as he ought, adds thefe words. We muft, therefore, wait till fuch time as we may learn how we ought to behave ourfelves towards the gods and towards men. But when will that time come, fays Alcibiades, and who is it will in ftruct us? for I would fain fee this man, whoever he is. It is one, fays Socrates, who takes care of you; but as Homer tells us, that Minerva removed the mift from Diomede's eyes, that he might plainly discover both gods and men; so the darkness that hangs upon your mind must be removed, before you are able to difcern what is good and what is evil. "Let him remove from my mind, fays Alcibiades, the darkness, and what else he pleases; I am determined to refuse nothing he fhall order me, whoever he is, fo that I may become the better man by it."-The remaining part of this dialogue is very obfcure: there is fomething in it that would make us think Socrates hinted at himself, when he spoke of this Divine Teacher who was to come into the world, did he not own that he himself was in this refpect as much at a loss, and in as great diftrefs, as the rest of mankind.

Some learned men look upon this conclufion as a prediction of our Saviour, or at least that Socrates, like the high-prieft, prophefied unknowingly, and pointed at that Divine Teacher who was to come into the world fome ages after him. However that may be, we find that this great philofopher faw, by the light of reafon, that it was fuitable to the goodness of the Divine Nature, to fend a perfon into the world who should instruct mankind in the duties of religion, and, in particular, teach them how to pray.

Whoever reads this abftract of Plato's Difcourfe on Prayer, will, I believe, naturally make this reflection, that the great Founder of our religion, as well by his own example, as in the form of prayer which he taught his difciples, did not only keep up to thofe rules which the light of nature had suggested to this great Philofopher, but inftructed his difciples in the whole extent of this duty, as well as of all others. He directed them to the proper object of adoration, and taught them, according

to

to the third rule above mentioned, to apply themselves to him in their closets, without fhow or oftentation; and to worship him in fpirit and in truth. As the Lacedæmonians, in their form of prayer, implored the gods in general to give them all good things fo long as they were virtuous, we afk in particular that our offences may be forgiven as we forgive thofe of others. If we look into the fecond rules which Socrates has prefcribed, namely, that we fhould apply ourselves to the knowledge of fuch things as are beft for us, this too is explained at large in the doctrines of the gofpel, where we are taught in feveral inftances to regard those things as curfes, which appear as bleffings in the eye of the world; and on the contrary, to esteem thofe things as bleffings, which to the generality of mankind appear as curfes. Thus, in the

form which is prefcribed to us we only pray for that happinefs which is our chief good, and the great end of our cxiftence, when we petition the Supreme Being for the coming of his kingdom, being folicitous for no other temporal bleffing but our daily fuftenance. On the other fide, we pray against nothing but fin, and against evil in general, leaving it with Omniscience to determine what is really fuch. If we look into the first of Socrates's rules of prayer, in which he recommends the above-mentioned form of the ancient poet, we find that form not only comprehended, but very much improved in the petition, wherein we pray to the Supreme Being that his will may be done: which is of the fame force with that form which our Saviour ufed, when he prayed against the most painful and most ignominious of deaths, Nevertheless not my will, but thine be done.'-This comprehenfive petition is the most humble, as well as the most prudent, that can be offered up from the creature to his Creator, as it fuppofes the Supreme Being wills nothing but what is for our good, and that he knows better than ourfelves what is fo. I 3

L.

SECTION V.

Advantages of Revelation above Natural Reason.

---quicquid dignum fapiente bonoque eft,

Hor

RELIGION may be confidered under two general heads. The first comprehends what we are to believe, the other what we are to practise. By thofe things which we are to believe, I mean whatever is revealed to us in the Holy Writings, and which we could not have obtained the knowledge of by the light of nature; by the things which we are to practife, I mean all those duties to which we are directed by reason, or natural religion. The first of these I shall diftinguish by the name of Faith, the fecond by that of Morality.

If we look into the more ferious part of mankind, we find many who lay so great a stress upon Faith, that they neglect Morality; and many who build fo much upon Morality, that they do not pay a due regard to Faith. The perfect man fhould be defective in neither of these particulars, as will be very evident to those who confider the benefits which arife from each of them, and which I fhall make the fubject of this day's paper.

