threatens to become embarrassing. In all the white schools English is the medium of instruction, though every possible effort has been made to meet the case of Dutch-speaking children, who, however, are only about 13 per cent. of the whole. For years there had been no complaint until a few months ago, when some Boer farmer from Melsetter, where there is a small Dutch community, approached the Government with a demand for a bi-lingual system up to Standard IV. There can be no doubt that the demand is actuated by political motives, for it coincides with a demand for equal rights for the two languages throughout the country, which means that Dutch should become an official language, and with an agitation in the Southern States for the absorption of Rhodesia into the Union. That large question must be passed over, nor need it have been introduced at all except to explain a movement that may be as embarrassing to Rhodesian education as it has been in the Southern Colonies. To whatever side we turn, signs of advancement may be seen. Savings Banks' deposits show an increase; trade is growing, as is shown by the following figures: Imports 1911. 1912. £3,014,527 The increase of mineral output has been already considered, but infinitely more satisfactory are the evidences of agricultural development. Maize is, of course, still the staple food crop, and shows an increase of no less than 758 per cent. in seven years. It has now become an article of export. The value of maize exported in 1904 was 95l.; in 1911 it had reached nearly 17,000l., an increase of 5000l. over the preceding year and of 10,000l. over 1909. These are not stupendous figures, they are even modest, but they show a healthy tendency. Far more remarkable is the growth of the tobacco trade. In 1904, only 147,355 lb. were grown. In 1911 the production had risen to 606,219 lb. In 1912 the production was more than doubled, and next year's crop is estimated at from 2,500,000 to 3,000,000. It is to be remembered also that this is tobacco of good quality of Virginia and Turkish leaf, far superior to the Boer tobacco formerly grown. Cattle-ranching is being established as a regular business; and, as has been said above, great hopes are being founded on the recent discovery of a rust-resisting wheat. What, then, shall be the answer to the question put at the beginning of this article? Is the present position of Southern Rhodesia cause for disappointment or admiration? We do not propose to give a categorical answer, for, after all, that is not the most important point. It is less vital to think of what might have been than of what will be. Rhodesia's past is beyond her control; her future lies in her own hands. She has got through many narrows and skirted many shoals, and now at last she is heading for the open sea. To what harbour, to what destiny, depends on herself. It depends not only on the spirit in which her people face the future, but on the spirit in which they seek to adjust the differences of the past. There will be much balancing of accounts in the next few months, it is to be hoped they will be balanced fairly. If that be impossible for those in the heat and dust of the controversy, it should not be impossible for those who stand outside, and in whose hands the final decision lies. Over and over again we shall hear it said, The Chartered Company have made Rhodesia. In great degree that boast is true; without the Company Rhodesia had never been. But with the Company alone she would have been only a geographical expression. While we can admire the faith that poured millions into a new land, and the patient confidence with which those who found the capital have waited for a return, we must not forget the men who gave themselves and their energy to the development of Rhodesia. Without the resources of the Company the settlers could have effected little; without the settlers the capital would be so much buried and irrecoverable treasure. There is an equal place in the scheme of things for the man who tills the soil and the man who produces the crop. Only by a recognition of this truth can Rhodesia set forth with hope and confidence on her way. RICHARD Dawson. Art. 14.-THE HOME RULE CRISIS AND A NATIONAL SETTLEMENT. 1. The Alternatives to Civil War. By F. S. Oliver. London: Murray, 1913. 2. Nationality and Home Rule. By the Right Hon. A. J. Balfour, M.P. London: Longmans, 1913. 3. Is Ulster Right? By An Irishman.' London: Murray, 1913. 4. Hansard. Home Rule Debates, 1912-1913. 5. Reports of Speeches by Ministers and Opposition Leaders, Oct.-Dec. 1913. SLOWLY, painfully slowly, the British nation is beginning to wake to the fact that it has been for some time drifting towards a national crisis more serious than any which has confronted it for generations. Dimly, and that only in partial glimpses, it is beginning to apprehend the real nature of that crisis. Even now, though references to the imminence of civil war are becoming a stock feature of political oratory and journalism, the ordinary citizen cannot bring himself to believe that anything so preposterous, so incredible, can come about in this enlightened country and in this enlightened age. In his heart of hearts he is convinced that the chapter of accidents will yet provide a happy solution. The Opposition may somehow succeed in forcing an election. The Government may yet decide on their own account to consult the electorate, if not before the passing of the Home Rule Bill, at any rate before