A much more serious objection than either of the two already mentioned is bilingualism. The Union is a bilingual country; it recognises the equality of the English and Dutch languages. Rhodesia is satisfied with one language. It must be granted that this is a grave and formidable objection which cannot easily be set aside. But it is an objection to Union at any time, whether now or later; and Rhodesians who regard partnership with the Southern Provinces as inevitable must make up their minds to accept bilingualism with the best grace they can. Still it is not impossible that a way out of the difficulty may be found; special terms might be made for Rhodesia.

A further objection to immediate inclusion will be referred to presently. Meanwhile let us take a glance at one or two of the advantages. The first and most material gain will be a great reduction in the cost of living. Rhodesia is the most expensive part of the Empire to live in. According to the report of a committee recently appointed to enquire into the excessive cost of living in Rhodesia, 27 per cent. of the married men, for reasons of economy, send their wives and families out of the country and provide for their maintenance elsewhere. The chief cause of this alarming state of things is to be found in the ruinous rates charged on the various Rhodesian railways. The following table shows the marked difference between the rates on the Rhodesian lines and the Union railways:

This table shows that the Rhodesia Railways are extracting rates twice as high as those payable to the Cape Railways, although the distance is less and there is no long pull up from the coast.

With the entry of Rhodesia the Union Government would take over the railways; the cost of acquisition

*The above is taken from a pamphlet published by the Rhodesia Chamber of Mines in April, 1913.

would be borne by the Union as a whole and would not fall on Rhodesia alone; and as, under the Act of Union, the railways are worked only for actual cost and are not allowed to earn a profit, the benefits which Rhodesia would derive by the change would be enormous.

In connexion with the railway question a matter that deserves some consideration is the situation that would arise if feeling in the Union towards Rhodesia ceased from some cause or other to be as brotherly as it is to-day. During the last session of the Legislative Council the Treasurer hinted at the possible withdrawal of Rhodesia from the Customs Union with a view to the taxation of Union products. If the Union finds that the idea of amalgamation is scouted and that its exports are taxed, it may be induced to retaliate by putting up its railway rates as against Rhodesia. It is usually argued that such a step could be met by importing through the Portuguese port of Beira. But it must not be forgotten that the Rhodesia Railways own the line between Vryburg and Bulawayo, a length of 588 miles. The Chartered Company, which controls all the railways, could not afford to allow this line to remain unused, and would be obliged to keep the rates on the BeiraSalisbury line sufficiently high to allow a large portion of the imports to be brought in over the southern route, so that, in a war of rates with the Union, the ability of Rhodesia to defend itself by importing through Beira is not so great as is commonly supposed.

Transcending in importance the railway question and all others is the enduring problem of the management of the natives. No definite or settled policy appears to be followed in this territory, nor indeed is it intended to be argued that the application of a definite policy has been possible. The Chartered Company has on the whole succeeded fairly well, But the time has arrived for uniform treatment of the natives throughout the whole of South Africa. It would assuredly be in the best interests of the natives themselves. So long, however, as Rhodesia continues under the rule of the Chartered Company, the question is bound to remain in abeyance.

The Asiatic question stands on a similar footing. Whether the attitude taken up by the Dominions on this question, one of the most serious in Imperial politics,

is defensible or not, it is beyond controversy that the existence of one policy in the Union and another in Rhodesia must inevitably lead to trouble in the long run. Feeling in Rhodesia is entirely in accord with that of the rest of South Africa; yet it is well known that, under the Charter, no legislation on the lines of anything existing in the Union or likely to become law there in the future would be sanctioned by the Imperial Government. Proof of this has already been given. An Ordinance passed by the Legislative Council in 1908 regulating Asiatic immigration was disallowed by the Secretary of State. Thus the Asiatic question already exists in Rhodesia. It is as well to be forewarned before it becomes acute.

