make any answer to them, I must not grant that they are necessarily conclusive; I must take them only as arguments which perhaps have in them much conveniency, much probability towards conclusiveness. For if a remedy or expedient may be found, they are not of necessity, they are not inevitable grounds: and if not necessary or concluding grounds, why then they will hang upon the reason of expediency or conveniency. And if so, I shall have a little liberty 'to speak;' otherwise I am concluded before I speak. Therefore it will behove me to say what I can, Why these are not necessary reasons; why they are not why it is not (I should say) so interwoven in the Laws but that the Laws may still be executed as justly, and as much to the satisfaction of the people, and answering all objections equally well, without such a Title as with it. And then, when I have done that, I shall only take the liberty to say a word or two for my own grounds.* And when I have said what I can say as to that 'latter point,' I hope you will think a great deal more than I say. [Not convenient to SPEAK everything in so ticklish a predicament; with Deputations of a Hundred Officers, and so many "scrupulous fellows, considerable in their own conceit," glaring into the business, with eyes much sharper than they are deep!] ** Truly though Kingship be not a 'mere' Title, but the Name of an Office which runs through the 'whole of the' Law; yet is it not so ratione nominis, by reason of the name, but by reason of what the name signifies. The Kingship: his Highness finds that the grammar will require to be attended to. ** "Grounds" originating with myself independently of yours. Is this "the second" thing, which his Highness had in view, but did not specify after the "first", when he started? The issue proves it to be so. It is a Name of Office plainly implying a Supreme Authority: is it more; or can it be stretched to more? I say, it is a Name of Office, plainly implying the Supreme Authority: and if so, why then I should suppose, I am not peremptory in anything that is matter of deduction or inference of my own, but I should suppose that whatsoever name hath been or shall be the Name under which the Supreme Authority acts [Sentence abruptly stops; the conclusion being visible without speech!] Why, I say, if it had been those Four or Five Letters, or whatever else it had been -! That signification goes to the thing, certainly it does; and not to the name. [Certainly!] Why, then, there can no more be said but this: As such a Title hath been fixed, so it may be unfixed. And certainly in the right of the Authority, I mean the Legislative Power, in the right of the Legislative Power, I think the Authority that could christen it with such a name could have called it by another name. Therefore the name is only derived from that 'Authority.' And certainly they, 'the primary Legislative Authority,' had the disposal of it, and might have detracted 'from it:' and I hope it will be no offence to say to you, as the case now stands, "So may you." And if it be so that you may, why then I say, there is nothing of necessity in your argument; and all turns on consideration of the expedience of it. [Is the Kingship expedient?] ---- Truly I had rather, if I were to choose, if it were the original question, which I hope is altogether out of the question [His Highness means, afar off, in a polite manner, "You don't pretend that I still need to be made Protector by you or by any creature!"], I had rather have any Name from this Parliament than any other Name without it: so much do I value the authority of the Parliament. And I believe all men are of my mind in that; I believe the Nation is very much of my mind, though it be an uncertain way I think we may -- of arguing, what mind they are of.* say it without offence; for I would give none! [No offence to you, Honourable Gentlemen; who are here, by function, to interpret and signify the Mind of the Nation. It is very difficult to do!] Though the Parliament be the truest way to know what the mind of the Nation is, yet if the Parliament will be pleased to give me a liberty to reason for myself; and if that be one of your arguments ["That:" what, your Highness? That the mind of the Nation, well interpreted by this Parliament, is really for a King? That our Laws cannot go on without a King? His Highness means the former mainly, but means the latter too; means several things together as his manner sometimes is, in abstruse cases] I hope I may urge against it, that the reason of my own mind is not quite to that effect. But I do say undoubtingly (let us think about other things, 'about the mind of the Nation and such like,' what we will), What the Parliament settles is what will run, 'and have currency, through the Law; and will lead the thread of Government through this Land equally well as what hath been. For I consider that what hath been was upon the same account, 'by the same authority.' Save that there hath been some long continuance of the thing [This thing of Kingship], it is but upon the same account! It had its original somewhere! And it was with consent of the whole, there is the ori *Naturally a delicate subject: some assert the Nation has never re cognised his Highness,-- his Highness himself being of a very different 'opinion indeed! ginal of it. And consent of the whole will 'still,' I say, be the needle that will lead the thread through all; [The same tailor-metaphor a second time] and I think no man will pretend right against it, or wrong! And if so, then, under favour to me, I think these arguments from the Law are all not as of necessity, but are to be understood as of conveniency. It is in your power to dispose and settle; and beforehand we can have confidence that what you do settle will be as authentic as the things that were of old, especially as this individual thing, the Name or Title, according to the Parliament's appointment. 'Is not this so? It is question not of necessity; we have power to settle it as conveniency directs.' Why then, there will (with leave) be way made for me to offer a reason or two to the other considerations you adduced: otherwise, I say my mouth is stopped! [His Highness is plunging in deep brakes and imbroglios; hopes, however, that he now sees daylight athwart them.] There are very many inforcements to carry on this thing. [Thing of the Kingship.] But I suppose it will 'have to stand on its expediency Truly I should have urged one consideration more which I forgot [Looks over his shoulder in the jungle and bethinks him], namely, the argument not of reason only, but of experience. It is a short one, but it is a true one (under favour), and is known to you all in the fact of it (under favour) [A damnable iteration; but too characteristic to be omitted]: That the Supreme Authority going by another Name and under another Title than that of King hath been, why it hath been already twice complied-with! [Long Parliament, called "Keepers of the Liberties of England," found compliance; and now the "Protectorate" finds.] 'Twice:' under the Custodes Libertatis Angliæ, and also since I exercised the place, it hath been complied-with. And truly I may say that almost universal obedience hath been given by all ranks and sorts of men to both. Now this, 'on the part of both these Authorities,' was a beginning with the highest degree of Magistracy at the first alteration; and 'at a time' when that 'Kingship' was the Name ‘established:' and the new Name, though it was the name of an invisible thing, the very Name, I say, was obeyed, did pass current, was received and did carry on the 'Public' Justice of the Nation. I remember very well, my Lords the Judges were somewhat startled: yet upon consideration, if I mistake not, I believe so, --- though -- they, there being among them (without reflection) as able and as learned as have sat there, they did, I confess, at first, demur a little, they did receive satisfaction, and did act, as I said before. [Untwist this extraordinary WITHE of a sentence; you will find it not inextricable, and very characteristic of Oliver!] And as for my own part [My own Protectorate], I profess I think I may say: Since the beginning of that change, though I should be loath to speak anything vainly, but since the beginning of that change to this day, I do not think there hath been a freer procedure of the Laws, not even in those years called, and not unworthily, the "Halcyon Days of Peace," from the Twentieth of Elizabeth to King James's and King Charles's time. I do not think but the Laws have proceeded with as much freedom and justice, and with less of private solicitation, since I came to the Government, as they did in those years so named, 'Halcyon.' I do not think, under favour, [His |