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ing civil and criminal causes; he called the senate together, convened the people, laid some affairs before the latter, and regulated the rest with the senate.

The authority of the senate was very great. The kings oftentimes pitched upon senators with whom they sat in judgment; and they never laid any affair before the people, till it had been previously debated § in that august assembly.

The people had the right of choosing|| magistrates, of consenting to the new laws, and, with the king's permission, of making war and peace; but they had not the judicial power. When Tullius Hostilius referred the trial of Horatius to the people, he had his particular reasons, which may be seen in Dionysius Halicarnasseus.

The constitution altered under ** Servius Tullius. The senate had no share in his election; he caused himself to be proclaimed by the people; he resigned the power of hearing civil causes,++ reserving none to himself but those of a criminal nature; he laid all affairs directly before the people, eased them of the taxes, and imposed the whole burthen on the patricians. Hence in proportion as he weakened the regal together with the senatorian power, he augmented that of the plebeians. ‡‡

Tarquin would neither be chosen by the senate nor by the people; he considered Servius Tullius as an usurper, and seized the crown as his hereditary right. He destroyed most of the senators; those who remained he never consulted; nor did he even so much as summon them to assist at his decisions. §§ Thus his power increased: but the odium of that power received a new addition, by usurping also the authority

See Tanaquil's discourse on Livy, book 1. dec. 1. and the regulations of Servius Tullius in Dionys. Halicarn. book 4. p. 229.

+ See Dionys. Halicarn. book 2. p. 118, and book 3. p. 171.

It was by virtue of a senatus consultum, that Tullius Hostilius ordered Alba to be destroyed. Dionys. Halicarn. book 3. p, 167, &

172.

§ Ibid. book. 4. p. 276.

| Ibid. book 2. And yet they could not have the nomination of all offices, since Valerius Publicola made that famous law, by which every citizen was forbid to exercise any employment, unless he had obtained it by the suffrage of the people.

Book 3. p. 159.

** Dionys. Halicarn. book 4.

+ He divested himself of half the regal power, says Dionys. Halicarn. book 4. p. 229.

It was thought that if he had not been prevented by Tarquin, he would have established a popular government. Dionys. Halicarn.

book 4. p. 243.

Dionys. Halicarn. book 4.

of the people, against, whose consent he enacted several laws. The three powers were by these means re-united in his person; but the people at a critical minute recollected that they were legislators, and there was an end of Tarquin.

CHAP. XIII.

General Reflections on the State of Rome after the Expulsion of · its Kings.

IT is impossible to be tired of so agreeable a subject as ancient Rome: thus strangers at present leave the modern palaces of that celebrated capital to visit the ruins; and thus the eye after recreating itself with the view of flowery meads, is pleased with the wild prospect of rocks and mountains.

The patrician families were at all times possessed of great privileges. These distinctions, which were considerable under the kings, became much more important after their expulsion. Hence arose the jealousy of the plebeians, who wanted to reduce them. The contest struck at the constitution, without weakening the government; for it was very indifferent of what family were the magistrates, provided the magistracy preserved its authority.

An elective monarchy, like that of Rome, necessarily supposes a powerful aristocratic body to support it; without which it changes immediately into tyranny or into a popular state. But a popular state has no need of this distinction of families to maintain itself. To this it was owing that the patricians, who were a necessary part of the constitution under the regal government, became a superfluous branch under the consuls; the people could suppress them without hurting themselves, and change the constitution without corrupting it.

After Servius Tullius had reduced the patricians, it was natural that Rome should fall from the regal hands into those of the people. But the people had no occasion to be afraid of relapsing under a regal power, by reducing the patri

cians.

A state may alter two different ways, either by the amendment or by the corruption of the constitution. If it has preserved its principles and the constitution changes, this is owing to its amendment; if upon changing the constitu

tion its principles are lost, this is because it has been corrupted.

The government of Rome, after the expulsion of the kings, should naturally have been a democracy. The people had already the legislative power in their hands; it was their unanimous consent that had expelled the Tarquins; and if they had not continued steady to those principles, the Tarquins might easily have been restored. To pretend that their design in expelling them was to render themselves slaves to a few families, is quite absurd. The situation therefore of things required that Rome should have formed a democracy, and yet this did not happen. There was a necessity that the power of the principal families should be tempered, and that the laws should have a bias to democracy.

The prosperity of states is frequently greater in the insensible transition from one constitution to another, than in either of those constitutions. Then it is, that all the springs of government are upon the stretch, that the citizens assert their claims, that friendships or enmities are formed amongst the jarring parties, and that there is a noble emulation between those who defend the ancient, and those who are strenuous in promoting the new constitution.