From the purely Rhodesian point of view, Union would bring other advantages, such as the settlement of all outstanding differences between the settlers and the Chartered Company, e.g. the dispute as to the ownership of the land, the proper allocation of revenues between the commercial and administrative sides of the Company, and many other questions which it would be tedious to notice in detail. From the Imperial point of view there can be but one opinion. If South Africa is to be a strength to the Empire and not a weakness, unity and brotherly love must prevail throughout its length and breadth. The population of Rhodesia is essentially British. There are no racial difficulties here. But surely they confess to a cramped imperialism who for that reason would dissuade Rhodesians from joining hands with the South.

One objection to Union has been held over. This is the place to examine it. Notwithstanding all that has been said in favour of Union, there is an obstacle, and from the Rhodesian point of view an almost insurmountable obstacle, to the immediate transference of the administration from the Chartered Company to the Union Government. No one would wish the country to be brought into the Union in opposition to the wishes of the people. Section 150 of the South Africa Act provides for the entrance of Rhodesia into the Union simply on addresses to the King from the Houses of Parliament of the Union; but it is hardly conceivable that such a step would be taken without some previous

indication of the willingness of the Rhodesian community to be taken into the partnership. There has been no advocate of Union who has not declared the will and free consent of Rhodesians to such a step to be essential and has not also claimed for Rhodesia the fullest liberty to make terms for herself. No machinery exists by which the community, apart from the Chartered Company, can enter into negotiations with the Union Government on its own account. But there seems no reason to doubt that, if such machinery existed, terms might be arranged which would be acceptable to a majority of the population. It is conceivable, for example, that on the language question a special set of provisions might be made applicable to Rhodesia; or the matter might be left to the decision of the Rhodesian Provincial Council. In these circumstances it is worth while considering whether there is not a good deal to be said for a suggestion recently made, that the Imperial Government should make use of its prerogative under section 33 of the Charter to terminate the administrative powers of the Company, and in doing so should transfer them to a Provisional Government responsible to the Crown, in which the settlers would be thoroughly represented, such Government being charged with the duty of entering into negotiations with the Union Government for the purpose of ascertaining the most favourable terms on which the inclusion of Rhodesia would be accepted. The terms being ascertained, a proposal for the admission of Rhodesia would be submitted to the people and their wishes ascertained by some means to be provided for in the constitution of the Provisional Government. In the event of its acceptance, Rhodesia would at once take up its place as one of the provinces of the Union. In the contrary event, the Imperial Government would be obliged to prolong the life of the Provisional Government for a term of years and, if necessary, from time to time for further terms of years, until the progress of the country became such as to entitle it to claim the full privileges and responsibilities of self-government or to reconsider its decision to remain out of the Union.

H. T. LONGDEN.

Art. 13.—AIRCRAFT IN WAR.

ALMOST unheeded, a momentous conflict is raging amongst the Powers. The first chapter of another volume of the next' war has been started. In the European campaign of to-morrow aerial supremacy will probably prove to be the dominant factor. That supremacy will be gained in peace. Salient and vital in this peace-strategy, this war of preparation,' is the contest for the air. Are we forward in the struggle? Let us consider briefly some of the many factors and components involved in the further development of military aviation.

.

The term ' aerial supremacy' is not, as is inferred by large sections of the press and by the man in the street, synonymous with numerical superiority in aircraft. The fact that military aviation means a combination of organisation, training, and materiel is often overlooked. To gain the true criterion of aerial strength, equal weight must be given to training of personnel, to ground organisation, and to the supply and maintenance of the best possible materiel. An air service lacking good ground arrangements is more seriously handicapped than is a fleet without bases.

In the air, as on land and at sea, advantage is with numbers; but, as we have recently seen in France, numbers alone do not denote aerial strength. A national subscription of about a quarter of a million was raised in France last year to promote military aviation. To encourage the home industry (and perhaps to gain public favour), part of this sum was spent on the purchase of 170 aeroplanes of various French marks. The Press then proudly declared that so many hundreds of aeroplanes were available for war purposes, and the public was assured of French predominance. When taken into army use, however, many of the machines were found to be out of date. Further, their multiplicity of types, involving a multiplicity of spare parts, rendered efficient ground organisation impossible. It is even doubtful whether many of them will be retained in the French Air Service. The move may have had its political value; the actual gain to the service was comparatively small.

The principle emphasised is that the fewer the types

1