a nation; but thinking of them as being Frenchmen, as having a common genesis, we have a class unit. In each case it is the same subject-matter, the same

whole and the same parts, — but in the former the parts are unified through coöperation, while in the latter through a common nature. Each triangle has sides which work together to make a triangle, but these sides have common nature, being produced by the same kind of movement, which makes the class units called sides. And so with the angles; they help to form the triangle, but the same activity produces each; by the former they are organized, and by the latter classified. Triangles might be placed together to form some figure, and would thus help one another to make the whole; but the same parts, triangles, may be formed into a class by conceiving them in unity with the idea producing each and all. Thus the distinction between the organic unit and the class unit is not that between different parts nor different wholes, but in the manner in which the parts are bound into wholes. It might be well to observe, however, that the class whole cannot be bounded in space, as can the organic whole; hence it is not a space whole. This follows from the fact that the producing energy, the idea, the type, can create individuals infinitely. After making any conceivable number of engines from the idea engine, the idea remains as productive as ever. Hence the imagination is not required to bound the class unit, as it is required to do with the organic unit.

As the organic unit has two aspects, so has the class unit. Class unity consists, as we have seen, in the

relation of the parts, the individuals, to the one principle which produces the parts. The unity is that of the individuals with the general creating them. This unity can be taken as it exists at a given time, simply as a fixed thing, somewhat as the individual is viewed in description; or the unity may be thought of in the process of being established under the influence of the active principle, somewhat as the individual is viewed in narration. Ocean currents may be considered as they are, the individual currents as in unity with a physical principle which constitutes them what they are; or the physical principle may be viewed in the active production of them, or, through them, of other phenomena. The distinction is simply that between individuals as already existing in the unity of a common nature and individuals in the process of being produced by a common nature or of producing other individuals.

From the side of mind, it is the distinction between concept and judgment. The concept is the grasping of the unity existing among individuals, while the judgment is the process of establishing in thought the unity between the subject and predicate of thought; which interpreted means the unity between the individual and the general. When the subject and predicate of a judgment judgment become identified the judgment vanishes into a new concept, and the desired unity is established, and may be taken in the future without affirming and arguing.

However the matter may be turned the unity appears as that between the individual and the general, either

as fixed, as a fact, or in the process of becoming. The first kind of unity is set forth by the process of Exposition; the second, by the process of Argumentation. These processes are distinct, because, as in the case of description and narration, unity cannot be viewed as established and in the process of being established at the same time.

The four discourse processes are alike in that each deals with individual objects; but they differ in that description deals with individual objects as fixed, as spatial wholes, as they stand organized at a given time; narration, with individuals as changing in time, as time wholes, as organized wholes progressive in time; exposition, with individuals as in fixed unity with a common productive energy; argumentation, with individuals in the active process of unity under a general principle. In all cases the purpose is to present the theme in unity, and the different processes are only so many phases of a movement to that end,phases depending on the kind of unity inherent in the subject-matter itself. All of the processes may be required in the same discourse, but the character of the discourse as a whole is determined by the kind of unity which the discourse seeks ultimately to establish. The relation of the processes is not that of higher and lower, or that of simplicity and complexity, but that of the view taken of the subject-matter. For different purposes the same theme may be presented under one or the other of the different processes.

Hence, the three ends of discourse are realized by four processes, and to the three kinds of discourse on

the basis of the effect produced must be added the four kinds of discourse on the basis of the process by which the effect is produced. These processes, based on the nature of the theme, move forward under the law of purpose. It thus appears that the processes of discourse are controlled by two factors: (1) the relations which constitute the theme, and (2) the laws imposed by the mind addressed. These factors must now guide us in the detailed consideration of the discourse processes.

DESCRIPTION.

Description is the process by which one mind presents to another, through language, an individual as constituted of coexisting elements.

If the real object or its picture could be presented to the eye, its attributes and parts would appear in their unity at once, at least in their spatial unity. But by the limitation of language, when the several ideas are presented in discourse they must follow each other in an order of time. In this respect language is inferior to painting. Painting, which employs figures and colors in space, presents attributes and parts as they coexist; thus freeing the mind from the necessity of unifying the constituent ideas, so far as the superficial unity is concerned. But in expressing the inner meaning of the object, as interpreted by the judgment and penetrative imagination, language has more than a compensating advantage. While it is possible to paint or to sculpture all parts of the human body, the functional relation of each to life, as interpreted by the judgment, can be expressed in language only. Painting can express only the outer unity of an object, while language can express the inner unity of thought. The two facts-namely, that the object to be described consists of coexisting elements, and that, by the necessities of language, these elements must be presented in succession - make the law of unity in description difficult to obey. The law requires the object