government of the inclination of the heart, either habitual or occasional, excited by motive; but according to natural and common sense, the more a man does any thing with full inclination of heart, the more is it to be charged to his account for his condemnation if it be an ill action, and the more to be ascribed to him for his praise, if t be good.

If the mind were determined to evil actions by contingence, from a state of indifference, then either there would be no fault in them, or else the fault would be in being so perfectly indifferent, that the mind was equally liable to a bad or good determination. And if this influence be liberty, then the very essence of the blame or fault would lie in the liberty itself, or the wickedness would, primarily and summarily, lie in being a free agent. If there were no fault in

See this matter illustrated in my Inquiry, Part IV. Sect. 4. t P. 156-159, 177, 178, 181, 183-185.