which he brings to us; for, otherwise, we treat him as an impoftor, as a meffenger that does not come from GOD, when the judgement of our reafon is, that he does come from him; which is abfurd. After the ambassador is received, and his credentials admitted, it would be madness to object to the embaffy, as not coming from him from whom it is fent, because the matter of it is unpleafing to you. In the cafe of a revelation, if the credentials of the mesfenger are fufficiently established, the revelation which he communicates muft come from GOD; and, if it comes from him, cannot be rejected. But you fay, God does not require it of you to believe what contradicts your reafon : you ought rather to fay, GOD does not require it of you to receive a meffenger as from him who does not bring with him a fufficient teftimony of his divine miffion; but, if he does bring with him that teftimony, he requires it of you, that you fhould believe him; and, if you are to believe him, what the purport of the message may be, whether fuch as your reafon approves or difapproves, is altogether foreign to the queftion. It comes from God, and therefore is true, and therefore must be implicitly received. It must be remembered, that GOD, when he makes a revelation to us, fubmits all that is neceffary to the judgement of our reason. The perfon by whom he communicates it to us is to be scrutinized to the utmoft: we are to examine, with all the powers ( 135 ) powers we have, whether he really does come from GoD, or not; and, if the examination terminates in an affurance, that he really is a man of GoD, that the miracles which he does are fuch as no man could do except GoD were with him; and, in the words of St. Peter, if he be a man approved among us by the figns and wonders and miracles which GoD worketh in our prefence by him, then reafon has all the fatisfaction given it that it can require. It is conftituted the judge. Its judgement is appealed to, and it is fuffered to determine according to the evidence before it. What more after this hath reafon to require? Shall we dare to fit in judgement over the meffage which GOD fends to us? Shall we have the arrogance to pronounce it unworthy of GoD inconfiftent with our reafon, and inadmiffible, on account of its abfurdity? What impiety! and what folly alfo! Such language as this which we hear but too too often, is not only a most flagitious attack on the truth of God himself, (for, by admitting the meffenger, we admit the meffage to come from GOD;) but it is as foolith as it is flagitious. It is playing the fool with the judgement of reafon. It is fetting up the judgement of reafon against the judgement of reason. It is establishing truth, and fighting with it as if it was a falfehood. It is the ultimate teft of the truth of a meffage as coming from Gon, by the conformity of the particular terms of the meffage with our judgement. Of what use are miracles? Why is the meffenger endowed with fupernatural K 4 ་ powers? powers? These in him are all a useless parade; for, whether he exerts, or does not exert them, we shall pay no regard to them. Our judgement will be formed from the message which he brings to us, and from nothing else; for, were he to establish the certainty of his divine miffion in the most irrefragable manner, it would be of no avail; the matter which he should communicate to us, if it met not with our approbation would condemn him for an impoftor. This was the principle which governed the Jews in the crucifixion of our LORD. His miracles and mighty works they paid no regard to, although he had done fo many before them, yet would they not believe on him, but, judging from his doctrine, which was fo oppofite to their prejudices and expectations, they condemned him to death as an impoftor, who had given fuch mighty evidence of his being true, and of his having "come out from "GOD." Moreover, let it be confidered, that if the judgement of our reason on the matter communicated to us is the only criterion of a revelation from GoD, we may call any thing a revelation from him if it happens to meet with our approbation; and then Socrates and Plato, and an hundred others who knew not GOD, may be faid to have had divine miffions from him. To fuch extreme abfurdities fhall we be driven if we make the matter revealed, and its conformity with with our judgement the ultimate test of the revelation! Moft certain is what we so often hear urged, that' GOD requires of no man to believe what in every respect contradicts the reason which he has given him, and therefore he does not require it of us to believe the revelation merely on the ground of its own internal evidence. What he requires of us is to believe the teftimony of the perfon whom he divinely commiffions and fends to us; and this we cannot refufe to do without a manifeft contradiction to our reason, if he brings with him fuch credentials as establish him to have a divine miffion. But, if we believe him we believe the revelation alfo which he brings with him, and we believe it on his authority, fo that the internal congruity of our minds, with the matter revealed, is not the ground of our faith, but the authority of the perfon by whom it is communicated to us. His authority affures us, that truth only can come from him, and therefore we acquiefce with what he communicates to us as truth, without bringing it to any farther teft or examination, being perfuaded that, as it comes from GoD, it must be true, although we may not be able to demonftrate its truth in all its parts with that clearness and perfpicuity which attend us in our demonstration of things purely terreftrial. I I have I have been the more particular, and dwelt the longer upon this fubject, becaufe the principal objections to our LORD's Divinity are derived from the doctrine's not being entirely conformable with our common way of thinking and reafoning; and the objections certainly would be valid if the doctrine had been communicated to us by an unauthorized perfon. But, as that is not the cafe, as the doctrine is not propofed to us as a problem which we are to folve, but is propofed to us for our acquiefcence with it as a communication from the GoD of Truth, by perfons divinely authorized for that purpose, therefore all objections from the nature of the doctrine are futile and frivolous. Our primary idea, and that which must take the lead in all our enquiries upon fubjects of this nature is, that all communications from the GoD of Truth muft be, true. Hence the whole of the matter will turn upon this fingle queftion. Is the doctrine, or is it not, a communication from GOD? If the New Teftament is a divine revelation, and the doctrine is there, then undoubtedly it comes from God, and is true? If it is not a divine revelation, then have we no other authority to appeal to for the truth of the doctrine; therefore, the oppofers of the Divinity of the Son of GoD, if they would act confiftently, and juftify themfelves in this oppofition, fhould either totally deftroy the whole credit of the New Teftament as a divine revelation, or they fhould prove fa |