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Art. 11.-THE MOTOR INDUSTRY AND THE WAR. EXCEPTING a few unsuccessful experiments in the employment of steam traction engines for the slow haulage of heavy loads, and a few attempts to produce substitutes for the old stage-coaches, the records of the use of self-propelled vehicles on common roads are comprised within the last quarter of a century. If we restrict ourselves to a consideration of the industrial uses of the motor car, excluding those types that have been directly developed from the traction engine, our field is still further narrowed, and we need go back little more than ten years. In this brief period there has sprung up an enormous industry of world-wide importance, the chief manufacturing centres of which lie within the British Isles. This industry was developed purely for peaceful purposes, and its progress has been affected comparatively little by military considerations. Whereas the home of early progress in the design and manufacture of the private motor car was France, the conditions of trade, of the distribution of population, and of facilities for transport by road, acted together to encourage in Great Britain the production of motors specially intended for the haulage or carriage of goods, and for the conveyance of passengers in considerable numbers.

The genius of the British engineer expresses itself best in machinery of a substantial and durable character; and in this particular instance he has had the advantage of having the biggest and readiest market near to his door. The French motor car factories have not been similarly encouraged, by a natural demand, to develop the industrial motor. Consequently, in France and also in other European countries, progress has been more nearly related to military requirements. All the great military Powers have endeavoured in some measure to encourage the construction of vehicles suitable for transport and supply under active service conditions. The method adopted, wherever possible, has been to offer a subsidy or subvention to the purchaser and user of any machine of a type passed as suitable by the Government's experts.

In France, annual trials have been held for some time past under the auspices of the War Department. As

a result of these trials, certain types and makes of vehicle have been certificated for subsidy. The general effect has been to create a more or less artificial demand, not based on sound economic principles, for machines so designed as to be at least fairly suitable for military service. The expenditure involved by putting this scheme into force in France has been considerable. It was found necessary to offer a subsidy amounting to an aggregate of about 3007., paid in instalments over a period of four years, in respect of each vehicle earmarked for Government use. In Germany, natural and trade conditions were even more unfavourable; and the subsidy offered consequently amounted to no less than about 4501. for each vehicle, paid in instalments spread over five years. German manufacturers have depended upon these particular models, and upon their export trade, rather than on any natural increasing demand for purely commercial machines for use within their own country. Austria, with a smaller manufacturing trade, has paid a subsidy amounting to about 3601.

All these figures have of course been strongly influenced by the fact that the aggregate supply of vehicles in industrial service has invariably been less than the military demand taken alone. In Great Britain, this state of affairs has been reversed. Consequently, a subsidy scheme was not required actually to create a demand, but merely to direct it gradually into the desired channels. This was done, with moderate success, by the offer of a subsidy of about 1207. spread over three years, which sufficed to encourage a limited number of manufacturers to build the types outlined in the War Office specifications. It did not, however, suffice to induce any very large number of commercial users to employ the types selected. Consequently, at the outbreak of war, the British Government had at its immediate disposal vehicles more than ample numerically, but not calculated to form fleets by any means perfect as regards uniformity and standardisation. All the other countries concerned in the war were situated even more unfavourably, the total supply in no case being adequate. Russia in particular, possessing no manufacturing industry and an extremely bad and incomplete road system, could not count within her boundaries anything approaching the

number of vehicles which she required for such an emergency as the present. No subvention scheme had been possible, but a certain number of lorries had been purchased directly or indirectly by the Government from Germany, England, and other countries during the two or three years preceding the war.

Italy manufactures a limited number of admirable industrial vehicles, but the conditions have not favoured their extensive purchase by the home market. The Italian Government was consequently obliged, during the Tripoli campaign, to purchase outright some hundreds of lightly constructed lorries suitable for working over loose sand. The United States possesses very great facilities for the manufacture of industrial motors. Up to the outbreak of war, however, she had not definitely attacked the European markets, as she had done in the sphere of the cheaper type of touring car. The best American industrial models indicate very clearly the influence of British designers. The American manufacturer is able to rely upon a very considerable home demand, but this is limited by the inadequacy of the roads at any considerable distance from the principal towns. His future consequently is probably dependent still more largely on a big export trade.

