sulted from them, attracted the attention of parliament; and in the act called the petition of right, passed in the third year of the reign of Charles the first, it was enacted, that no person should be kept in custody, in consequence of such imprisonments.

But the judges knew how to evade the intention of this act: they indeed did not refuse to discharge a man imprisoned without a cause; but they used so much delay in the examination of the causes, that they obtained the full effect of an open denial of justice.

The legislature again interposed, and in the act passed in the sixteenth year of the reign of Charles the first, the same in which the star-chamber was suppressed, it was enacted, that "if any person be committed by the king himself in person, or by his privy council, or by any of the members thereof, he shall have granted unto him, without any delay, upon any pretence whatsoever, a writ of habeas corpus; and that the judge shall thereupon, within three court days after the return is made, examine and determine the legality of such imprisonment."

This act seemed to preclude every possibility of future evasion: yet it was evaded still; and, by the connivance of the judges, the person who detained the prisoner could without danger, wait for a second, and a third writ, called an alias and a pluries, before he produced him.

All these different artifices gave at length birth to the famous act of habeas corpus, passed in the thirtieth year of the reign of Charles the second, which in England is considered as a second great charter, and has definitely suppressed all the resources of oppression.a

The principal articles of this act are, to fix the different terms allowed for bringing up a prisoner: those terms are proportioned to the distance; and none can in any case exceed twenty days.

2. That the officer and keeper neglecting to make due returns, or not delivering to the prisoner, or his agent, within six hours after demand, a copy of the warrant of commitment, or shifting the custody of the prisoner from one to another, without sufficient reason or authority, specified in the act, shall for the first offence forfeit one

a The real title of the act is, An act for better securing the subject, and for prevention of imprisonments beyond the seas.

hundred pounds, and for the second, two hundred, to the party grieved, and be disabled to hold his office.

3. No person, once delivered by habeas corpus, shall be recommitted for the same offence, under penalty of five hundred pounds.

4. Every person committed for treason or felony shall, if he require it in the first week of the next term, or the first day of the next session, be indicted in that term or session, or else admitted to bail, unless the king's witnesses cannot be produced at that time: and if not indicted and tried in the second term or session, he shall be discharged of his imprisonment for such imputed offence.

5. Any of the twelve judges, or the lord chancellor, who shall deny a writ of habeas corpus, on sight of the warrant, or on oath that the same is refused, shall forfeit seve rally to the party grieved five hundred pounds.

6. No inhabitant of England, except persons contracting, or convicts praying to be transported, shall be sent prisoner to Scotland, Ireland, Jersey, Guernsey, or any place beyond the seas, within or without the king's dominions, on pain, that the party committing, his advisers, aiders, and assistants, shall forfeit to the party grieved a sum not less than five hundred pounds, to be recovered with treble costs; shall be disabled to bear any office of trust or profit; shall incur the penalty of a præmunire,“ and be incapable of the king's pardon.

The statutes of præmunire, thus called from the writ for their execution, which begins with the words preımunire (for premonere) facias, were originally designed to oppose the usurpations of the popes. The first was passed under the reign of Edward the first, and has been followed by several others, which, even before the reformation, established provisions of such a nature, as to draw upon one of them the epithet of execrabile statutum. The offences against which those statutes were framed, were also distinguished by the appellation of præmunire; and under that word were included in general all attempts to promote the pope's authority at the expence of the king's. The punishment decreed for such cases, was called a præmunire: it has since been extended again to several other kinds of offence, and amounts to "the imprisonment for life, and forfeiture of all goods and rents of lands during life." See Blackstone's Com. book iv. ch. s.

We have seen, in former chapters, the resources allotted to the different parts of the English government for balancing each other, and how their reciprocal actions and reactions produce the freedom of the constitution, which is no more than an equilibrium between the ruling powers of the state. I now propose to shew, that the particular nature and functions of these same constituent parts of the government, which give it so different an appearance from that of other free states, are moreover attended with peculiar and very great advantages, which have not hitherto been sufficiently observed.

