The Spirit of Laws, Volumes 1-2J. Collingwood, 1823 - Jurisprudence |
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Page 8
... extremely well qualified for choosing those whom they are to intrust with part of their authority . They have only to be determined by things to which they cannot be strangers , and by facts that are obvious to sense . They can tell ...
... extremely well qualified for choosing those whom they are to intrust with part of their authority . They have only to be determined by things to which they cannot be strangers , and by facts that are obvious to sense . They can tell ...
Page 10
... extremely backward in giving in their names to be drawn by lot . The law which determines the manner of giving suffrage , is likewise fundamental in a democracy . It is a question of See in the Considerations on the causes of the ...
... extremely backward in giving in their names to be drawn by lot . The law which determines the manner of giving suffrage , is likewise fundamental in a democracy . It is a question of See in the Considerations on the causes of the ...
Page 18
... extremely agreeable to the nature of things . For it is clear , that in a monarchy , where he who commands the execution of the laws , generally thinks himself above them , there is less need of virtue than in a popular government ...
... extremely agreeable to the nature of things . For it is clear , that in a monarchy , where he who commands the execution of the laws , generally thinks himself above them , there is less need of virtue than in a popular government ...
Page 22
... extremely difficult for the people to be virtuous * . Let us compare what the historians of all ages have asserted concerning the courts of monarchs ; let us recollect the con- versations and sentiments of people of all countries , in ...
... extremely difficult for the people to be virtuous * . Let us compare what the historians of all ages have asserted concerning the courts of monarchs ; let us recollect the con- versations and sentiments of people of all countries , in ...
Page 25
... extremely dangerous . Here the immense power of the prince is devolved entirely upon those whom he is pleased to intrust with the adminis- Persons capable of setting a value upon themselves , would be likely to create disturbances ...
... extremely dangerous . Here the immense power of the prince is devolved entirely upon those whom he is pleased to intrust with the adminis- Persons capable of setting a value upon themselves , would be likely to create disturbances ...
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Common terms and phrases
abuse accused advantage affairs amongst ancient aristocracy Aristotle Asia Athens body cause CHAP China citizens civil laws climate commerce conquered conquest consequence constitution contrary corruption crimes customs danger decemvirs democracy despotic governments Dionys emperor empire endeavour equal established Europe executive power father favour fortune give Greeks Halicarn Hence high treason honour Ibid inhabitants judge Julian law kind kings labour land latter legislative liberty likewise Livy luxury magistrates manner marriage ment merchandizes moderate governments monarchies Montesquieu morals nations nature necessary never nobility obliged particular passions Persia person Plato Plutarch political preserve prince principle proper proportion provinces punishment reason regulations relation religion render republic respect riches Romans Rome Salic Salic law says senate Servius Tullius slavery slaves Sparta specie spirit Strabo Subject continued subsistence sumptuary laws Tacitus taxes thing tion trade tribunal twelve tables Ulpian virtue Visigoths women
Popular passages
Page 154 - When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty ; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner.
Page 199 - If thy brother, the son of thy mother, or thy son, or thy daughter, or the wife of thy bosom, or thy friend, which is as thine own soul, entice thee secretly, saying, Let us go and serve other gods...
Page 319 - The enjoyment of liberty, and even its support and preservation, consists in every man's being allowed to speak his thoughts, and lay open his sentiments.
Page 129 - Should a popular insurrection happen in one of the confederate states, the others are able to quell it. Should abuses creep into one part, they are reformed by those that remain sound. The state may be destroyed on one side, and not on the other; the confederacy may be dissolved, and the confederates preserve their sovereignty. "As this government is composed of...
Page 160 - But as we have already observed, the national judges are no more than the mouth that pronounces the words of the law, mere passive beings, incapable of moderating either its force or rigour.
Page 154 - There would be an end of everything, were the same man or the same body, whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and of trying the causes of individuals.
Page 159 - But if the legislative power in a free state has no right to stay the executive, it has a right and ought to have the means of examining in what manner its laws have been executed...
Page 129 - If a single member should attempt to usurp the supreme authority, he could not be supposed to have an equal authority and credit in all the confederate states. Were he to have too great influence over one, this would alarm the rest.
Page 122 - It is natural to a republic to have only a small territory, otherwise it cannot long subsist.
Page 128 - It is very probable" (says he*) "that mankind would have been obliged at length to live constantly under the government of a SINGLE PERSON, had they not contrived a kind of constitution that has all the internal advantages of a republican, together with the external force of a monarchical, government.