The connexion between the decay of home life and the growth of divorce is not perceived by all Americans, and was questioned by a witness, Mr Barratt (vol. ii, pp. 187, 188), who, however, seemed to admit it so far as the rich are concerned. The same witness (vol. ii, pp. 172. 173) complained that it had been formerly represented that one marriage in twelve ended in divorce, but tha the figures on which this statement had been founde were wrong in consequence of non-registration of many marriages. But the error does not affect the comparison of divorces with population, which alone is relied on in the Minority Report. This comparison is sufficiently portentous; and we need not concern ourselves with correetions which relate to some entirely different statistics.

The chief lesson of American experience is not to be obscured by points of this nature. The facts which are material and are not challenged are these-divorces easily obtained on the grounds recommended by the Majority Report; a very great and rapidly-growing divorce rate; and a general unsettlement of family life. While we listen with respect to the common, perhaps prevalent, American opinion, that divorce is a popularand firmly established institution' (vol. ii, p. 158), an that, whatever is amiss with family life in the States i not to be traced to divorce but to other causes, it seems unreasonable to exclude it as at least one efficient factor of the forces at work. But the point of importance to us at the present time is to note that divorce has certainly failed in the States to do what its advocates predict it will do in England, namely, foster family life, raise 'the standard of morality,' and increase 'regard for the sanctity of marriage' (Rep., p. 96). America is in this respect like every other country where divorce has been freely granted The Minority Report (p. 175) states that

'no witness has been able to tell us of a country where, as the result of greater facilities for the dissolution of marriage. public morality has been promoted, the ties of family, of husband and wife, of parents and children, have been strengthened, and home life has been made purer and more settled.'

Art. 12.-THE STRATEGY OF THE BALKAN WAR.

SINCE the period of the Napoleonic wars, the steady growth of population, the rise in material prosperity, the development of agriculture, industries, communications, buildings and enclosures, have all combined to alter profoundly the face of Western and Central Europe. But the general condition of European Turkey remains what it was a hundred or five hundred years ago. From the point of view of military science this is to be regretted, for we all want to know what modern European warfare really means. We want to know how the enormous changes in material civilisation, which have taken place in the last century, are going to affect the conduct of warlike operations, for affect them they certainly will. And yet we are little wiser than we were before this Balkan War, for the campaign has been fought in a region where Napoleon, if he were brought to life again, would find little in the landscape to surprise him.

Now, in studying a theatre of war, the features which normally attract the strategist's attention are, first, communications, the road and railway systems; secondly, natural obstacles, the mountains, rivers, marshes, forests and enclosures; thirdly, the resources in the way of food; lastly, the nature of the inhabitants and their habitations. Bearing these points in mind, look at a map of European Turkey. Few railways, few roads; a mountainous country; few towns, few ports; the land apparently undeveloped and therefore probably poor. So it is, very poor; not that the soil is barren or Nature unkind, but that the country is thinly populated, and, where there are few cultivators, the crops will be small. Moreover, during the long years of Turkish maladministration, there have been few markets, great difficulties of intercourse and transport, little or no security. The inhabitants have therefore been accustomed to sow just enough to satisfy their own requirements and those of the Turkish tax-collectors, and no more. Except, then, that after the autumn harvest stores laid in for winter consumption might be commandeered, there is normally no surplus, nothing to spare for invading or defending armies. Armies operating anywhere in European Turkey

must therefore carry all, or nearly all, their own suppli and this means increased strain upon, increased portance of, the roads and railways.

about the dista

From sea to sea, the northern frontier of Tur measures more than 600 miles from London to John o' Groat's. Only two raily cross that frontier, one from Sofia to Constantin the other from Nish to Salonica. Join these by the line which skirts the Aegean coast; run o branch from Uskub to Mitrovitza, another from Salo to Monastir, a third, recently constructed, from Baba to Kirk Kilisseh-and that completes the rail system of European Turkey. All the lines are single all of the same gauge; there are no main repair-sl factories or depots; and the normal service was passenger train and one or two goods trains so that the amount of rolling stock available was sm

So much for the railways. What about the r The road system was taken over from their predece by the Turks when they conquered the country i 14th and 15th centuries; and, for all practical pur what it was then so it has remained. Spasmodic att at reform have led to patchwork repair in places strategical considerations to a capricious rather consistent development of communications in sc the frontier areas. The writer, for instance surprised to find last winter a new and well-const cart-road running over the mountains between F and Veria (Karaferia); and the Greeks who used it i advance upon Salonica were perhaps no less plea surprised. In general, roads in the map mark more than the lines which the roads used to follow route is fit for vehicles at all, the driver more often his path alongside the ancient roadway than upon i

Next, as to the natural obstacles. From the Bla westwards as far as the watershed between the A and the Adriatic seas-that is as far as the natur neither ethnical nor administrative frontier of Alb the general slope and the trend of the rivers and v and therefore of the main communications, is north to south-a fact to be noted, because it faci invasion from the north. From the military p view the rivers are not serious obstacles in them