thoughts, his hearers, and his hands, with equal dexterity. The science, on the other hand, having the object-matter for its touchstone, admits nothing except what relates directly to it; and so a far greater unity and simplicity naturally belongs to it. Geometry treats of nothing but the properties of space, because it is a pure science; whilst the arts founded upon it, such as Land-surveying, must bring in such topics as inequalities of surface, use of instruments, and the like. The science of Musical Counterpoint teaches the theory of harmonic progressions, and nothing else; but the musician's art, in which it is employed, must add the knowledge of instruments and their compass, of the human voice, even sometimes of the powers of a particular singer. Now in the popular meaning of the word Logic, no doubt the notion of an art is more prominent; to be able to reason better, and to expose errors in the reasoning of others, is supposed to be the object of this study.* But those writers who have followed out this view have been compelled to go over too wide a field for any one system. Logic must be the widest of all arts or sciences; because thinking, which is its objectmatter, belongs to all the rest; it is ars artium, the

* Upon the historical view of the question, whether Logic is an Art or a Science, most valuable remarks will be found in a paper by Sir William Hamilton. Edinburgh Review, 115, p. 202. seq.

art which comprehends all others, because its rules apply to every subject on which the human mind can be engaged. If then it is to be taught as an Art, it should contain specific rules for reasoning or thinking in every region of thought; it must propose to itself nothing less than to enable men of the most various capacities to apply a set of principles to effect the work of thinking correctly, under all circumstances. And the consequences are, an enormous expansion in the first instance, from the huge mass of heterogeneous materials; and a consciousness of incompleteness in the second, since it is impossible to suppose that so vast a work has ever been completely achieved. Works in which the attempt has been made often contain a chapter on Scriptural Interpretation, and perhaps another on Forming a Judgment on Books:

-can it be supposed that the precepts under either of these heads can be complete? The one is an epitome of all Theology, and the other, it might be said, of all wisdom. Now Logic may be unquestionably an art or a science; but it seems that all we can do is to lay down the principles of the science and leave each student to form for himself his own art, to teach himself how to employ these principles in practice. In this way we may attain something like completeness in a moderate compass, and may escape those incessant shiftings of the boundaries of the art, which

are inevitable where men have to select a finite number of precepts out of infinite knowledge.

§ 7. Those who represent Logic as both art an science are accustomed to assume that all arts, possessing the principles of correspondent sciences, teach their application to practice, so that art is but science turned to account. In the case of Logic this is not very far from the truth; but as a general statement it is false, for it overlooks that notion of unconsciousness which is commonly involved in Art. Shakspeare is admitted to be a consummate artist, but no one means by this that his plays were composed only to develope a certain express theory of Dramatic Poetry, such as Coleridge, Horn, or Ulrici have since founded upon them. No: the man of science possesses principles, but the artist, not the less nobly gifted on that account, is possessed and carried away by them. "The principles which Art involves,

science evolves. The truths on which the success of Art depends, lurk in the artist's mind in an undeveloped state,―guiding his hand, stimulating his invention, balancing his judgment, but not appearing in the form of enunciated propositions." * And because the artist cannot always communicate his own principles, men speak of his "happy art," as if it were almost by chance or hap that his works were ac

* Whewell's Philosophy of Ind. Sciences, ii p. 111.

complished; and it was the fashion of the last century to speak of Shakspeare himself as a wild, untutored child of genius, not even to be named as an artist, because in truth his plays wanted dramatic science and were not obedient to the law of the dramatic unities. So that the praise of being a good logician, or of having a logical mind, is sometimes awarded where there is little or no acquaintance with the science of logic. An understanding naturally clear, and a certain power of imitation, will enable the thinker or speaker to pour forth arguments which might serve for examples of all the logical rules, not one of which he has learnt; and without some share of these talents, no precepts would avail to make a reasoner. But when we write upon Logic, the unconscious skill of the artist must be left out of the account, because it cannot be communicated by rules. By the art of Logic we mean so much of the art of thinking as is teachable, and no more. The whole of every science can be made the subject of teaching.†

§ 8. In treating of Logic as a science, we shall not forget that the ultimate object of the study is strictly practical, and shall labour to state the prin

* So we have the line of Agatho, Τέχνη τύχην ἔστερξε, καὶ τύχη τέχνην.

† Διδακτὴ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ εἶναι. Aristotle, Eth. Nic. VI. iii.

ciples in such a way as to facilitate to the student their application as an art. If we would redeem Logic from the charge usually brought against it, that it is a system of rules which the initiated never employ, and the uninitiated never miss, it must be by giving it a far more extensive verification in practice than it usually receives. The inconsistency of teaching a science, where we mean that an art should be ultimately learnt, is only apparent, not real; and at any rate is less injurious than that of those who teach an "instrumental art" which is never employed in practice, and which is too often inadequate to the simplest tasks of practical application.

§ 9. Pure Logic is a science of the necessary laws of thought. After the remarks already made (in page 8.), this subject will need less illustration. Logic only gives us those principles which constitute thought; and presupposes the operation of those principles by which we gain the materials for thinking. Thus I have a conception of house, which sums up and comprises all buildings in which men live; how did I obtain it? Logic answers that it was generalised from different single houses which I had seen, by noticing what points they had in common, and by gathering up these common features into a new notion. It tells us, further, that this conception has various powers, that it may be defined, by declaring what I understand by it, that it may be divided, as

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