probably will, if it has no other ground for its truth than what the approbation of reason gives it. But, if the unity of GOD is a truth, it must rest upon fome other and certain bafis, upon a bafis which will not admit of being disturbed by new lights and new discoveries; a basis, which will support it unfhaken through all the fluctuations of time and circumftances. Upon fuch it certainly does reft; for, heaven has revealed it to us to be a truth; no new lights therefore can operate upon the mind in this cafe: it is a truth, a revealed truth, and unalterable as its great Author. As then our primary idea of the Divinity is actual truth, because fixed on the firm basis of revelation; fo, if we reafon juftly, will our deductions from it be true likewise. But, in our reasoning from this great fubject, the utmost caution is to be applied, that we do not derive confequences from it which it will not justify, that we do not reject a farther revelation of the nature of GOD from a presumption of its being inconfiftent with his divine unity; for, it is impoffible that a revelation from GOD, with regard to the Divine Nature, can be inconfiftent with the Divine Unity; and therefore, if there appears to be any inconfiftency in it, the inconfiftency must be in our apprehenfion, which we muft endeavour to rectify, but not in the revelation. Let Let it be remembered, that the revelation of GOD's unity is not a revelation of the whole of the divine nature; it is a revelation of only one point, and therefore a subsequent revelation may communicate to us what is not comprehended under this one point, and more than we poffibly can derive from it by our reasoning powers. The nature of GOD, until made known to us by the light of revelation, is like an unexplored region, of whofe quality and productions we know nothing; affured we may be of its existence, but of what belongs to it we can know nothing, until the traveller, who has explored it, fhall have given us the neceffary information. Affured we are, because it is a revealed truth,of the existence of God, and that there is but one GoD only; but of his nature, and being, what can we say, unless guided by a divine light? Reafon can infer nothing from the unity of God, with regard to his effential nature. Let an argument be framed: GOD is only one, therefore his effential nature is-What? Therefore, his effential nature is unity; but what is this? this is only making the inference the fame as the premifes; GOD is one, 'therefore he is one. But the queftion is, what is the effential nature of God? and this cannot be inferred from his unity; that is, no inference from his unity will inform us. Our intelligence, therefore, muft come to us from revelation; and, if it comes to us from revelation, we know, and are affured, that it is actual truth, however it may not, in fome in ftances, ftances, mect with the direct approbation of our reafon. Under the various fluctuations of the human mind, reason will often vary from the truth; experience affures us of it; experience affures us, that it may fo vary from it, as to esteem what is actual truth to be an abfurdity, and impoffible. And, therefore, a revelation, even if it fhould not meet with the direct approbation of our reafon, is not to be rejected merely on that account; for, it may be actual truth notwithstanding. The truth of a revelation refts not at all on the accord of our natural reafon with the matter revealed; but on the authority with which the revelation is communicated to us; and, if that authority is fufficiently established, it will be useless to oppose the matter revealed with an outcry of abfurdity and con→ tradiction; we may as well oppofe matters of fact with the fame outcry. How abfurd, how contrary to our reafon, docs it appear to be, that any human beings fhould make a beverage of their own faliva, and be happy in intoxicating themselves with it! and yet fuch is the evidence of fact attefted by eye-witneffes of it. We do not canvas this on the ground of probability or abfurdity; we do not make either the standard of the truth of the fact. The evidence of the eye-witness who attefts it fuperfedes all difcuffion; and it is his evidence alone which makes us receive as a truth what otherwise we should think incredible. As then fuch is the conduct of the human human mind in general, that it admits and receives the fact on the authenticity of the evidence by which it is supported; as its general mode of proceeding is to judge of the truth of the fact by the authenticity of the evidence, and not to argue the incompetency of the evidence from the nature of the fact; why are we to proceed in a different manner, when a subject of so high a nature as the being of GoD is concerned? If the authority with which the revelation is communicated to us is once fufficiently established, it fuperfedes all difcuffion; the matter revealed is juftified to be the truth, because the authority with which it is communicated to us is fufficiently eftablished; therefore it is true, because we know it to be a revelation. But the argument would be prepofterous, to fay, therefore, the fufficiently-authorised revelation is no revelation, nor true, because our reafon doth not approve the matter revealed. Prior to the communication of the revelation, reafon hath determined that the revelation from the GOD of truth must be true, therefore the matter revealed must be true also. The certainty of the revelation is the teft of the truth of the matter revealed, not the matter revealed the teft of the revelation. But it has been faid, and ftrangely faid too, that reason is unquestionably the first revelation of GOD to man; and hence it has been inferred, that rea fon any fon is to be the judge of the revelation, whether it comes from GOD, or otherwife. The premifes are abfurd; for, reason is no more a revelation than other power of the mind, or than fight and hearing, whereby we diftinguish founds and colours; they are all gifts, endowments from GOD to his creatures; but, to call either of them a revelation is infinitely ridiculous. The inference (let the premises be what they will) is partly true and partly falfe; for, reafon certainly is to be exercised in enquiring and determining whether a revelation comes from God, or not; wherein its firft operation is to ascertain whether the person who communicates it hath a divine miffion: if the refult is, that he certainly doth not appear to have any fuch divine miffion, then unqueftionably whatever his pretended revelation may be, reason will reject it as a revelation: but, if the result is, that he certainly hath a divine miffion, and that God hath fent him to communicate a revelation to us, then reason is neceffarily called upon to admit and to receive that revelation, because it comes from GOD. After then it is established, that the person communicating hath a divine miffion, and that the end of his miffion is to communicate to us a revelation from GOD; what hath reafon farther to do? is it to canvas and fift the matter revealed in order to find flaws in it? But the exercife of reafon, in order to find flaws in what reafon hath acknowledged to be a revelation from GoD, is the exercife of folly; it is to undo with one hand what you have done with the |