increase the difficulty of securing their lines of communication and supplying their armies, without offering any reasonable prospect of obtaining a decision. Petrograd and Moscow are beyond the practicable range of operations before the winter. It would seem that, as the only possible alternative, they will endeavour to establish a line of defence on which to maintain themselves during the winter months. The possession of the line of the Dwina would be essential to guard their left flank; and the numerous tributaries which flow into the Pripet might afford suitable positions for the rest of the Austro-German armies east of the Rovno-Wilna railway, which would facilitate the distribution of supplies. It is hard to see how they can hope to withdraw any considerable force for operations elsewhere. The brilliant offensive of the Allied armies in France, which began on Sept. 25, has made the position more embarrassing for the Germans.

The situation in the Dardanelles has naturally caused anxiety, and aroused misgivings in many minds concerning the wisdom of the expedition as a military enterprise. Undertakings which have failed to achieve the success anticipated are readily criticised; and errors in execution are apt to be mistaken for unsoundness in the original design. Some reasons were given in the April number of this Review for considering the conception of the expedition fundamentally sound; and, although expectations have not yet been realised, subsequent events have not modified, but rather strengthened, the view then expressed. The great advantage which Germany derives from her central position has been amply illustrated during the past three months. She has been able to reinforce either front at will, and, while holding the Allied armies in the west, to mass her forces against Russia, who, isolated from her Allies, has had to bear the onset unsupported. The misfortunes of Russia have been due principally to want of munitions, a deficiency which could only be supplied by circuitous and inconvenient routes, which will become more precarious in the winter. The opening of the Dardanelles would solve this and other problems, in which communication between Russia and the Mediterranean is

the dominant factor. The defeat of Turkey would decide the wavering attitude of the Balkan States, and, besides bringing reinforcements to the Allies, would open the way to the only vulnerable flank of the Central Empires against which operations might be directed with decisive effect, releasing Russia from the grasp of the invader, and perhaps bringing the end of the war within sight. The command of the sea gives the Allies the power of choosing the decisive locality, which, according to strategical principles, is to be sought where the enemy is weak, not where he is strongest. The choice of Turkey as the objective appears sound both for the reasons already given, and because she is Germany's weakest partner; while, like Russia, she is, so long as the Balkan States remain neutral, beyond the reach of active assistance.

These views derive support from the anxiety which the Germans have shown to win over or intimidate the Balkan States, and while keeping Russia isolated, to open up communication with their Turkish Allies. That purpose achieved, they would endeavour to make their lines as formidable in the east as they are in the west; and the war would become one of endurance, the end and result of which could not be foreseen. It is customary to be optimistic on this subject; but optimism, however valuable as a sentiment, is apt to be a bad guide in war, and it has frequently led us astray. The power of endurance varies in nations as it does in individuals; and the withdrawal of one Power from the Alliance would turn the scale, which has not so far been decisively weighted in our favour. Of this the Germans are well aware, and they have spared no effort, by intrigue and force of arms, to break up the Coalition.

But, though the Dardanelles expedition was rightly conceived, it has been marred in the execution. Ships were sent, without military assistance, to attack the formidable defences of the Dardanelles, although it was the opinion of many who had studied the question in the light of history and of recent developments, that such an enterprise could not succeed. The result has justified this opinion; and the experiment has been costly. The Turks were warned of what was impending, and had ample time to throw up defences and assemble strong

forces to oppose an attack by land. The Expeditionary Force, had it been available in February, would probably have gained possession of the whole of the Peninsula, though it could hardly have advanced on the mainland. When it arrived in April, the essential factor of surprise was wanting; and its strength was inadequate to do more than gain a precarious foothold on the extreme point of the Gallipoli Peninsula. Since that time reinforcements have been thrown in by driblets, in sufficient numbers to replace wastage and to enable partial successes to be won, but never strong enough to obtain a decision. There can be no doubt that the official information regarding the numbers which the Turks could put in the field was erroneous in the first instance, and that in other respects the difficulties of the task have been underestimated.

Read between the lines, Sir Ian Hamilton's despatch, published in the 'London Gazette' on Sept. 21, provides ample evidence of the inadequacy of the Allied forces to deal with those with which they have been confronted. After the first critical days the existing formations had to be broken up and reorganised in order to provide a general reserve on the southern front; and a British brigade had to be placed at the disposal of General d'Amade, whose force was insufficient to hold the front assigned to him. On several occasions attacks which prospered at first were held up for want of support at the critical moment; and on others, notably on May 7 and 8, troops which were already exhausted had to be launched again to the attack. There were also instances of troops which had made important progress having to fall back owing to the inability of those adjoining to advance far enough to secure their flanks. The operations on Aug. 7, when a fresh force was successfully landed at Suvla Bay, furnish another instance of the failure of a promising attack to attain its objective, which was probably largely due to lack of reserves. The disembarkation, which was effected before daybreak, was a masterpiece of Staff management, and took the Turks completely by surprise. But, during the advance which followed, a stage was reached when the attack lost its momentum and came to a standstill. Such phases occur repeatedly in every attack against positions defended

with modern weapons; and they are likely to be more frequent when the troops are inexperienced. The fighting line becomes exhausted from nerve-strain; and reinforcements must be thrown in to provide the impetus necessary to carry it forward. There is little doubt that on this occasion a victory was within sight which would have secured possession of the ridge of heights above the Anafarta villages, commanding the whole breadth of the Peninsula. The Turkish forces to the south would either have been cut off or forced to retreat, and the forts of the Narrows would have fallen. But the opportunity, once lost, did not recur. The Turks, quickly reinforced, entrenched themselves strongly on the heights; and, when a fresh attack was made on Aug. 21, the position proved impregnable.

It is not to be supposed that the Commander-in-chief or his subordinates have been to blame. There is, on the contrary, ample reason to believe that, throughout the whole course of the operations, they have done all that could be done with the forces at their disposal. The troops, for their part, have faced the continuous fighting and incessant bombardment of the past four months with the utmost courage and resolution. The fault lies in our inadequate preparation for war; and our shortsighted politicians, and the nation, which refused to be warned, must bear the blame. It is not in numbers only that the forces have proved deficient. The abortive attack against the Anafarta heights on Aug. 7 proves that inexperienced troops, however excellent the material, are apt to be at a loss when circumstances are abnormal. The ground over which the attack was made is close and broken, causing the men to lose touch with each other and with their officers. They had not acquired the selfreliance and initiative which would have carried experienced troops forward without waiting for orders. The military instinct which enables men unhesitatingly to take the right course in such a situation can hardly be created in the time available for training troops improvised during war, and devoid of any leavening of experienced soldiers.

Of all the misguided counsel that has been volunteered, the suggestion that the Allies should abandon the enterprise is the most fatuous. Such a course would be fatal