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THE

ANTI-JACOBIN

Review and Magazine;

&c. &c. &c.

FOR MAY, 1802.

Si quis LUMEN amat, Mufarum e LAMPADE quærat,
Non e Plebeâ (Plebs fine mente!) face.
Hoc Votum pro Pace, hæc Gaudia digna Britannis,
Scriptori hinc oritur Pacis amica quies.

ORIGINAL CRITICISM.

Elements of the Philofophy of the Mind, and of Moral Philofophy. To which is prefixed a Compendium of Logic. By Thomas Belsham. 9s. 8vo. PP. 448. 1801.

MR. Belfham's book profeffes no less than to deliver, in an abridged

form, a complete fyftem of logic, a complete theory of the operations of the human mind, both intellectual and active, and a complete theory of moral fentiments. It is a view of Hartley's philofophy which the author proposes to give in the two laft of thefe articles. This is not the only view we have of the same doctrine. His book therefore is one of a clafs; and we shall on that account give it a more full investigation than its individual merits would entitle it to.

In the first place, we object to his arrangement. He himfelf tells us that "logic is one branch of the theory of the human mind applied to a practical purpose." This is abundantly exceptionable as a definition. But furely, according to this account, the application, of the theory ought not to be taught before the theory. Yet in Mr. Belfham's book logic ftands firft; his theory of the human mind comes after. He does not seem to have confidered the difference between science and art and their connection with one another; science is the foundation of art, and art is built on fcience. Logic teaches B

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the art of applying the faculties of the mind, and the account of the laws of human thought is the fciencè on which that art is founded. To place, therefore, as Mr. B. has done, his logic before his metaphyfics, is exactly the fame thing as for a perfon profeffing to deliver a fyftem of geometry to place trigonometry and navigation before the elements of Euclid.

The logic itself is a fhort view of the vulgar old fyftem. It is no more than an account of the fyllogiftic method of reafoning, with an appendage, which fince the time of Mr. Locke has been generally prefixed to it, an abridgement of his doctrine of ideas, all copied chiefly from Dr. Watts. It deferves, therefore, little either of praise or blame, which is not due to the treatife of that author.

Let us examine, however, one or two of his enumerations and definitions, that we may fee what acuteness and accuracy we have to expect from him as a metaphyfician. "Perception, judgment, reasoning, and difpofition," fays he, in his introduction," are the operations of the mind in the acquifition and communication of knowledge." By this account, memory has nothing to do in the acquifition of knowledge. At the beginning of Sec. Ift. is this definition, "Perception is the attention which the mind pays to a variety of impreffions made upon it by external objects, or by internal feelings; or, it is the faculty by which we acquire fenfations and ideas." Not to ask him what he means by impreffions made upon the mind, or how external objects can make an impreffion on the mind, let us only afk what he means "by internal feelings making an impreffion on the mind." If thefe feelings are of the internal part of the body, they make impreffions on the mind in the fame way as the feelings of the external part. But if they be what are called mental feelings, we know not what kind of impreffion on the mind a mental feeling can make. The mental feeling is itself an impreffion, by Mr. B.'s doctrine to say, therefore, that a mental feeling makes an impreffion on the mind is to fay that an impreffion on the mind makes an impreffion on the mind.

"Or," fays Mr. B. " perception is the faculty by which we acquire fenfations and ideas." To make this definition intelligible, he fhould first have given us the definition of fenfation and idea. However he gives it us immediately after. "Senfation," fays he, "is the perception of an object by the organs of fenfe." By the definition of perception, fenfation is got by means of perception. By the definition of sensation, it is perception itself. Perception therefore is got by means of perception; and fenfation and perception are the fame thing. "A

We have, in the fame page, another definition of fenfation. fenfation is the impreffion made upon the mind by an object actually prefent." A fenfation therefore is an impreffion. Perception, he has told us before, is the faculty by which we acquire fenfations. It is therefore the faculty by which we acquire impreffions. But he

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told us in the fame definition that perception is the faculty of attending to impreffions. How then can it be the faculty by which they are acquired? How can it attend to them unless they be acquired already? But, further, he tells us here that fenfation is impreffion. He told us in the fentence before that it is perception. Therefore fenfation, perception, and impreffion, are all exactly the fame thing. We have often heard of reafoning in a circle; but this is the first fpecimen of defining in a circle which has ftruck our attention.

