The Spirit of Laws, Volumes 1-2J. Collingwood, 1823 - Jurisprudence |
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Page xviii
... able to the principle of each government : in a republic , to maintain equality and frugality ; in monarchy , to support the nobility without ruining the people ; in a despotic govern- ment , to silence and equally to keep under ...
... able to the principle of each government : in a republic , to maintain equality and frugality ; in monarchy , to support the nobility without ruining the people ; in a despotic govern- ment , to silence and equally to keep under ...
Page xxii
... able for his life to the state , is still more so for his liberty , and consequently has no title to sell it . Besides , what could be a proper price for such a sale ? It cannot be the money given to the seller , because the moment he ...
... able for his life to the state , is still more so for his liberty , and consequently has no title to sell it . Besides , what could be a proper price for such a sale ? It cannot be the money given to the seller , because the moment he ...
Page xxvi
... able to read , without being moved , the Remonstrance to the Inquisitors , that odious tribunal , which outrageously affronts religion when it appears to avenge it . In a word , after having treated in particular of the different kinds ...
... able to read , without being moved , the Remonstrance to the Inquisitors , that odious tribunal , which outrageously affronts religion when it appears to avenge it . In a word , after having treated in particular of the different kinds ...
Page xxxiii
... able to practise that general virtue , which comprehends the love of all . Man , that flexible being , conforming in society to the thoughts and impressions of others , is equally capable of knowing his own nature , whenever it is laid ...
... able to practise that general virtue , which comprehends the love of all . Man , that flexible being , conforming in society to the thoughts and impressions of others , is equally capable of knowing his own nature , whenever it is laid ...
Page 6
... able to nature , is that which best agrees with the humour and disposition of the people in whose favour it is established . The strength of individuals cannot be united without a conjunction of all their wills . The conjunction of ...
... able to nature , is that which best agrees with the humour and disposition of the people in whose favour it is established . The strength of individuals cannot be united without a conjunction of all their wills . The conjunction of ...
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Common terms and phrases
abuse accused advantage affairs amongst ancient aristocracy Aristotle Asia Athens body cause CHAP China citizens civil laws climate commerce conquered conquest consequence constitution contrary corruption crimes customs danger decemvirs democracy despotic governments Dionys emperor empire endeavour equal established Europe executive power father favour fortune give Greeks Halicarn Hence high treason honour Ibid inhabitants judge Julian law kind kings labour land latter legislative liberty likewise Livy luxury magistrates manner marriage ment merchandizes moderate governments monarchies Montesquieu morals nations nature necessary never nobility obliged particular passions Persia person Plato Plutarch political preserve prince principle proper proportion provinces punishment reason regulations relation religion render republic respect riches Romans Rome Salic Salic law says senate Servius Tullius slavery slaves Sparta specie spirit Strabo Subject continued subsistence sumptuary laws Tacitus taxes thing tion trade tribunal twelve tables Ulpian virtue Visigoths women
Popular passages
Page 154 - When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty ; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner.
Page 199 - If thy brother, the son of thy mother, or thy son, or thy daughter, or the wife of thy bosom, or thy friend, which is as thine own soul, entice thee secretly, saying, Let us go and serve other gods...
Page 319 - The enjoyment of liberty, and even its support and preservation, consists in every man's being allowed to speak his thoughts, and lay open his sentiments.
Page 129 - Should a popular insurrection happen in one of the confederate states, the others are able to quell it. Should abuses creep into one part, they are reformed by those that remain sound. The state may be destroyed on one side, and not on the other; the confederacy may be dissolved, and the confederates preserve their sovereignty. "As this government is composed of...
Page 160 - But as we have already observed, the national judges are no more than the mouth that pronounces the words of the law, mere passive beings, incapable of moderating either its force or rigour.
Page 154 - There would be an end of everything, were the same man or the same body, whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and of trying the causes of individuals.
Page 159 - But if the legislative power in a free state has no right to stay the executive, it has a right and ought to have the means of examining in what manner its laws have been executed...
Page 129 - If a single member should attempt to usurp the supreme authority, he could not be supposed to have an equal authority and credit in all the confederate states. Were he to have too great influence over one, this would alarm the rest.
Page 122 - It is natural to a republic to have only a small territory, otherwise it cannot long subsist.
Page 128 - It is very probable" (says he*) "that mankind would have been obliged at length to live constantly under the government of a SINGLE PERSON, had they not contrived a kind of constitution that has all the internal advantages of a republican, together with the external force of a monarchical, government.