it is put into force and before trouble begins. If it comes to the worst there may be a serious affray, a kind of glorified strike riot, in a corner of Ireland, the occurrence of which will at once definitely show which way public sympathy inclines, and which, he assumes, according to his political leanings, will finally wreck the Government and its Home Rule policy or finally discredit a factious Opposition. It is this very want of clear realisation on the part of the public at large which constitutes one of the gravest elements of the situation, and one of the most serious obstacles in the way of any peaceful settlement. Is such a settlement attainable in any case? Is there really any solution which the parties to the struggle can accept, if not as ideal, yet as at least preferable to the alternative of pushing the conflict to its almost inevitable conclusion? That question can only be answered if we are first clear in our minds as to the real character and meaning of the crisis and as to the real issue between the parties. That issue is not Home Rule, in itself. Still less is it the position of Ulster, in itself. It is the carrying of Home Rule, and the dragooning of Ulster, under the Parliament Act. It is only by keeping that point in mind that it is possible to understand how the crisis has come about; and it is only by holding to that clue that statesmanship can hope to find a way of escape from a fatal maze of strife. Home Rule, as the Irish Nationalists demand it, and as the present Bill would by its provisions, and still more by its inevitable consequences, concede it, is nothing less than the denial of the right of the United Kingdom to exist as a nation. By every ordinary test of nationhood, by continuity of historic union, by substantial unity of territory, of race, speech, and institutions, by clear differentiation from the outside world in each of these respects, the United Kingdom is emphatically a single political unit, a nation in at least as full a sense as Italy, Japan, or Denmark. The Irish claim to separate national existence, on the other hand, is, as Mr Balfour points out in his trenchant little pamphlet on 'Nationality and Home Rule,' and as the anonymous author of 'Is Ulster Right?' proves at greater length and with ample historical illustration, an essentially fictitious claim. There is no such thing as a separate Irish race, in any sense in which either ethnologists or historians use the word. There never was an organised Irish nation. The so-called Irish institutions which we are asked to restore are, as Mr Balfour observes, only English institutions which were abolished because they were failures. There is no oppression or denial of self-government. Ireland shares every constitutional liberty that is enjoyed by any other part of the United Kingdom. Last, but not least, essential considerations, alike of commerce and of defence, make the political separation of Ireland from Great Britain a weakness and a danger to both islands. But, even if the case for Irish nationalism against the Union were as strong as it is weak, if it were as strong as was the case of Venice and Lombardy against Austria, or the case of Poland against its present rulers, it is inconceivable that any sane and healthy nation would concede such a claim, even partially, without a keen political struggle, without the fullest and most exhaustive discussion of every feature, and without bringing every possible constitutional safeguard to bear against ill-considered and hasty action. Equally inconceivable is it that such a nation would, in any circumstances, forcibly expel a million of its own people, and against their will transfer them to a new political nationality. The Parliament Act marked the final supersession of the old British system of government through Parliament, and the substitution of the unqualified and arbitrary rule of a party majority. The old system secured both elasticity and stability because, though unfettered by the dead hand of a written constitution, it possessed a safeguard in the powers of an essentially conservative and national Second Chamber. The Parliament Act swept this safeguard away, but provided no substitute. Neither the fundamental constitution of the State, nor the rights of minorities, nor even the need for ascertaining the expressed will of a national majority, can at this moment impose any limitation upon the power of a party majority in the House of Commons. Such a state of affairs is not free government, but arbitrary government. That the tyrant in this case is not an individual but a political organisation, or rather coalition of organisations, does not affect the essential character of the new tyranny. Even if it confined itself to ordinary legislation, such a system of government could not continue long without provoking a serious crisis. The beginnings of the constitutional crisis may, indeed, in a sense, be said to have shown themselves in the controversy over the legislation of the late Unionist Government. Measures like the Education Act and the Licensing Act were essentially of a conservative and moderate character. They touched no great constitutional issues. Their subsequent amendment presented no inherent difficulties. But they had not been in any very definite sense before the electorate in 1900. They were carried by the sheer strength of party organisation in the House of Commons. They met with little effective criticism or amendment in a Second Chamber |