A few passages remain where some doubt or difficulty attaches to the citation.

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Conv. II. ix. 1. 78. Aristotile l' afferma, quando dice nel duodecimo degli Animali, che l' uomo è perfettissimo di tutti gli animali.

The reference seems to be to the de Hist. Anim. Bk. VIII, c. i. (588 a. 20 seqq.). The drift of this interesting passage is to assert the continuity (μετάβασις συνεχής) in nature from inanimate objects to vegetable life, thence to animal life (the 'fungo marino' being a connecting link, 588 b. 12, see supra, p. 137), and thence to man, who thus becomes the head and crown of things.' But man himself, in the earlier stages of his development, not only embryonic, but even those of childhood, differs little, if at all, from the lower animals, dɩapépel δ ̓ οὐθὲν ὡς εἰπεῖν ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς τῶν θηρίων ψυχῆς κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον (scil. τὴν τῶν παίδων ἡλικίαν). But as the treatise de Hist. Anim. contains only ten books, Mazzuchelli (h. 1.) suggests that perhaps in Dante's time the four books de Partibus Animalium may have preceded the ten books of de Historia Animalium, thus forming one collection 'de Animalibus,' of which consequently Bk. VIII. of the latter treatise would form Bk. XII. It is to be observed that Dante merely quotes from the twelfth Book, degli Animali, which leaves the ground open for such an explanation. Further, we know that in Michael Scot's translation from Arabic into Latin, the Historiae Animalium consisted of nineteen books, comprising besides. the ten of the present Historia Animalium, the de Gen. Anim. (five books), and the de Part. Anim. (four books). See Jourdain, Traductions Latines d'Aristote, pp. 172, 327. Jourdain also mentions a quotation from an Arabian writer of the eleventh Book of the Animals' of Aristotle, which comes from the first Book of the de Part. Anim., so that he at any rate combined the two treatises into one, though in a different order from that which seems to be implied by the citation in Dante.

Conv. II. xv. 11. 40-43. E questi tre movimenti soli (viz. (1) locale, (2) dell' alterazione, (3) del crescere) mostra la Fisica; siccome nel quinto del primo suo libro è provato.

with Aristotle, Phys. V. i. (fin.) (225 b. 7), åváyên тpeîs eivai κινήσεις, τήν τε τοῦ ποίου καὶ τὴν τοῦ πόσου καὶ τὴν κατὰ τόπον.

The reference for this quotation in Dante is given in a curious and unusual form. The name of the author quoted does not appear. The subject of Physics' is in a manner personified, and a reference is made to the fifth (chapter?) of her first Book.' Such an expression could hardly, in the mouth of Dante, refer to any other treatise than that of Aristotle. Otherwise we should certainly expect the quotation, being in such an unusual form, to be from some other work; and so, of course, it may possibly still be, especially as in Aristotle, Phys. I. v., there is nothing to correspond to this. In V. i. however, there is a passage (quoted above) which exactly expresses the statements made by Dante, except that the order of the three kinds of Motion is altered. It is probable that the rectification of the reference by the reversal of the numbers is purely accidental, for I do not believe that the division into chapters was recognized in Dante's time. At least I have been unable to trace it 1.

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I am

Conv. IV. xi. 1. 83. Disse Aristotile che 'quanto più l'uomo soggiace allo intelletto, tanto meno soggiace alla fortuna.' This appears to be an 'apocryphal' quotation. indebted to the learned notes of Mazzuchelli for the probable explanation of it; and it is one which may apply to some other doubtful quotations, and indeed possibly to some

I There is a case in Conv. III. xiv. 1. 98, where a reference is made by Dante to secondo della Metafisica,' the true reference being to Bk. I. ch. ii. This again is probably accidental, and the error is due to a slip of memory. All the MSS. examined are reported as having secondo. We have no right, therefore, to replace it by primo, as is done by Giuliani, Fraticelli, and other editors, without further evidence that the error was not likely to have been made by Dante himself (see supra, p. 37).

genuine and accurate ones also. I mean that it is a quotation at secondhand, and made without verification. Mazzuchelli observes that in the Novissima Polyanthea Josephi Langii, the following sentiment is attributed, s. v. 'Fortuna,' to Aristotle, Lib. de Bona Fortuna, 'Ubi plurimus intellectus et ratio, ibi minima fortuna.' Such collections of quotations, 'Adagia,' 'Florilegia,' &c., were numerous from early times, as we have already seen, and were successively copied and enlarged1. It is observable that Dante does not profess, as he usually does, to give a reference to any definite work of Aristotle. Again, in Conv. IV. xii. l. 120, a sentiment attributed to Seneca seems to be capable of a similar explanation. See also s. v. Horace, infra.

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Par. xiii. 76-78. Ma la natura la dà sempre scema,

Similemente operando all' artista,

Ch' ha l'abito dell' arte, e man che trema.

It seems not improbable that this beautiful comparison of nature to an artist with an unsteady hand, so that he cannot always do the things that he would,' may have been suggested by Aristotle, Phys. II. viii. (199 a. 33), åμapría dè yiyvetai καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τεχνήν· ἔγραψε γὰρ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὁ γραμματικός, καὶ ἐπότισεν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὁ ἰατρὸς τὸ φάρμακον· ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν. But if this or other similar passages in Aristotle may have suggested the comparison, it is most interesting to observe the transformation which the idea has undergone by a touch of the poet's hand. An admirable didactic illustration has become an exquisite piece of poetry. (See supra, pp. 23 seqq. for other instances of this.)

