of London newspapers, Mr Fess had reached the conclusion that the British Government was being urged, in regard to the blockade, to pursue such policy as would best aid the Allies, regardless of the wishes of the United States:

'You ask me, "What are you going to do about it?" I will tell you what I might be willing to do. We may be driven to it here, not because it is our wish or desire, but as a measure to compel respect for our rights; and that is, if Great Britain will not respect our rights as defined in law, I am about ready to vote now to stop all the munitions of war going to her (applause)' ('Cong. Rec.', vol. liii, p. 944).

A pronouncedly pro-German note was struck in these debates on the blockade on Jan. 25, when Mr Bennet, a Republican from New York, interpreted to the House the view which our fellow-citizens of German birth' took as regards the negotiations of the State Department with the Government at Berlin over the 'Lusitania' and other vessels torpedoed by Germany, and the negotiations with Great Britain over the blockade. Taking cognisance of the notes that went to Germany:

'they called upon us to note that as between the Central Powers and ourselves a solution of these problems is being reached which bids fair to be creditable to both sides; but they also note that there is no strict accountability note going to Great Britain; and they demand, as Americans, that we present an American policy and stand by it as against the whole of the world or any portion of it.'

Mr Bennet further expressed himself in agreement with a remark that had been made by Mr Mann, Republican leader of the House, that the United States stands a far better chance, with these daily recurring instances of high-handed oppression to our citizens and our commerce, of getting into trouble with Great Britain than with Germany.'

The only movement in Congress that attracted public attention all over the United States-the only movement out of which anything approaching a crisis developedarose out of Germany's intimation to the neutral powers on Feb. 10, 1916, to the effect that, after Feb. 29, it was

her intention to treat all armed enemy merchantmen as belligerents, liable to attack by submarines without warning. There had been some discussion in both Houses before Feb. 10 on the question of armed merchantmen ; and bills had been introduced suspending the right of American citizens to travel on ships of the belligerent nations. So early as Jan. 5, Mr T. P. Gore, a Democrat of Oklahoma, had introduced two such bills in the Senate. The object of the first was to prevent the issuance of passports for use on belligerent ships. The purpose of the second bill was to withdraw protection from citizens of the United States who persisted in travelling on vessels of the belligerents, to prevent belligerent ships from entering or clearing from ports of the United States if they carried American citizens as passengers, and to prevent American vessels from transporting American citizens as passengers and contraband of war at the same time upon the same vessel.*

In the House of Representatives, Mr Mondell, of Wyoming, had introduced a bill to prohibit citizens carrying United States passports from travelling on armed merchantmen.† These bills had been referred to committees with no likelihood that they would be favourably reported; but their introduction and the discussions on submarine warfare had made it obvious that, in both the House and the Senate, there were large groups of members-Democrats as well as Republicans-who were willing, at the behest of Germany, to surrender the right of citizens of the United States to travel on merchant vessels of the belligerent powers. This was the situation in Congress before Feb. 10, when Germany announced that it was her intention to treat all armed merchantmen as belligerents, liable to attack by submarines without warning. Within a few days the situation was seriously changed by the introduction of what, in the congressional crisis of Feb. 29-March 7, were known as the McLemore and Gore resolutions. The McLemore resolution was introduced in the House on Feb. 17. The Gore resolution was submitted to the Senate on Feb. 25. By the McLemore resolution the House was asked to express the determination of the people and the Government of

* Cong. Rec.', vol. liii, p. 571.

† Ib. p. 1668.

the United States both to uphold all American rights, and to exercise care, consideration and wisdom in avoiding actions which tend to bring American citizens and American interests into the zone of conflict where the passions of war are raging.'* The resolution was at once referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

The Gore resolution was, in the phraseology of Congress, a concurrent resolution. It differed from a joint resolution in that, if it had been carried in both Houses, it would have been only an expression of the opinion of Congress, whereas a joint resolution, when signed by the President, has the force of law. At a later stage during the crisis that developed out of these two resolutions Senator Gore offered an amendment in his resolution. As introduced, the resolution had a preamble of seven clauses, the sixth of which read:

'Whereas the right of American citizens to travel on armed belligerent vessels rather than on unarmed vessels is essential neither to their life, liberty or safety, nor to the independence, dignity or security of the United States.'

