The Spirit of Laws, Volumes 1-2J. Collingwood, 1823 - Jurisprudence |
From inside the book
Results 1-5 of 99
Page ix
... less famous , whom our author saw fre- quently at Venice , was count Bonneval . This man so well known by his adventures , which were not yet brought to their final period , pleased to have a judge that deserved so well to hear him ...
... less famous , whom our author saw fre- quently at Venice , was count Bonneval . This man so well known by his adventures , which were not yet brought to their final period , pleased to have a judge that deserved so well to hear him ...
Page xiii
... less formality : he knew that the conclusion of a pleasant story is the chief point ; therefore he hastened to it , and produced the desired effect , without having pro- mised it . The pleasure found in his company was not merely the ...
... less formality : he knew that the conclusion of a pleasant story is the chief point ; therefore he hastened to it , and produced the desired effect , without having pro- mised it . The pleasure found in his company was not merely the ...
Page xiv
... less considerable works , which served him for relaxation . The most remarkable of these is the Temple de Gnide , which appeared soon after the Lettres Persannes . In this piece he paints the delicacy and simplicity of pastoral love ...
... less considerable works , which served him for relaxation . The most remarkable of these is the Temple de Gnide , which appeared soon after the Lettres Persannes . In this piece he paints the delicacy and simplicity of pastoral love ...
Page xvi
... less efficacious , which are destined to suspend or to restrain their blows . But the prodigious extent of the globe which we inhabit , the different nature of the regions of the earth , and of the people who are spread over it , not ...
... less efficacious , which are destined to suspend or to restrain their blows . But the prodigious extent of the globe which we inhabit , the different nature of the regions of the earth , and of the people who are spread over it , not ...
Page xix
... less than monarchies : immense conquests suppose despotism already in a state , or render its approach certain . One of the great principles of the spirit of conquest ought to be , to render the condition of the conquered as much better ...
... less than monarchies : immense conquests suppose despotism already in a state , or render its approach certain . One of the great principles of the spirit of conquest ought to be , to render the condition of the conquered as much better ...
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Common terms and phrases
abuse accused advantage affairs amongst ancient aristocracy Aristotle Asia Athens body cause CHAP China citizens civil laws climate commerce conquered conquest consequence constitution contrary corruption crimes customs danger decemvirs democracy despotic governments Dionys emperor empire endeavour equal established Europe executive power father favour fortune give Greeks Halicarn Hence high treason honour Ibid inhabitants judge Julian law kind kings labour land latter legislative liberty likewise Livy luxury magistrates manner marriage ment merchandizes moderate governments monarchies Montesquieu morals nations nature necessary never nobility obliged particular passions Persia person Plato Plutarch political preserve prince principle proper proportion provinces punishment reason regulations relation religion render republic respect riches Romans Rome Salic Salic law says senate Servius Tullius slavery slaves Sparta specie spirit Strabo Subject continued subsistence sumptuary laws Tacitus taxes thing tion trade tribunal twelve tables Ulpian virtue Visigoths women
Popular passages
Page 154 - When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty ; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner.
Page 199 - If thy brother, the son of thy mother, or thy son, or thy daughter, or the wife of thy bosom, or thy friend, which is as thine own soul, entice thee secretly, saying, Let us go and serve other gods...
Page 319 - The enjoyment of liberty, and even its support and preservation, consists in every man's being allowed to speak his thoughts, and lay open his sentiments.
Page 129 - Should a popular insurrection happen in one of the confederate states, the others are able to quell it. Should abuses creep into one part, they are reformed by those that remain sound. The state may be destroyed on one side, and not on the other; the confederacy may be dissolved, and the confederates preserve their sovereignty. "As this government is composed of...
Page 160 - But as we have already observed, the national judges are no more than the mouth that pronounces the words of the law, mere passive beings, incapable of moderating either its force or rigour.
Page 154 - There would be an end of everything, were the same man or the same body, whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and of trying the causes of individuals.
Page 159 - But if the legislative power in a free state has no right to stay the executive, it has a right and ought to have the means of examining in what manner its laws have been executed...
Page 129 - If a single member should attempt to usurp the supreme authority, he could not be supposed to have an equal authority and credit in all the confederate states. Were he to have too great influence over one, this would alarm the rest.
Page 122 - It is natural to a republic to have only a small territory, otherwise it cannot long subsist.
Page 128 - It is very probable" (says he*) "that mankind would have been obliged at length to live constantly under the government of a SINGLE PERSON, had they not contrived a kind of constitution that has all the internal advantages of a republican, together with the external force of a monarchical, government.