to him; of which I have discoursed, ARGUMENT THIRD, Section Third. For as these things plainly shew that what God requires may be done; what he exhorts to, is possible for them to perform, by the assistance of that grace which he is ready to afford them; that the evils which he threateneth may be avoided, and what he promises may be obtained by them; so are all these arguments strongly confirmed by the concurrent suffrage, and the express and frequent declarations of the ancient Fathers, saying,

IV. First. In the general, that the scriptures every where assert, and give plain testimonies of the liberty of the will of man to chuse the good and refuse the evil. Thus Justin Martyr having told us, that "man would not be worthy of praise or recompence, ἐκ ἀφ' ἑαυτῇ ἐλόμενος τὸν ἀγαθὸν, did he not chuse good of himself,' nor worthy of punishment for doing evil, if he did not this aQ' aur, of himself';" saith, "this the Holy and Prophetick Spirit hath taught us by Moses in these words, 'See, I have set before thee good and evil, chuse the good &c.' and also by Esaias the prophet, speaking thus in the name of God, 'If you be willing and obedient, ye shall eat the good of the earth; but if you will not hear, you shall be devoured by the sword, for the mouth of the Lord hath spoken it'." "The prophecy of Isaiah," saith Clemens of Alexandria, "saith,If you be willing, &c. q' ἡμῖν κείμενα διαλέγχεσα καὶ τὴν ἅιρεσιν, καὶ τὴν ἐκτροπὴν, ‘demonstrating that both the choice and the refusal,' (viz. of faith and obedience, of which he there speaketh)'are in our power'." Tertullian pronounces them "unsound in faith, and corrupters of the christian discipline, and excusers of all sin, who so refer all things to the will of God, dicendo nihil fieri sine ejus nutu, ut non intelligamus aliquid esse in nobis ipsis, 'by saying, nothing is done without his appointment, as that we cannot understand that any thing is left to ourselves to do:' whereas though we learn from his precepts both what he would, and would not have done, tamen nobis est voluntas, et arbitrium elegendi alterum, sicut scriptum est, ecce posui ante te bonum et malum, yet is there in us a liberty of chusing either, according as it is written,' 'behold I have set before thee good and evil." St. Cyprian proves "credendi, vel non

Apol. 2, p. 80, B. C. D.

k Strom. 1, p. 314, B. 7 Exhort. ad Castit. cap. 2.

credendi libertatem in arbitrio positam, that to believe or not was left to our own free choice'." From the same texts, (Deut. xxx, 19. Isaiah i. 19,) Epiphanius, against the Pharisaical fate, cites those word of Isaiah, if ye be willing and obedient;' "whence," saith he, "it is plainly manifest and indubitable, that God hath granted to man free-will, ὥςε περὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθοεργεῖν, ἤ τῶν φαύλων ἐφίεσθαι πραγμάτων, so that it is in his power to do the good, or to chuse the evil.""" Theodoret having cited those words of Christ, If any man thirst, let him come to me and drink,' adds, “'Aîné dè μúgia Euga tìs ἄν καν τοῖς θείοις ἐυαγγελίοις καν τοῖς τῶν Αποςόλων συγγράμμασι δηλῶντα σαφῶς τὴς τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσεως τὸ ἀυθαίρετον, ten thousand things of this nature may be found both in the gospels and other writings of the apostles, clearly manifesting the liberty or selfelection of the nature of man'."" St. Chrysostom speaks thus, "God saith, If you will and if you will not, nvpiss Ỷμãs TOIŴV TÕS ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας, καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ γνώμῃ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ τιθείς, giving us power, and putting it in our own option to be virtuous, or vicious.' The devil saith, Thou canst not avoid thy fate; God saith,' I have put before thee fire and water, life and death, stretch forth thy hand to whether thou wilt. The devil saith, it is not in thee to stretch forth thy hand to them."" And St. Cyril' establisheth this doctrine from the same texts of scripture, Aud St. Austin proves from those words of Christ, either make the tree good and the fruit will be good, or make the tree evil and the fruit will be evil, "in nostrâ potestate situm esse mutare voluntatem, 'that it is put in our own power to change the will'."" It would be endless to transcribe all that the Fathers say upon this head.*