The state of affairs briefly indicated above leads naturally to consequences of the highest importance in connexion with the subject under consideration. In the first place, it followed that, at the outbreak of war, the Governments concerned could not limit themselves to the requisitioning of vehicles of definite types, but were compelled to commandeer any presumably sound machine of fairly suitable carrying capacity. This meant a definite interference with ordinary trade; but, while some users were deprived of their vehicles against their will, the trade of others was so far affected as to make their existing delivery system more than adequate. The result was that in the early stages matters were fairly evenly balanced; and, so far as Great Britain was concerned, the action of the War Department did not cause any great inconvenience in commercial circles. A point which is perhaps of more consequence is that, when a fleet is made up of vehicles of all makes and

types, the difficulties of maintaining it in service are immeasurably increased. Each separate type of vehicle must be supported by a supply of spare parts suitable for employment in the event of breakdown. If these spare parts are not already available, it becomes necessary to place orders with the vehicle manufacturers for their supply. It is of course impossible to devote machines or shops to the production of parts of obsolete models without seriously affecting the output of new and complete cars. Moreover, the use of mixed fleets necessitates the employment of a staff much larger than would be necessary if the cars were of uniform type.

The second important consequence of the conditions obtaining at the outbreak of war was that the Governments of all the belligerent countries were compelled to make prompt endeavours to arrange for a continuous and large supply of new vehicles either from works within their own country, or else by import. Manufacturers experienced in the production of motor lorries designed to carry loads of about 30 cwt. to 3 tons were in most instances required to reserve their whole output for delivery to Government. They were therefore unable to execute orders placed by their agents or by customers whose original vehicles had been requisitioned.

In France, all the suitable motor factories were completely mobilised, and the duties for which they were best fitted promptly assigned to them. The action taken in Great Britain was to some extent similar, but naturally, under our system of voluntary service, did not involve the enlistment of the men continuing to be employed in the factories. Meanwhile, the Russian Government, not having at its disposal suitable facilities for the manufacture of vehicles at home, began to place large orders with British manufacturers whose products had not been earmarked by our own War Department. For a time, Great Britain was in the position of supplying its own immediate needs, and assisting to make good those of all its allies. It soon became evident, however, that our unaided resources would not prove equal to the strain. First the Russian and Belgian Governments, then the French, and lastly the British supplemented the fleets immediately obtainable by placing large orders with manufacturers in the United States. In the aggregate,

tremendous encouragement has been given to American builders of industrial motor vehicles; and there is little doubt that at the conclusion of the war the permanent output of these firms will be enormously greater in proportion to the British output than it was in the summer of 1914.

While these statements apply mainly to the heavier class of motor vehicle designed originally for the carriage of goods or for public service work, it must not be imagined that the touring car and the motor cycle industries remained unaffected. In order to convey some impression of a general character, it would be advisable at this point to consider briefly the principal uses to which motor vehicles are put in time of war.

The introduction of mechanical transport has led to a revolution in the methods of the Army Service Corps. The transport and supply columns which link up the railhead with the distributing points in the immediate neighbourhood of the front are now formed entirely of motor vehicles. Generally speaking, the type selected is a self-contained lorry capable of handling a useful load of about 3 tons, and on level roads of attaining a maximum speed somewhat over 20 miles per hour. If we assume that the average speed in convoy does not exceed 10 miles per hour, it follows that a fleet of 100 motor lorries can in the course of four hours bring up 300 tons of supplies to the front from a railhead 40 miles distant. The length of such a convoy would be not more than half that of a horsed convoy dealing with an equal aggregate load. This in itself is an assistance towards keeping clear the main traffic arteries behind the army in the field, but the speed capacity of the motor is a still more important factor towards the same end.

The occupation of a road by a vehicle may be measured by the product of the space actually filled by the vehicle into the time taken in carrying its load from point to point. A horsed convoy could not of course operate daily over a distance of 40 miles, carrying its load and returning empty over the same distance. To perform the work by means of animal traction would mean perhaps three convoys linking up the railhead with refilling points. At intervals along the road representing

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