The Spirit of Laws, Volumes 1-2J. Collingwood, 1823 - Jurisprudence |
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Page xviii
... republic , to maintain equality and frugality ; in monarchy , to support the nobility without ruining the people ; in a despotic govern- ment , to silence and equally to keep under subjection those of every condition . M. de Montesquieu ...
... republic , to maintain equality and frugality ; in monarchy , to support the nobility without ruining the people ; in a despotic govern- ment , to silence and equally to keep under subjection those of every condition . M. de Montesquieu ...
Page xxvii
... republic to attend to its true interests . Even the ostracism was a good law ; for , on one hand it was honourable to the citizen who was the object of it , and prevented on the other , the effects of ambition : besides , a great number ...
... republic to attend to its true interests . Even the ostracism was a good law ; for , on one hand it was honourable to the citizen who was the object of it , and prevented on the other , the effects of ambition : besides , a great number ...
Page xxx
... republic , is the love of one's country , that is , the love of equality . It is not a moral , nor a christian , but a political virtue ; and it is the spring which sets the republican government in motion , as honour is the spring ...
... republic , is the love of one's country , that is , the love of equality . It is not a moral , nor a christian , but a political virtue ; and it is the spring which sets the republican government in motion , as honour is the spring ...
Page xxxvi
... Republic in a Democracy 40 4. In what manner the Love of Equality and Frugality is inspired .... 41 5. In what manner the Laws establish Equality in a De- .... mocracy ibid . 6. In what manner the Laws ought to maintain Frugality in a ...
... Republic in a Democracy 40 4. In what manner the Love of Equality and Frugality is inspired .... 41 5. In what manner the Laws establish Equality in a De- .... mocracy ibid . 6. In what manner the Laws ought to maintain Frugality in a ...
Page xxxvii
... Republic ibid . 17 . Distinctive Properties of a Monarchy 121 18 . 19 . 122 Particular Case of the Spanish Distinctive Properties of a Monarchy Despotic Government ... ibid . Consequence of the preceding 21. Of the Empire of China ibid ...
... Republic ibid . 17 . Distinctive Properties of a Monarchy 121 18 . 19 . 122 Particular Case of the Spanish Distinctive Properties of a Monarchy Despotic Government ... ibid . Consequence of the preceding 21. Of the Empire of China ibid ...
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Common terms and phrases
abuse accused advantage affairs amongst ancient aristocracy Aristotle Asia Athens body cause CHAP China citizens civil laws climate commerce conquered conquest consequence constitution contrary corruption crimes customs danger decemvirs democracy despotic governments Dionys emperor empire endeavour equal established Europe executive power father favour fortune give Greeks Halicarn Hence high treason honour Ibid inhabitants judge Julian law kind kings labour land latter legislative liberty likewise Livy luxury magistrates manner marriage ment merchandizes moderate governments monarchies Montesquieu morals nations nature necessary never nobility obliged particular passions Persia person Plato Plutarch political preserve prince principle proper proportion provinces punishment reason regulations relation religion render republic respect riches Romans Rome Salic Salic law says senate Servius Tullius slavery slaves Sparta specie spirit Strabo Subject continued subsistence sumptuary laws Tacitus taxes thing tion trade tribunal twelve tables Ulpian virtue Visigoths women
Popular passages
Page 154 - When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty ; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner.
Page 199 - If thy brother, the son of thy mother, or thy son, or thy daughter, or the wife of thy bosom, or thy friend, which is as thine own soul, entice thee secretly, saying, Let us go and serve other gods...
Page 319 - The enjoyment of liberty, and even its support and preservation, consists in every man's being allowed to speak his thoughts, and lay open his sentiments.
Page 129 - Should a popular insurrection happen in one of the confederate states, the others are able to quell it. Should abuses creep into one part, they are reformed by those that remain sound. The state may be destroyed on one side, and not on the other; the confederacy may be dissolved, and the confederates preserve their sovereignty. "As this government is composed of...
Page 160 - But as we have already observed, the national judges are no more than the mouth that pronounces the words of the law, mere passive beings, incapable of moderating either its force or rigour.
Page 154 - There would be an end of everything, were the same man or the same body, whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and of trying the causes of individuals.
Page 159 - But if the legislative power in a free state has no right to stay the executive, it has a right and ought to have the means of examining in what manner its laws have been executed...
Page 129 - If a single member should attempt to usurp the supreme authority, he could not be supposed to have an equal authority and credit in all the confederate states. Were he to have too great influence over one, this would alarm the rest.
Page 122 - It is natural to a republic to have only a small territory, otherwise it cannot long subsist.
Page 128 - It is very probable" (says he*) "that mankind would have been obliged at length to live constantly under the government of a SINGLE PERSON, had they not contrived a kind of constitution that has all the internal advantages of a republican, together with the external force of a monarchical, government.