ADVERTISEMENT.

THE following Letters arose out of a conversation held in London between the Rev. H. E. Manning, the Rev. F. Meyrick, and others. The Rev. F. Meyrick maintained that the teaching of S. Alfonso Liguori's Moral Theology was immoral in many respects, specifying in particular his doctrines of Theft and Equivocation. With regard to the first of these, he asserted that it would result from Liguori's teaching that the sin of a conscious thief would still be mortal or venial, according to the amount which he appropriated and the person from whom he stole in such sense, that a man standing between a nobleman and a commoner, and having the same disposition of mind towards each, would be guilty of a mortal or venial sin, according as he stretched out his right hand, or his left, and stole a certain sum (say 4s.) from one or the other; and he further argued that this introduction of the Quantitative Principle made the guilt of an act of Theft, so far, to depend upon something external, instead of upon the frame of

mind of the agent. With respect to the last, he maintained that Liguori's theory of Equivocation was incompatible with Truthfulness. The Rev. H. E. Manning objected to both these positions, and the following morning left a volume of the Homo Apostolicus at the house at which the conversation had taken place, requesting the Rev. F. Meyrick to read certain chapters, and offering "to explain any difficulties that he might have, if he would write to him on the subject." In consequence of this request and proposal, the Rev. F. Meyrick wrote the first letter, which, it will be seen, refers to the points which had been under discussion.

The correspondence took place, it is believed, without any kind of ill-feeling on either side, and is now published with the assent of both parties, as a contribution towards a subject which is deservedly beginning, more and more, to draw attention towards itself—the Moral Theology of the Church of Rome.

July 26, 1855.

LETTER I.

Rev. F. MEYRICK to Rev. H. E. MANNING.

My dear Sir,

Blickling, July 15, 1853.

You were kind enough to leave the volume of Liguori, containing the passages of which we had been speaking, and to offer to explain any difficulties that I might have about them.

Would you, then, kindly tell me if the following is Liguori's theory of theft, as laid down in Tract x. cap. 2? That a certain quantity of matter is required to make theft a mortal sin— that this quantity is greater or smaller according to the state of the owner from whom the theft is made-that in the case of a beggar, a sufficient quantity is one real, of a labourer, two reals, of an artizan, three reals, &c. of a nobleman, one scudo, &c.? Might not, then, a theft of the same amount be a mortal sin if the owner were a commoner, a venial sin if the owner were a nobleman? And is not the guilt of the act made to depend upon something external, not upon the frame of mind of the agent?

Again, would you explain the assertion that a wife may support her previous children out of her husband's goods against his will, and spend something under the twentieth of his income on alms and gifts.-Tract x. 2. 33. And that a nobleman in extreme distress may steal if he is ashamed to beg.-x. 2. 15. And that a servant may compensate himself for a salary remarkably too small. vii. 3. 10. And that a rich man's son may steal from his father three scudi, without grave sin. And that a prince's son commits only a venial sin if he steal from his father anything under fifty scudi.-x. 2. 32. And that a monk is guilty of only a venial sin if he steals any sum less than four scudi from the monastery. In what manner can these cases be reconciled with the principles of morality with which they seem to conflict?

B

On the subject of Amphibology and Truthfulness, I should like to have pointed out the difference between falsehood and non-pure mental reservation.-v. 2. 15. Are not the conditions of an oath such as would make it unnecessary to keep almost any oath ?-v. 2. 18. Is not the same true of vows ?-v. 3. Does not the easy bestowal of dispensations take away all security for the observance of pledges? Can promises be counted important? -x. 2. 127. or secrets secure ?—xi. 3. 9. Does " ex capite meo hoc erui, æquivocando, quia omnia verba e mente, pro quâ accipitur caput, procedunt," or "mentitus sum,' quia omne peccatum est fallacia et mendacium," mend the moral untruth? Are any one of the four answers put into the mouth of an unfaithful wife truthful? 1. Non fregisse matrimonium. 2. She had not committed adultery, because she had not committed idolatry. 3. Innocens sum ab hoc crimine. 4. Non commisi. Is a seducer on promise of marriage not bound to keep his promise (although the victim did not know of any disparity) because he is longè nobilior?-x. 3. 93.

I am, dear Sir,
Yours faithfully,

F. MEYRICK.

LETTER II.

Rev. H. E. MANNING to Rev. F. MEYRICK.

25, Chapel Street, Grosvenor Square, July 20, 1853. My dear Sir,

As it is S. Alphonso who is on his trial, it is just that he should be allowed to speak for himself in his own words. I will therefore begin by referring to the principles which he presupposes in the chapter De Furto.

In the Treatise de actibus humanis et peccatis, (Tract iii. c. 2. 4.) he says, "Peccatum mortale est illud quod privat hominem divinâ gratiâ quæ est anima vitæ, et ideo dicitur mortale. Veniale est quod non privat gratiâ, sed minuit caritatem, &c."

If this distinction be really admitted, I believe most of the supposed difficulties will disappear.

According to Catholic Theology, a soul in mortal sin is spiritually dead. Although in the mercy of God it still continues to be the subject of actual grace, it is deprived of habitual, or sanctifying grace; and is thereby under the power of eternal death. Mortal sin deprives the soul of the grace of charity, i. e. of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, by which it is united with God; and the loss of this grace separates the soul from God.