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to ourselves, the pleafures and gratifications of a life which is uncertain and precarious, and at its utmost length, of a very inconfiderable duration; or to secure to ourselves the pleafures of a life which is fixed and fettled, and will never end? Every man, upon the first hearing of this queftion, knows very well which fide of it he ought to close with. But however we are right in theory, it is plain, that in practice we adhere to the wrong fide of the queftion. We make provifion for this life, as though it were never to have an end, and for the other life, as though it were never to have a beginning.

Should a fpirit of fuperior rank, who is a stranger to human nature, accidently alight upon the earth, and take a furvey of its inhabitants; what would his notions of us be? Would not he think, that we are a fpecies of beings, made for quite different ends and purpoles, than what we really are? Must not he imagine, that we were placed in this world, to get riches and honours? Would not he think, that it was our duty to toil after wealth, and ftation, and title? Nay, would not he believe, we were forbidden poverty, by threats of eternal punishment, and enjoined to purfue our pleasures under pain of damnation? He would certainly imagine, that we were influenced by a fcheme of duties, quite oppofite to thofe which are indeed prefcribed to us. And truly, according to fuch an imagination, he must conclude that we are a fpecies of the most obedient creatures in the univerfe; that we are conftant to our duty, and that we keep a fteady eye on the end for which we were fent hither.

But how great would he his aftonishment, when he learnt that we were beings, not defigned to exift in this world above threefcore and ten years! and that the greatest part of this bufy fpecies, fall fhort even of that age? How would he be loft in horror and admiration, when he should know that this fet of creatures, who lay out all their endeavours for this life, which scarce deferves the name of existence, when, I say, he should

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know, that this fet of creatures are to exift to all eternity, in another life, for which they make no preparations? Nothing can be a greater difgrace to reafon, than that men, who are perfuaded of these two different ftates of being, fhould be perpetually employed in providing for a life of threefcore and ten years, and neglecting to make provifion for that, which after many myriads of years, will be still new, and still beginning; efpecially when we confider, that our endeavours for making ourfelves great, or rich, or honourable, or whatever elfe we place our happinefs in, may, after all, prove unfuccefsful; whereas, if we conftantly and fincerely en 'eavour, to make ourselves happy in the other life, we are fure that our endeavours will fucceed, and that we shall not be difappointed of our hope.

The following question is started by one of the fchoolmen. Suppofing the whole body of the earth were a great ball or mafs of the finest fand, and that a fingle grain or particle of this fand, should be annihilated every thoufand years. Suppofing then, that vou had it in your choice to be happy, all the while this prodigious mafs of fand was confuming, by this flow method, till there was not a grain of it left, on condition you were to be miferable for ever after; or, fuppofing that you might be happy for ever after, on condition you would be miferable till the whole mafs of fand was thus annihilated, at the rate of one grain in a thousand years: which of these two cafes would you make your choice?

It must confeffed in this cafe, fo many thousands of years are to the imagination as a kind of eternity, though in reality they do not bear fo great a proportion to that duration which is to follow them, as an unit does to the greatest number which you can put together in figures, or as one of thofe fands to the fuppofed heap. Reafon therefore tells us, without any manner of hefitation, which would be the better part of this choice. However, as I have before intimated, our reafon might, in such a cafe, be fo overfet by the ima gination,

gination, as to difpofe fome perfons to fink under the confideration of the great length of the first part of this duration, and of the great diftance of that fecond duration, which is to fucceed it. The mind, I fay, might give itself up to that happiness which is at hand, confidering that it is fo very near, and that it would laft fo very long. But when the choice we actually have before us is this; whether we should choose to be happy, for the fpace only of threefcore and ten, nay perhaps only of twenty or ten years, I might fay only of a day or an hour, and miferable to all eternity; or, on the contrary, miferable for this fhort term of years, and happy for a whole eternity: what words are fufficient to exprefs that folly, and want of confideration, which, in fuch a case, makes a wrong choice?

I here put the cafe even at the worst, by fuppofing (what feldom happens) that a course of virtue makes us miferable in this life: but if we fuppofe (as it generally happens) that virtue would make us more happy even in this life, than a contrary course of vice; how can we fufficiently admire, the ftupidity or madnefs of those persons, who are capable of making fo abfurd a choice?

Every wife man, therefore, will confider this life, only as it may conduce to the happiness of the other, and cheerfully facrifice the pleasures of a few years, to those of an eternity.

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Labitur et labetur in omne volubilis ævum. 'MR. SPECTATOR,

THER

HOR.

HERE are none of your fpeculations which please me more, than those upon infinitude and eternity. You have already confidered that part of eternity which is paft, and I wish you would give us your thoughts upon that which is to come.

Your readers will, perhaps, receive greater pleafure with this view of eternity, than the former, fince we have every one of us a concern in that which is to come: whereas a fpeculation on that which is past, is rather curious than useful.

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• Befides,

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Befides, we can easily conceive it poffible for fucceffive duration, never to have an end; though as you have justly obferved, that eternity which never had a beginning, is altogether incomprehenfible: that is, we can conceive an eternal duration, which may be, though we cannot an eternal duration which hath been; or, if I may use the philofophical terms, we may apprehend a potential, though not an actual ⚫ eternity.

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This notion of a future eternity, which is natural to the mind of man, is an unanswerable argument that he is a being defigned for it; efpecially if we confider that he is capable of being virtuous or vici6 ous here; that he hath faculties improveable to all eternity; and by a proper or wrong employment of them, may be happy or miferable, throughout that ⚫ infinite duration. Our idea, indeed, of this eternity, is not of an adequate or fixed nature, but is perpetually growing and enlarging itself toward the object which is too big for human comprehenfion. As we are now in the beginning of existence, fo fhall we always appear to ourfelves, as if we were for ever entering upon it. After a million or two of centuries, • fome confiderable things already paft, may flip out of 6 our memory; which, if it be not ftrengthened in a ⚫ wonderful manner, may poffibly forget that there ever was a fun or planets. And yet, notwithstanding the long race that we fhall then have run, and fhall still imagine ourselves just starting from the goal, and find no proportion between that fpace, which we know had a beginning, and what we are fure never will have an end.'

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Şentio Te fedem Hominum ac domum contemplari, quæ fi tibi parva (ut uf) ira videtur, hæc cœleftia, femper spectato; illa humana contemnito.

CICERO Somn. Scip.

THE following Effay comes from the ingeniou author of the letter upon Novelty, printed in late Spectator: The notions are drawn from the Pla tonic way of thinking, but as they contribute to raise

the

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