p

Secondly. To the same effect they speak, when they say the scripture testifies that God hath left man in a capacity of doing good or evil. Thus Irenæus having laid down this as a rule, "that it is in the power of man to work and retain what is good; and again, not to do, or to lose the good he hath done: for this

m Test. ad Quirin. 1. 3, c. 52. n Hær. 16, adv. Pharis. sec. 4. o Adv. Gr, Serm. 5, To. 4,p. 543. p To. 6, Hom. 2, De Fato. p. 868. q L. 1, in Es. 21. p.

r Contra Adiman. c. 26.

* See in Esa. 1, 19. St. Jerom. and St. Basil. Cyril. Alex. ibid. Clemen. Alex. Strom. 1, p. 314, B, Ex verbis Mosis, Deut. xxx, 19. Tertullian de Monog. c. 14. Basil. Hom. in Psal. lxi,

Ex Ecclus. xv, 15, 16, 17. August. de Gratia et Lib. Arb. c. 2.

s L. 4, e. 72,

b

cause," saith he, "do the prophets exhort men to work righteousness, and to do good, as q' Яμiv ÖVTOS TỸ TOIST8, as having it in their power so to do,' as we have shewed by many testimonies, and our Lord doth the same in many places, viz. Matt. v. 16. xxiv. 48–51. Luke vi. 46. xii. 35, 36, 47. xxi. 34. Tauta yàp πάντα τὸ αὐτεξέσιον ἐπιδείκνυσι τῶ ἀνθρώπε, all which words demonstrate the free-will of man.' And the apostle exhorts men in many places to do good works, which he could have no reason to do, si in nobis non esset facere hæc, aut non facere, if it were not in our power to do, or not to do what our Lord and his apostles do exhort us to do'." Then he goes on to prove that "God hath preserved to man, non tantum in operibus, sed etiam in fide liberum esse et suæ potestatis arbitrium, that man hath free-will, or hath it in his power not only to do, but also to believe'," from Mat. viii. 13. Matt. ix. 29. Mark ix. 23. And he concludes, that "all these texts shew man to be suæ polestatis secundum fidem, 'free as to his faith';" for as Clemens Alexandrinus saith, Tò ISEVELV τε, καὶ πείθεσθαι ἐφ' ἡμῖν, it is in our power to believe and obey. Tertullian is as express in this, saying, that "God made man at first after his own image, arbitrii sui libertate et potestate, 'with liberty of, and power over, his own will;' and that this appears from the law that he gave him, non enim poneretur lex ei qui non haberet obsequium debitum legi in suâ potestate,nec rursus comminatio transgressori adscriberetur, si non et contemptus legis in arbitrii libertatem homini deputaretur; 'for neither would God have given a law to him who had not freedom to obey it, nor have threatened death to the transgressor, if he had not a freedom to contemn it: sic et in posteris legibus Creatoris invenias, and so was it also in the laws given by God after the fall,' in which he sets before man good and evil, life and death; nor would the order of discipline be disposed by precepts in which God calls us from, and exhorts us to things, and threatens our disobedience, nisi et ad obsequium et ad contemptum, libero, et voluntario homine, ‘did not man freely and voluntarily obey or contemn them'."" Origen is also copious in this assertion, for having cited those words, ' And now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee?" He adds, "Let them blush at these words, who deny that man hath

b 'EP' ï To Wεideodai nai rò μn. Strom. 2, p. 370, Strom. 7, p. 707, Strom.