The first peculiarity of the English government, as a free government, is its having a king,—its having thrown into one place the whole mass, if I may use the expression, of the executive power, and having invariably and for ever fixed it there. By this very circumstance, also, has the depositum of it been rendered sacred and inexpugnable. By making one great, very great, man in the state, has an effectual check been put to the pretensions of those who otherwise would strive to become such, and disorders have been prevented, which, in all republics, ever brought on the ruin of liberty, and before it was lost, obstructed the enjoyment of it.

If we cast our eyes on all the states that ever were free, we shall see that the people in them, ever turning their jealousy, as it was natural, against the executive power, but never thinking of the means of limiting it that has so happily taken place in England, have never employed

a The rendering that power dependent on the people for its supplies. See on this subject chapier VI. book I.

any other expedient besides that obvious one, of trusting that power to magistrates whom they appointed annually; which was in great measure to keep to themselves the management of it. Whence it resulted, that the people, who, whatever may be the frame of the government, always possess, after all, the reality of power, uniting thus in themselves with this reality of power the actual exercise of it, in form as well as in fact, constituted the whole state. In order, therefore, legally to disturb the whole state, nothing more was requisite than to put in motion a certain number of individuals.

In a state which is small and poor, an arrangement of this kind is not attended with any great inconveniences, as every individual is taken up with the care of providing for his own subsistence, as great objects of ambition are wanting, and as evils cannot, in such a state, ever become much complicated. In a state that strives for aggrandisement, the difficulties and danger attending the pursuit of such a plan, inspire a general spirit of caution, and every individual makes a sober use of his rights as a citizen.

But when, at last, those exterior motives come to cease, and the passions, and even the virtues, which they excited, thus become reduced to a state of inaction, the people turn their eyes back towards the interior of the republic, and every individual, in seeking then to concern himself in all affairs, seeks for new objects that may restore him to that state of exertion, which habit, he finds, has rendered necessary to him, and to exercise a power which, small as it is, yet flatters his vanity.

As the preceding events cannot but have given an influence to a certain number of citizens, they avail themselves of the general disposition of the people, to promote their private views: the legislative power is thenceforth continually in motion; and as it is ill informed and falsely directed, almost every exertion of it is attended with some injury either to the laws, or the state.

This is not all; as those who compose the general assemblies cannot, in consequence of their numbers, entertain any hopes of gratifying their private ambition, or, in general, their private passions, they at least seek to gratify their political caprices, and they accumulate the honours

and dignities of the state on some favourite whom the public voice happens to raise at that time.

But, as in such a state there can be, from the irregularity of the determinations of the people, no such thing as a settled course of measures, it happens that men never can exactly tell the present state of public affairs. The power thus given away is already grown very great, before those by whom it was given so much as suspect it; and he himself who enjoys that power, does not know its full extent: but then, on the first opportunity that offers, he suddenly pierces through the cloud which hid the summit from him, and at once seats himself upon it. The people, on the other hand, no sooner recover sight of him, than they see their favourite become their master, and discover the evil, only to find that it is past remedy.

As this power, thus surreptitiously acquired, is destitute of the support both of the law, and of the ancient course of things, and is even but indifferently respected by those who have subjected themselves to it, it cannot be maintained but by abusing it. The people at last succeed in forming somewhere a centre of union; they agree in the choice of a leader; this leader in his turn rises; in his turn also he betrays his engagements; power produces its wonted effects, and the protector becomes a tyrant.

This is not all; the same causes which have given a master to the state, give it two, give it three. All those rival powers endeavour to swallow up each other; the state becomes a scene of quarrels and endless broils, and is in a continual convulsion.

If amidst such disorders the people retained their freedom, the evil must indeed be very great, to take away all the advantages of it; but they are slaves, and yet have not what in other countries makes amends for political servitude, I mean tranquillity.

In order to prove all these things, if proofs were deemed necessary, I would only refer the reader to what every one knows of Pisistratus and Megacles, of Marius and Sylla, of Cæsar and Pompey. However, I cannot avoid translating a part of the speech which a citizen of Florence addressed once to the senate: the reader will find in it a kind of abridged story of all republics; at least of those which, by the share allowed to the people in the government, de