It was not to be expected that an author of this caft fhould produce any of the improvements, which logic, as still taught, stands fo much in need of. But an author, who at this time of day undertakes to deliver a fystem of logic, fhould certainly know that the fyllogistic art is a very small part of that important fubject. Lord Bacon gave a very comprehenfive view of it under four heads, 1. Ars Inveniendi, 2. Ars Judicandi, 3. Ars Retinendi, 4. Ars Tradendi. The first of these, as far as respected the arts and fciences, Lord Bacon pronounced to be entirely wanting in his time, and exerted all his abilities to fupply, producing his glorious doctrine of induction. And it is truly aftonishing that none of the authors who fince his time have produced fyftems of logic, have thought of delivering fully fo much as what he has left us on that fubject, not to fpeak of perfecting what he left uncompleted. This author is fo perfectly unacquainted with the nature of Lord Bacon's Induction, that he evidently confounds it (fee his account of Induction) with the old induction of the fchools; of which Lord Bacon pronounces thus, Vitiofa plane eft et incompetens, & naturam tantum abest ut perficiat, ut etiam pervertat & detorqueat. Hæc inductionis formal tam pinguis eft & craffa, ut incredibile videatur tam acuta & fubtilia ingenia potuiffe eam mundo obtrudere, nifi illud in caufa fuiffet quod opera feftinata ad theorias & dogmata contendiffent. It was the fpecies most suitable to the genius and practice of Mr. B. We do not mean to speak disrespectfully of this gentleman's abilities or intentions; but furely we may be allowed to conclude, from the fpecimen we have already exhibited, that his talent is not for metaphyfics.

We now proceed to the fecond part of this book, the philofophy of the human mind. The author himself tells us, very juftly, as he enters upon this fubject, that the object of the philofophy of mind is "to investigate the laws of the intellectual world ;" he adds, "and explain the phenomena." This is exactly the fame thing. To explain the phenomena is to investigate the laws of any part of nature, and to investigate the laws is to explain the phenomena. This is another of thofe inftances, with which this book abounds, of inaccuracy in the use of language, and a feeming ignorance of the true bufìnefs of philofophy.

In inveftigating the laws of any part of nature, there are two ways which may be followed, either, ift, what Lord Bacon calls anticipationes, that is, forming conjectures beforehand of 'what we think are the rules which nature follows in producing the events which we

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obferve, and then endeavouring to make thefe events correfpond to our theory; or 2dly, carefully obferving the events which nature produces, to learn from thefe events themselves what is the established order in which nature actually brings them about. The first of these is called the method of hypothefis or theory; the fecond that of induction or experience. Mr. B. after stating Sir Ifaac Newton's abftract of the rules of this fecond mode of philofophiling, declares," that thefe rules which have been fo fuccefsfully applied to the investigation of the phenomena of nature, ought to be adhered to with equal rigour in our attempts to folve the phenomena of mind." And yet immediately after he enters upon a formal vindication of the firft mode, and directs himself by it through the whole of his book. All that he has faid in favour of hypothefis, and all that can be faid, amounts only to this, that it may fometimes be ufed as a help to induction, but never that it can be fubftituted for induction, as he has employed it; and he even allows that it is a dangerous help. Dr. Hartley, Dr. Priestley, and Mr. Belfham have proceeded altogether according to the first method. Mr. Locke, Dr. Reid, Mr. Dugald Stuart, and fome others have made great efforts to introduce the fecond mode of philofophifing into the inquiries refpecting mind. It is rather remarkable that Dr. Priestley and Mr. Belham, not contented with adopting in their own practice the firft mode of philofophifing, have ftated themselves to be the peculiar enemies of those who have adopted the second; and have remarked, the former of these gentlemen in particular, upon Dr. Reid and fome others of the Scottish philofophers, with an illiberality of construction, and a coarseness of abuse, not very becoming either philofophers or gentlemen.

They have, indeed, been very eager to represent Mr. Locke as of their party; how juftly the flighteft acquaintance with his book muft demonftrate. Mr. Locke's object was not to give a theory of the mind; he does not even propofe to investigate all the faculties of the mind; he investigates one faculty only. The object of his book is twofold; ift, to examine the faculty of conception; and, 2dly, the nature and extent of evidence. The first of these objects he accomplishes by two inquiries; 1ft, what are the fources from which our conceptions are derived; thefe, according to him, are fenfation and reflection: 2d, what are the heads under which our conceptions, infinite and diverfified as they appear, may be claffed. The latter of thefe inquiries he has executed in a manner wonderfully fatisfactory, an atchievement of thought the greatest perhaps on record in the history of the human mind. He first divides them into two grand claffes, ift, fimple, 2d, compound, and fhews what is the nature of each. Thefe again are subdivided, 1ft, the fimple into two claffes; 1ft, fenfible qualities of matter; 2d, operations of mind of which we are confcious and the fecond great divifion, compound conceptions, is fubdivided into three claffes; they are either, ift, of fubftances, thofe groups of fimple conceptions, the archetypes of which nature prefents to us united; or, 2dly, mixed modes, groups of conceptions arbitra

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