2, p. 380, 387, 390.

c Lib. 2, contr. Marcion. c. 5, 6.

free-will; for, quomodo posceret ab homine Deus, nisi haberet homo in suâ potestate quod poscenti Deo deberet offerre, how could God require that of man which he had not in his power to offer to him'?" And again," the soul, saith he, "doth not incline to either part out of necessity, for then neither vice nor virtue could be ascribed to it, nor would its choice of virtue deserve reward, nor its declination to vice punishment; sed servatur ei in omnibus libertas arbitrii, ut in quodcunque voluerit ipsa declinet, "but the liberty of its will is preserved in all things that it may incline to what it will;' as it is written, behold I have set before thee life and death'." St. Austin' also, from many passages in which the scripture saith, do not so, or so; or do this, or that, lays down this general rule, ubi dicitur Noli hoc, aut Noli illud, et ubi ad aliquid faciendum, vel non faciendum in divinis monitis opus voluntatis exigitur, SATIS LIBERUM DEMONSTRATUR ARBITRIUM, that all such places SUFFICIENTLY DEMONSTRATE THE LIBERTY OF THE WILL;' and.this he saith against them, qui sic gratiam Dei defendunt, ut negent liberum arbitrium,' who so asserted the grace of God, as to deny the liberty of the will,' or thought it was so defended by him and his partners as to destroy it."

g

Thirdly. They add, that all God's commands and prohibitions, exhortations and dehortations, all his threats and reprehensions, all his encouragements and promises, would be vain and unreasonable, and all his punishments unjust and his rewards groundless, if man after the fall had not still the liberty to do what is commanded, and forbear what is forbidden. For, First, saith St. Austin, ipsa divina præcepta homini non prodessent, nisi haberet liberum voluntatis arbitrium, quo ea faciens ad promissa præmia perveniret; the divine precepts would profit none, if they had not free-will, by which they doing them might obtain the promised rewards assigned to the doers of them." "These precepts,” saith he, cut off men's excuse from ignorance, or saying I did not this because I did not know it was my duty; but then because others," saith he, "accuse God of being wanting in giving them power to do good, or inducing them to sin:" Against these men he cites that known passage of the Son of Sirach, [' God left man in the hands of his counsel, SI VOLUERIS, SERVABIS MANDATA,

d Hom. 12, in Numb. Fol. 113, F.

f Tom. 7, de Gr. et lib. Arb. c. 2.

Cap. 1.

e Lib. 1, in Rom. Fol. 138. B. h Ibid. Cap. 2.

'if he would, to keep the commandments.' He had set before him fire and water, and to which of them he pleased he might stretch forth his hand; he had placed life and death before him, and which he pleased should be given him.'] And then cries out, Ecce apertissime videmus expressum liberum humana voluntatis arbitrium, 'behold here a very plain proof of the liberty of human will,' or an express in what it consists; "and this," saith he, "is also evident from all God's injunctions to do and keep his commandments; for quomodo jubet si non est liberum arbitrium? for how (or why) doth he command, if man hath not free-will or power to obey?" This therefore, if St. Austin answers pertinently, must be the true import of these men's excuse,—that they wanted free-will, or power to obey God's precepts; and therefore he enquires "what do all God's commands shew but the free-will of man? Neque enim præciperentur nisi homo haberet propriam voluntatem quâ divinis præceptis obediret; for they would not be commanded, if man had not that freedom of will by which he could obey them'." And therefore in his book DE FIDE against the Manichees, who denied that man had free-will, or that it was, in potestate hominis facere bene aut male, in his power to do well or ill;' he makes this an indication of their blindness, quis enim non clamet stultum esse præcepta dare ei cui liberum non est quod præcipitur facere, et iniquum esse eum damnare cui non fuit potestas jussa complere? Et has injustitias, et iniquitates miseri non intelligunt Deo se adscribere.* For who,' saith he, 'will not cry out that it is folly to command him who hath not liberty to do what is commanded, and that it is unjust to condemn him who hath it not in his power to do what is required? And yet these miserable men understand not that they ascribe this wickedness and injustice to God.' "Whosoever," saith Eusebius, "doth industriously pursue, or command, or teach any thing, or exhort any man to obey or not, to sin or not; or reproves any for sin, or commends any for doing well, is he not thereby plainly convinced that he only retains the name of fate, τὸ μὲν ἔργον καταλίπων τῆ παρ' ἡμῖν καὶ τε αὑτεξεσία, “but leaves the actions to our liberty, and our own power?" Clemens of Alexandria declares, that "neither praises nor reprehensions, rewards nor punishments are

Ibid. Cap. 4.

k Cap. 10.

Præp. Evang, l. 6, c. 6, p. 244,