The Spirit of Laws, Volumes 1-2J. Collingwood, 1823 - Jurisprudence |
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Results 1-5 of 67
Page ii
... fortune is no less adven- titious than transitory ; it indiscriminately falls to the share of the virtuous and the undeserving ; and is but too often prostituted to the base purposes of debauchery and corruption . The extraordinary ...
... fortune is no less adven- titious than transitory ; it indiscriminately falls to the share of the virtuous and the undeserving ; and is but too often prostituted to the base purposes of debauchery and corruption . The extraordinary ...
Page vi
... fortune and his office to M. de Montes- quieu , who had been admitted a counsellor in the parliament of Bourdeaux , February 24th , 1714 , and was received pre- sident à mortier , July 13th , 1716. In 1722 , during the king's minority ...
... fortune and his office to M. de Montes- quieu , who had been admitted a counsellor in the parliament of Bourdeaux , February 24th , 1714 , and was received pre- sident à mortier , July 13th , 1716. In 1722 , during the king's minority ...
Page vii
... fortunes . Though this piece had the greatest success , it was not owned by the author . There were several free expressions in it , relating , not to the essentials of Christianity , but to things that many people endeavour to confound ...
... fortunes . Though this piece had the greatest success , it was not owned by the author . There were several free expressions in it , relating , not to the essentials of Christianity , but to things that many people endeavour to confound ...
Page xxi
... fortune of every member of it . Besides , in a democratical state , an unjust application of the public revenue is ... fortunes out of what belongs to the public , to plunder them in their turn , as was formerly prac- tised in certain ...
... fortune of every member of it . Besides , in a democratical state , an unjust application of the public revenue is ... fortunes out of what belongs to the public , to plunder them in their turn , as was formerly prac- tised in certain ...
Page 8
... fortune ; Rome , who had sometimes all her inhabitants without her walls , and sometimes all Italy and a considerable part of the world within them : Rome , I say , never fixed the number ; † and this was one of the principal causes of ...
... fortune ; Rome , who had sometimes all her inhabitants without her walls , and sometimes all Italy and a considerable part of the world within them : Rome , I say , never fixed the number ; † and this was one of the principal causes of ...
Contents
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Common terms and phrases
abuse accused advantage affairs amongst ancient aristocracy Aristotle Asia Athens body cause CHAP China citizens civil laws climate commerce conquered conquest consequence constitution contrary corruption crimes customs danger decemvirs democracy despotic governments Dionys emperor empire endeavour equal established Europe executive power father favour fortune give Greeks Halicarn Hence high treason honour Ibid inhabitants judge Julian law kind kings labour land latter legislative liberty likewise Livy luxury magistrates manner marriage ment merchandizes moderate governments monarchies Montesquieu morals nations nature necessary never nobility obliged particular passions Persia person Plato Plutarch political preserve prince principle proper proportion provinces punishment reason regulations relation religion render republic respect riches Romans Rome Salic Salic law says senate Servius Tullius slavery slaves Sparta specie spirit Strabo Subject continued subsistence sumptuary laws Tacitus taxes thing tion trade tribunal twelve tables Ulpian virtue Visigoths women
Popular passages
Page 154 - When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty ; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner.
Page 199 - If thy brother, the son of thy mother, or thy son, or thy daughter, or the wife of thy bosom, or thy friend, which is as thine own soul, entice thee secretly, saying, Let us go and serve other gods...
Page 319 - The enjoyment of liberty, and even its support and preservation, consists in every man's being allowed to speak his thoughts, and lay open his sentiments.
Page 129 - Should a popular insurrection happen in one of the confederate states, the others are able to quell it. Should abuses creep into one part, they are reformed by those that remain sound. The state may be destroyed on one side, and not on the other; the confederacy may be dissolved, and the confederates preserve their sovereignty. "As this government is composed of...
Page 160 - But as we have already observed, the national judges are no more than the mouth that pronounces the words of the law, mere passive beings, incapable of moderating either its force or rigour.
Page 154 - There would be an end of everything, were the same man or the same body, whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and of trying the causes of individuals.
Page 159 - But if the legislative power in a free state has no right to stay the executive, it has a right and ought to have the means of examining in what manner its laws have been executed...
Page 129 - If a single member should attempt to usurp the supreme authority, he could not be supposed to have an equal authority and credit in all the confederate states. Were he to have too great influence over one, this would alarm the rest.
Page 122 - It is natural to a republic to have only a small territory, otherwise it cannot long subsist.
Page 128 - It is very probable" (says he*) "that mankind would have been obliged at length to live constantly under the government of a SINGLE PERSON, had they not contrived a kind of constitution that has all the internal advantages of a republican, together with the external force of a monarchical, government.