CHAP. XIV.

In what Manner the Distribution of the three Powers began to change after the Expulsion of the Kings.

THERE were four things that greatly prejudiced the liberty of Rome. The patricians had engrossed to themselves all public employments whatever; an exorbitant power was annexed to the consulate; the people were often insulted; and in fine they had scarce any influence at all left in the public suffrages. These four abuses were redressed by the people.

1st. It was regulated that the plebeians might aspire to some magistracies; and by degrees they were rendered capable of them all, except that of Inter-rex.

2nd. The consulate was dissolved into several other magistracies; prætors were created, on whom the power was con

*

Livy, 1. Decad. book 6.

ferred of trying private causes; quæstors were nominated for determining those of a criminal nature; ædiles were established for the civil administration, treasurers were made for the management of the public money; and, in fine, by the creation of censors the consuls were divested of that part of the legislative power which regulates the morals of the citizens, and the transient polity of the different bodies of the state. The chief privileges left them were, to preside in the great meetings of the people, to assemble the senate, and to command the armies.

3rd. The sacred laws appointed tribunes, who had a power of checking the encroachments of the patricians, and prevented not only private, but likewise public injuries.

In fine the plebeians increased their influence in the general assemblies. The people of Rome were divided in three different manners, by centuries, by curiæ, and by tribes and whenever they gave their votes, they were convened one of those three ways.

In the first the patricians, the leading men, the rich, and the senate, which was very near the same thing, had almost the whole authority; in the second they had less; and less still in the third.

The division into centuries was a division rather of estates and fortunes, than of persons. The whole people were distributed into a hundred and ninety-three centuries, which had each a single vote. The patricians and leading men composed the first ninety-eight centuries; and the other ninetyfive consisted of the remainder of the citizens. In this division therefore the patricians were masters of the suffrages.

In the division into curiæ, the patricians had not the same advantages; some however they had, for it was necessary to consult the augurs, who were under the direction of the patricians; and no proposal could be made there to the people, unless it had been previously laid before the senate, and approved of by a senatus consultum. But in the division into tribes they had nothing to do either with the augurs or with the decrees of the senate; and the patricians were excluded.

Now the people endeavoured constantly to have those meetings by curia which had been customary by centuries, and by tribes, those they used to have before by curia; by which

• Quastores parricidii, Pomponius, leg. 2. ff. de Orig. Jur. + Plutarch, Life of Publicola.

1 Comitiis centuriatis.

§ See Livy, book 1. Dionys. Halicarn, book 4, and 7.

Dionys. Halicarn. book 9. p. 598.

means the direction of public affairs soon devolved from the patricians to the plebeians.

Thus when the plebeians obtained the power of trying the patricians, a power which commenced in the affair of Coriolanus, they insisted upon assembling by tribes,† and not by centuries; and when the new magistracies of tribunes and ædiles were established in favour of the people, the latter obtained that they should meet by curiæ in order to nominate them; and after their power was quite settled, they gained so far their point as to assemble by tribes to proceed to this nomination.

CHAP. XV.

In what Manner Rome, in the flourishing State of that Republic, suddenly lost its Liberty.

IN the heat of the contests between the patricians and the plebeians, the latter insisted upon having fixed laws, to the end that the public judgments should no longer be the effect of capricious will or arbitrary power. The senate after a great deal of resistance acquiesced; and decemvirs were nominated to compose those laws. It was thought proper to grant them an extraordinary power, because they were to give laws to parties whose views and interests it was almost impossible to unite. The nomination of all magistrates was suspended; and the decemvirs were chosen in the comitia sole administrators of the republic. Thus they found themselves invested with the consular and the tribunitian power. By one they had the privilege of assembling the senate, "by the other that of convening the people; but they assembled neither senate nor people. Ten men only of the republic had the whole legislative, the whole executive, and the whole judiciary power. Rome saw herself enslaved by as cruel a tyranny as that of Tarquin. When Tarquin trampled on the liberty of that city, she was seized with indignation at the power he had usurped; when the decemvirs exercised every act of oppression, she was astonished at the extraordinary power she had granted.

Dionys. Halicarn. book 7.

+ Contrary to the ancient custom, as may be seen in Dionys. Halicarn. book 5. p. 320.

Dionys. Halicarn. book 6. p. 410. and 411. § See Dionys. Halicarn, book 9. p. 650.

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