XIX. CHAPTER of some other power; and further, that the high seas were extra-territorial, and that merchant vessels navigat 1806. ing thereon did not carry with them any such foreign jurisdiction as to protect British subjects sailing therein from this exercise of the king's prerogative. To give up this prerogative would render American ships an asylum for British seamen anxious to evade their country's service, and even for deserters from British ships of war, and might, in the peculiar existing state of things, go far toward the overthrow of that naval power on which the safety of the state essentially depended. The Board of Admiralty and the law-officers of the Admiralty courts were unanimous as to the right of the crown, and the impolicy and danger of giving it up; and, under such circumstances, so the British commissioners stated, the ministry could not give it up, without taking a responsibility such as no administration would be willing to assume, however pressing the emergency. At the same time, a readiness was avowed to do any thing to satisfy the United States short of a positive relinquishment of the right to impress British seamen on the high seas; and Monroe and Pinkney were called upon to point out any thing short of such relinquishment which would be satisfactory. But this the American commissioners professed their inability to do. They offered, indeed, by way of offset to the relinquishment upon which they insisted that the aid of the local authorities in America should be given toward the arrest and return of deserters from British ships, whether national or merchant vessels. But this was not thought satisfactory by the British commissioners, since little could be hoped from such interference, even if exercised in good faith; the popular feeling in both countries being in favor of shielding deserters, while their most like XIX. ly places of refuge would be on board of American ves- CHAPTER sels, where, by the stipulation asked for, they would be expressly protected. On the other hand, the British commissioners proposed that laws should be passed by both nations, making it penal on the one hand for British commanders to impress American citizens, and, on the other, for any officer of the American government to grant certificates of American citizenship to British subjects. But this the American commissioners declared to be inadmissible; indeed, it raised the whole delicate and disputed question of the right of a subject or citizen to renounce the allegiance under which he had been born. 1806. In this state of the case, a very important question presented itself to the American commissioners. Should they forego the present fair opportunity of settling so many other grave subjects of dispute, because, as to this one, they could not obtain all they were instructed to ask? The British negotiators declared that although the ministry could not venture to give up, by formal treaty, the right of impressment on the high seas, yet that special instructions should be given and enforced for the observance of the greatest caution against subjecting any American-born citizen to molestation or injury, and that, in case of any such injury, upon representation of it, the promptest redress should be afforded. These assurances they reduced to writing, suggesting, at the same Nov. 8 time, that while both parties thus reserved their rights, this stipulation might answer temporarily all the purposes of a treaty provision. The American commissioners were, in fact, given to understand, though it was not so expressed in terms, that the intention of the British government was not to allow impressments from American vessels on the high seas except under extraordinary cir CHAPTER cumstances, as in the case of their having on board known XIX. deserters from the British navy; thus gradually and si1806. lently abandoning a practice of which the national preju dices and feeling did not admit a specific renunciation. Having obtained every concession on the subject of impressment short of a renunciation by the British gov. ernment of the claim of right to take British subjects out of American vessels-a claim going back to an indefinite antiquity, strongly supported by the national feeling, and thought, at the present crisis of European affairs, essential to the national safety-and having thus placed the United States, as to this question, on ground short, indeed, of their pretensions, and perhaps of their rights, but the best which, at present, there was the slightest prospect of obtaining; especially considering the total inabili ty of the United States to enforce by arms their claim to be exempt from maritime visitation and search, and the total ruin which must ensue, from war with Great Britain, of that maritime commerce which alone made this question of impressments of any practical importance:-under these circumstances, imitating the example of Jay, and of the commission to France in 1799, Monroe and Pinkney did not deem it consistent either with common prudence or common sense to relinquish the advantage thus secured, and, along with it, other advantages in prospect, and, from a too strict adherence to instructions, to leave the country, by breaking off the negotiation, exposed to vast maritime losses, to the continuance and aggravation of present misunderstandings, and to imminent risk of war. They accordingly resolved to proceed with the negotiation, having first informed the British commissioners that they did so on their own responsibility, and with full reserve to the government at home of the privilege to ratify or not, as might be deemed proper. XIX. The stumbling-block of the impressment question thus CHAPTER removed out of the way, the terms of a treaty for ten years were soon agreed to, based principally on Jay's. 1806. By a slight improvement on the provisions of that treaty, the trade between the United States and the European possessions of Great Britain was placed on a basis of entire reciprocity. On the subject of the East India trade the provision was less favorable than Jay's, American vessels being limited in terms to the direct voyage to British India and back. No concessions could be obtained as to the trade to the British West Indies. That stood as before, American vessels being excluded from it. The questions of blockades and of contraband were arranged as in Jay's treaty, an express additional provision being inserted that no American vessels were to be visited or seized within five miles of the American coast. On the great point of the carrying trade, as to which the decisions of the British admiralty courts had caused so much excitement, the right was conceded, for the present war, to transport in American vessels, to any belligerent colony not blockaded by a British force, any European goods except contraband of war, provided the same were American property, had previously been landed in the United States, and had paid a duty of at least one per cent. above the amount drawn back on re-exportation. In like manner, all the produce of such colonies the property of American citizens, and not contraband of war, might be brought to the United States, and having been landed, and having paid a duty of at least two per cent. exclusive of drawback, might be exported in American vessels to any port of Europe not blockaded. The news of the issue of the Berlin decree arriving in England just as this, on the whole, very favorable treaty was ready for signature, occasioned some hesitation on XIX. CHAPTER the part of the British commissioners. They wanted assurances that the United States would not allow their 1806. trade with Great Britain and in British merchandise to be interrupted and interfered with by France without 1807. taking measures to resent it. Finally, however, they Jan. 3. consented to sign; but they presented, at the same time, a written protest against the Berlin decree, reserving to the British government the right, should that decree be actually carried into force as against neutrals, and be submitted to by them, to take such measures of retaliation as might be deemed expedient. One measure of retaliation as against France and her allies was indeed taken, a few days after, by the issue of an order in council restraining neutrals from the coasting trade between one hostile port to another, a commerce hitherto allowed, with some slight exceptions. This, indeed, was but the extension to all the hostile ports of a principle previously applied to the line of coast from Brest to the Elbe, under a British order in council of May 16, 1806, issued in consequence of the occupation of Hanover by the Prussian armies. This was called an order of blockade, and was one of those relied upon by Bonaparte and his apologists as justifying the Berlin deBut, except as to the ports from the Seine to Ostend, before which a marine force was stationed, this order went only to restrain neutrals from trading from port to port along that coast; and by a subsequent order of the 27th of September, previous to the issue of the Berlin decree, even this restriction had been repealed as to the coast from Ems to the Elbe. cree. The same powerful reasons-conclusive to every mind not disturbed by passion or misled by delusive fancies— which had induced the American commissioners to complete and sign this treaty, ought to have operated with |