subject must be of importance, that tends to unfold the human heart; for what other science is of greater use to human beings? The present subject is too extensive to be discussed without dividing it into parts; and what follows suggests a division into two parts. In every period, two things are to be regarded: first, the words of which it is composed; next, the arrangement of these words; the former resembling the stones that compose a building, and the latter resembling the order in which they are placed. Hence the beauties of language with respect to signification, may not improperly be distinguished into two kinds: first the beauties that arise from a right choice of words or materials for constructing the period: and next, the beauties that arise from a due arrangement of these words or materials. I begin with rules that direct us to a right choice of words, and then proceed to rules that concern their arrangement. And with respect to the former, communication of thought being the chief end of language, it is a rule, That perspicuity ought not to be sacrificed to any other beauty whatever if it should be doubted whether perspicuity be a positive beauty, it cannot be doubted that the want of it is the greatest defect. Nothing therefore in language ought more to be studied, than to prevent all obscurity in the expression; for to have no meaning, is but one degree worse, than to have a meaning that is not understood. Want of perspicuity from a wrong arrangement, belongs to the next branch. I shall here give a few examples where the obscurity arises from a wrong choice of words; and as this defect is too common in the ordinary herd of writers to make examples from them necessary, I confine myself to the most celebrated authors. Livy, speaking of a rout after a battle, Multique in ruina Majore quam fuga oppressi obtruncatique. L. iv. sect. 46. This author is frequently obscure, by expressing but part of his thought, leaving it to be completed by his reader. His description of the sea-fight, 1. xxviii. cap. 30. is extremely perplexed. Unde tibi reditum certo subtemine Parcæ Horace, epod. xiii. 22. I am in greater pain about the foregoing passages, than about any I have ventured to criticise, being aware that a vague or obscure expression, is apt to gain favour with those who neglect to examine it with a critical eye. To some it carries the sense that they relish the most; and by suggesting various meanings at once, it is admired by others as concise and comprehensive: which by the way fairly accounts for the opinion generally entertained with respect to most languages in their infant state, of expressing much in few words. This observation may be illustrated by a passage from Quintilian, quoted in the first volume for a different purpose. At quæ Polycleto defuerunt, Phidiæ atque Alcameni dantur.→→ Phidias tamen diis quam hominibus efficiendis melior artifex traditur: in ebore vero, longe citra æmulum, vel si nihil nisi Minervam Athenis, aut Olympium in Elide Jovem fecisset, cujus pulchritudo adjecisse aliquid etiam recepte religioni videtur ; adeo májestas operis Deum equavit. The sentence in the Italic characters appeared to me abundantly perspicuous, before I gave it peculiar attention. And yet to examine it independent of the context, its proper meaning is not what is intended: the words naturally import, that the beauty of the statues mentioned, appears to add some new tenet or rite to the established religion, or appears to add new dignity to it; and we must consult the context before we can gather the true meaning; which is, that the Greeks were confirmed in the belief of their established religion by these majestic statues, so like real divinities. There may be a defect in perspicuity proceeding even from the slightest ambiguity in construction; as where the period commences with a member conceived to be in the nominative case, which af terward is found to be in the accusative. Example: "Some emotions more péculiarly_connected with the fine arts, I propose to handle in sepa"rate chapters."* Better thus: "Some emotions "more peculiarly connected with the fine arts, are ແ proposed to be handled in separate chapters. I add another error against perspicuity; which I mention the rather because with some writers it passes for a beauty. It is the giving different names to the same object, mentioned oftener than once in the same period. Example: Speaking of the English adventurers who first attempted the VOL. II. Elements of Criticism, vol. i. p. 43, edit Í conquest of Ireland, "and instead of reclaiming the "natives from their uncultivated manners, they were gradually assimilated to the ancient inha"bitants, and degenerated from the customs of "their own nation." From this mode of expres sion, one would think the author meant to distinguish the ancient inhabitants from the natives; and we cannot discover otherwise than from the sense, that these are only different names given to the same object for the sake of variety. But perspicuity ought never to be sacrificed to any other beauty, which leads me to think that the passage may be improved as follows: "and degenerating from "the customs of their own nation, they were gradually assimilated to the natives, instead of re"claiming them from their uncultivated man"ners." แ The next rule in order, because next in importance, is, That the language ought to correspond to the subject: heroic actions or sentiments require elevated language; tender sentiments ought to be expressed in words soft and flowing, and plain language void of ornament, is adapted to subjects grave and didactic. Language may be considered as the dress of thought; and where the one is not suited to the other, we are sensible of incongruity, in the same manner as where a judge is dressed like a fop, or a peasant like a man of quality. Where the impression made by the words resembles the impression made by the thought, the similar emotions mix sweetly in the mind, and double the pleasure; but where the impressions made by the thought and the words are dissimilar, the unnatural union they are forced into is disagreeable.t This concordance between the thought and the words has been observed by every critic, and is so Chapter II. Pärt it. ↑ Ibid. well understood as not to require any illustration, But there is a concordance of a peculiar kind, that has scarcely been touched in works of criticism, though it contributes to neatness of composition. It is what follows. In a thought of any extent, we commonly find some parts intimately united, some slightly, some disjoined, and some directly oppos ed to each other. To find these conjunctions and disjunctions imitated in the expression, is a beauty; because such imitation makes the words concordant with the sense. This doctrine may be illustrated by a familiar example. When we have occasion to mention the intimate connexion that the soul hath with the body, the expression ought to be, the soul and body; because the particle the, relative to both, makes a connexion in the expression, resembling in some degree the connexion in the thought: but when the soul is distinguished from the body, it is better to say the soul and the body; because the disjunction in the words resembles the disjunction in the thought. I proceed to other examples, beginning with conjunctions, Constituit agmen; et expedire tela animosque, equitibus jussis, &c. Livy, . xxxviii. sect. 25. Here the words that express the connected ideas are artificially connected by subjecting them both to the regimen of one verb. And the two following are of the same kind. Quum ex paucis quotidie aliqui eorum caderent aut vulnerarentur, et qui superarent, fessi et corporibus et animis essent, &e. Livy, 1. xxxviii. sect. 29, Post acer Mnestheus adducto constitit arcu, Eneid, v. 507. But to justify this artificial connexion among the words, the ideas they express ought to be intimately connected; for otherwise that concordance which |