The seventh clause insisted that, as Congress is vested with power to declare war, it is under an obligation to 'prevent war by all proper means consistent with the honour and vital interest of the nation.' The resolution read as follows:

'That it is the sense of the Congress, vested as it is with the sole power to declare war, that all persons owing allegiance to the United States should in behalf of their own safety and the vital interest of the United States forbear to exercise the right to travel as passengers upon any armed vessel of any belligerent power, whether such vessel be armed for offensive or defensive purposes; and it is the further sense of the Congress that no passport should be issued or renewed by the Secretary of State, or by anyone acting under him, to be used by any person owing allegiance to the United States for purposes of travel upon any such armed vessel of a belligerent power' (Cong. Rec.', vol. liii, p. 3556).

As was the case with the McLemore resolution, the Gore resolution was referred without discussion to a committee.

* 'Cong. Rec.', vol. liii, p. 3147.

Vol. 226.-No. 448.

P

It went to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Both resolutions might have been 'cushioned' in the respective committees until the end of the session, had it not been for the intervention of the President, who on Feb. 29 made it known to the House Committee on Rules, and to Senator Stone, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, that the introduction of these resolutions had created a false impression abroad; that they were hampering negotiations then proceeding with Germany in regard to submarine warfare; and that it was imperative that they should be disposed of in the Senate and the House without delay. In the House, only the Committee on Rules could expedite matters as desired by President Wilson. Consequently it was to Mr Pou, ranking member of the committee, in the absence of Mr Henry, the chairman, that the President addressed his letter.

'The report that there are divided counsels in Congress in regard to the foreign policy of the Government (wrote the President) is being made industrious use of in foreign capitals. I believe that report to be false; but, so long as it is anywhere credited, it cannot fail to do the greatest harm and expose the country to the most serious risks. I therefore feel justified in asking that your committee will permit me to urge an early vote upon the resolutions with regard to travel on armed merchantmen which have recently been so much talked about in order that there may be afforded an immediate opportunity for full public discussion and action upon them, and that all doubts and conjectures may be swept away, and our foreign relations once more cleared of damaging misunderstandings' (Cong. Rec.', vol. liii, p. 4406).

President Wilson's first discussion of the resolutions with Senator Stone was at the White House on Monday, Feb. 28. Following this conference there was an exchange of letters between the President and Mr Stone, letters that are of importance in view of the fact that in them the President offered a detailed explanation of his policy in regard to the German intimation of Feb. 10. In a letter to the President dated Feb. 29, Mr Stone stated what he supposed to be Mr Wilson's attitude.

The essential paragraphs in the President's letter in reply to Senator Stone are these:

'You are right in assuming that I shall do everything in my power to keep the United States out of war. I think the country will feel no uneasiness about my course in that respect. Through many anxious months I have striven for that object, amid difficulties more manifold than can have been apparent upon the surface, and so far I have succeeded. I do not doubt that I shall continue to succeed. The course which the Central European powers have announced their intention of following in the future with regard to undersea warfare seems for the moment to threaten insuperable obstacles; but its apparent meaning is so manifestly incon sistent with explicit assurances recently given us by those powers with regard to their treatment of merchant vessels on the high seas, that I must believe that explanations will presently ensue which will put a different aspect upon it. We have had no reason to question their good faith or their fidelity to their promises in the past, and I for one feel confident that we shall have none in the future.

'But in any event our duty is clear. No nation, no group of nations, has the right, while war is in progress, to alter or disregard the principles which all nations have agreed upon in mitigation of the horrors and sufferings of war; and, if the clear rights of American citizens should very unhappily be abridged or denied by any such action, we should, it seems to me, have in honour no choice as to what our own course should be.

'For my own part, I cannot consent to any abridgment of the rights of American citizens in any respect. The honour and self-respect of the nation is involved. We covet peace, and shall preserve it at any cost but the loss of honour. To forbid our people to exercise their rights for fear we might be called upon to vindicate them would be a deep humiliation indeed. It would be an implicit, all but an explicit, acquiescence in the violation of the rights of mankind everywhere and of whatever nation or allegiance. It would be a deliberate abdication of our hitherto proud position as spokesmen, even amid the turmoil of war, for the law and the right. It would make everything this government has attempted, and everything that it has accomplished, during this terrible struggle of nations meaningless and futile.

'It is important to reflect that, if in this instance we allowed expediency to take the place of principle, the door would inevitably be opened to still further concessions. Once accept a single abatement of right, and many other humiliations would certainly follow, and the whole fine fabric of international law might crumble under our hands piece by