Notwithstanding this general divifion of Chriftian Duty into Morality and Faith, and that they have both their peculiar excellencies, the first has the pre-eminence in feveral refpects.

Firit, Because the greateft part of Morality (as I have ftated the notion of it) is of a fixed, eternal nature, and will endure when Faith fhall fail, and be loft in conviction.

Secondly, Becaufe a perfon may be qualified to do greater good to mankind, and become more beneficial to the world, by Morality without Faith, than by Faith without Morality.

Thirdly, Because Morality gives a greater perfection to human nature, by quieting the mind, moderating the paffions, and advancing the happiness of every man in his private capacity.

Fourthly, Because the rule of Morality is much more certain than that of Faith, all the civilized nations of the

world

world agreeing in the great points of Morality, as much as they differ in thofe of Faith.

Fifthly, Because Infidelity is not of fo malignant a nature as Immorality; or to put the fame reafon in another light, because it is generally owned, there may be falvation for a virtuous infidel, (particularly in the cafe of invincible ignorance) but none for a vicious believer.

Sixthly, Because Faith feems to draw its principal, if not all its excellency, from the influence it has upon Morality; as we shall fee more at large, if we confider wherein confifts the excellency of Faith, or the belief of revealed =religion; and this I think is,

Firft, in explaining, and carrying to greater heights, feveral points of Morality.

Secondly, In furnishing new and ftronger motives to enforce the practice of Morality.

Thirdly, In giving us more amiable ideas of the Supreme Being, more endearing notions of one another, and a true ftate of ourfelves, both in regard to the grandeur and vilenefs of our nature.

Fourthly, By fhewing us the blackness and deformity of vice, which in the Chriftian fyftem is fo very great, that he who is poffeffed of all perfection, and the Sovereign Judge of it, is reprefented by feveral of our Divines, as hating fin to the fame degree that he loves the Sacred Perfon who was made the propitiation of it.

Fifthly, In being the ordinary and prefcribed method of making Morality effectual to falvation.

I have only touched on thefe feveral heads, which every one who is converfant in difcourfes of this nature will eafly enlarge upon in his own thoughts, and draw conclufions from them which may be ufeful to him in the conduct of his life. One I am fure is fo obvious, that he cannot mifs it, namely, that a man cannot be perfect in his fcheme of Morality, who does not strengthen and fupport it with that of the Christian Faith.

Befides this, I fhall lay down two or three other maxims which I think we may deduce from what has been faid. First, that we should be particularly cautious of making

making any thing an article of Faith, which does not contribute to the confirmation or improvement of Marality.

Secondly, That no article of Faith can be true and authentic, which weakens or fubverts the practical part of religion, or what I have hitherto called Morality.

Thirdly, That the greatest friend of Morality, or of natural religion, cannot poffibly apprehend any danger from embracing Chriftianity, as it is preferved pure and uncorrupt in the doctrines of our national church.

There is likewife another maxim which I think may be drawn from the foregoing confiderations, which is this, that we fhould in all dubious points, confider any ill confequences that may arise from them, fuppofing they fhould be erroneous, before we give up our affent to them.

For example, in that difputable point of perfecuting men for confcience fake, befides the imbittering their minds with hatred, indignation, and all the vehemence of refentment, and infnaring them to profess what they do not believe; we cut them off from the pleasures and advantages of fociety, afflict their bodies, diftrefs their fortunes, hurt their reputation, ruin their families, make their lives painful, or put an end to them. Sure when I fee fuch dreadful confequences arifing from a principle, I would be as fully convinced of the truth of it, as of a mathematical demonftration, before I would venture to act upon it, or make it a part of my religion.

In this cafe the injury done our neighbour is plain and evident, the principle that puts us upon doing it, of a dubious and difputable nature. Morality feems highly violated by the one, and whether or not a zeal for what a man thinks the true fyftem of Faith may juftify it, is very uncertain. I cannot but think, if our religion produces charity as well as zeal, it will not be for fhewing itself by fuch cruel inftances. But, to conclude with the words of an excellent author, "We have just enough of religion to make us hate, but not enough to make us love one another."