which are committed against him; but this must always be considered as subject to one condition, the repentance of the offender; for otherwise this attribute would undo and defeat all the rest; for a perfect facility of unconditional forgiveness would prove such an excuse for great wickedness, as would fill the world with misery and disorder. But placability, such as is consistent with the order of a moral governor studious for the happiness of the whole, is ascribed to God in both Testaments. It was not unknown to the Old, and the New is full of it; the 13th chapter of Ezekiel is direct as to the first: "If the wicked will turn from all his sins that he hath committed, and keep all my statutes, and do that which is lawful and right, he shall surely live, he shall not die; all his transgressions that he hath committed, they shall not be mentioned unto himin his righteousness that he hath done he shall live. Have I any pleasure that the wicked should die, saith the Lord God, and not that he should return from his ways and live?" The New Testament is full of it: Christ came to preach repentance and remission of sins, to seek and to save that which was lost-his baptism was the baptism of repentance-the great offer that both Christ and his apostles held out to the converts was forgiveness of the sins which were past, and faith and amendment. The 5th chapter of Saint Luke sets forth the complacency with which God receives returning sinners in a variety of forms; it is with the satisfaction with which a father receives a miserable and repenting child-" Verily I say unto you, there is joy in heaven over one sinner that repenteth."

The last branch of divine goodness we consider is his mercy-mercy, in the common and general sense of the text, comprehends all those benevolent qualities

which we have noticed: It is another name for his goodness. But there is one particular instance and exercise of mercy which is all I need name; and this is his tenderness and compassion to our infirmities, and the disadvantages of our state and condition: "Like as a father pitieth his own children," saith the psalmist, "so the Lord pitieth them that fear him; for he knoweth our frame, he remembereth that we are but dust." Saint Paul, in the 2d chapter of the Ephesians, describes the future condition, both of himself, and of those whom he wrote to before their call and conversion to Christianity. "Among whom we all had our conversation in times past in the lusts of the flesh, fulfilling the desires of the flesh and of the mind; but God, who is rich in mercy, for his great love wherewith he loved us, even when we were dead in sins, hath quickened us together with Christ."

Upon the whole, therefore, here is Almighty God described in the words which he himself, and his holy Spirit, dictate and authorise. He is described as supremely good; and if any one asks what his goodness consists in, we answer that the Scripture teaches us to place it in justice to his rational creatures, in dealing with every one according to his deserts, punishing the impenitent and unrighteous, remembering and rewarding our works and labours of love-in loving the whole creation (for, throughout the whole world, there is not a corner in which some instance of kind contrivance and provision for their happiness is not found)-in fidelity to his word, his promises and threats-in patience and long-suffering with our sins and provocation -in placability, or a disposition to pardon, whenever pardon is consistent with the end and support of his

moral government; and lastly, in compassion and mercy to our infirmities and feelings, in condescension to the difficulties and defects under which we labour-in accepting and remembering our struggles with temptation, our feeble endeavours, if they are sincere, after amendment-our progress, though but very imperfect, in obedience and reformation.

XXXVII.

THE ILLS OF LIFE DO NOT CONTRADICT THE GOODNESS OF GOD.

ROM. X. 23.

And we know that all things work together for good to them that love God.

A CHILD, if it reflect, will often be at a loss to account for the behaviour of its parents towards it; and a peevish and perverse child will often murmur and complain; yet the same child, when it becomes a man, and looks back upon its youth and infancy, will see nothing in its parents' treatment of it but the greatest prudence and affection-will then discover the reason and the justice of what it once complained of, and discern the end and meaning of many things which at that time appeared so intricate and unaccountable. This hereafter may be our case, and probably will be so. We must wait for the great day of Christ's coming again, for the further enlargement of our understandings and more perfect comprehension of these subjects. In the mean time, nevertheless, many considerations which may conduce to set us at ease, and inspire us with trust and confidence in God's providence and goodness, are fit to be known and attended to. To proceed, therefore : many of the complaints which we make against Providence are of such a nature as, one may say, can never be satisfied, and are therefore manifestly unreasonable;

as, for instance, when we complain of the want of greater strength than we have, or of superior knowledge, or longer life, or immortality, or that we cannot move ourselves with greater speed, or get through our work in less time or with less trouble-what is this but, in other words, to wish that we had been created angels; which is all one as if a brute, a horse, for instance, or a dog, should murmur that it was not born a man. The absurdity of this we see immediately. In like manner, a superior being, or an angel, might as well complain that it was not formed an archangel; and the archangel itself would have the same reason to complain that it was inferior to the supreme Being who made it. Now all these complaints are of a kind, as I said before, never to be satisfied: for so long as there is any thing above us, which there always must be; any perfection we do not possess-any, however, that we can form a notion of-there would be the same reason for these complaints. Suppose a brute to complain that it has not the faculties or reason of a man-in other words, that it is not a man: suppose its own complaint gratified, suppose it to succeed, and the brute to become a manwould it cease to complain? might it not still answer that it was without the properties and perfections of an angel?—at least, it would have the same reason for its murmuring that we have. The evils then, complained of, are called by divines the evils of imperfection; and it is agreed, I think, by all, that they are to be laid out of the case, as conveying no possible imputation upon the divine wisdom or goodness: for a complaint which cannot be satisfied, and which you must go on for ever with, must evidently be groundless and unreasonable in its principle. So then, the defects and imperfections of our nature are what Providence, so far as