NOTE ON UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR NATURE.

I will here draw attention to an interesting series of passages in which Dante refers to a distinction between the operations of Natura universalis' and 'Natura particularis.' The distinction has a sort of Aristotelian flavour about it, but, as far as I can ascertain, it is not to be found in Aristotle. Dante does

It is hardly necessary to observe that this particular collection was long after Dante's time, but was no doubt founded on earlier ones. See sup. pp. 15 16. 2 See a similar case under Cicero, No. 23.

not indeed profess to be making any quotation, but yet his language seems to me to imply that he is appealing to a doctrine already familiar, and not originating a new theory, especially as the distinction occurs so often in his works. The following are the passages in question, with their contents briefly summarized :— (1) Conv. I. vii. ll. 54 seqq. Particular Nature obeys Universal Nature when she gives man thirty-two teeth, or five fingers on each hand. (The application made of this is very difficult to explain, the passage following being apparently corrupt.) (2) In Conv. III. iv. ll. 98 seqq., Universal Nature is identified with God, as the author of the limits of the human intellect or intelligence. (3) In Conv. IV. ix. 11. 15-33, the operations of Universal Nature are said to be co-extensive with the Universe, but the Universe, i. e. Heaven and Earth, is declared (on the authority of Aristotle) to be, however vast, not infinite or without limit. Thus Universal Nature, and by consequence Particular Nature, has limits, and those limits are imposed by Him who is Himself without limit, viz. God. Thus in this passage a distinction is drawn between Universal Nature and God. (4) Once more, in Conv. IV. xxvi. ll. 18-20, Universal Nature is said to order Particular Nature to its perfection. This statement resembles the passage which was first quoted. Lastly, it is interesting to find the distinction occurring three times in the disputed Quaestio de Aqua et Terra, §§ 18 bis and 20. This appears to me to be one of several similar indications in the way of favourable internal evidence, which have not received sufficient attention from those who have peremptorily rejected this treatise. (5) In the first passage, § 18, ll. 20 seqq., it is declared that Universal Nature can never fail to attain its end, but that Particular Nature may do so, owing to the stubbornness (inobedientiam) of the subject-matter on which it has to work. (6) In the next passage, 1. 55 of the same section, all nature is said to be obedient to the purpose of Universal Nature, and so the sometimes adverse tendencies of what is described as the 'simplex natura' of an object may be overcome. Thus the 'simplex natura' of earth is to fall downwards, but 'necesse est ... inesse aliam naturam1 per quam obediret intentioni universalis naturae;' and this is explained to mean that it is able to rise, or to elevate itself, in response to the attraction of the heavens. Even so in man the appetitive part, which tends to follow the promptings of sense, can be diverted 'a proprio impetu 23 so as to obey Reason. (7) The passage in the next section merely recalls and repeats the sentiment of that last explained.

As far as I can make out, the distinction insisted on in all these passages was probably suggested to Dante by Albertus Magnus. That at any rate is in itself a not unlikely source, and I have not so far been able to find any other. In his Physica, Lib. II. Tract i. Chapter V is headed digressio declarans quod est esse secundum cursum naturae universalis, et secundum cursum naturae particularis.' First, several senses of the term Universal Nature are distinguished, and then occur such passages as the following, which may be compared with those above noticed in Dante. 'Dicitur natura universalis quae universaliter continet et regit omnem naturam particularem". Again the following passage resembles the second of those from the Quaestio, ‘. . . aliquid est cuius principium movendo

1 We are reminded here of the Aristotelian expression čoire dè kai áλλŋ tis φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς ἄλογος εἶναι. Nic. Eth. 1. xiii. 15 (1102 b. 13).

* This recalls the language, though the application is different, of Par. i, II. 130-135.

* Ed. Lugduni, 1651. Vol. ii. p. 61 a, ll. 11. Compare p 61 b, ll. 11, 12.

non est particularis natura, sed est extra cursum suum naturalem: cuius tamen principium et causa est natura universalis et secundum suum cursum naturalem.' (P. 61 b. ll. 22 seqq.) Then follows a very curious illustration of the difference between Universal and Particular Nature, and of a product which is according to the natural course' of Universal, but not of Particular Nature. The production of woman was never the purpose of Particular Nature, 'sed causatur ex corruptione alicuius principiorum naturalium, eo quod natura intendit opus perfectum, quod est mas;' and in support of this Aristotle is referred to 1... 'tamen foemina non est extra cursum universalis naturae, quae ordinis est causa in inferioribus, . . . quoniam nisi esset necessaria generationi, nunquam natura duceret foeminam.' Again, another illustration is drawn from Death, which is 'praeter cursum particularis naturae,' but is brought about by Universal Nature, which imposes a limit to the duration of the existence of corruptible things. The general idea of the existence of such a distinction, rather than the particular details of it, seem to be reproduced by Dante. It may be noticed that Albertus refutes a doctrine on this subject attributed to Plato and Hermes Trismegistus because (among other grounds) it involves a relation between Universal and Particular Nature, which would be inconsistent with the views of Aristotle. This at any rate seems to imply that the doctrine was thought to be an Aristotelian one.

PLATO.

DANTE'S knowledge of the actual works of Plato was doubtless limited (as was that of other writers nearly, if not quite, up to his time) to the Timaeus, though from passages in Aristotle, Cicero, and perhaps St. Augustine, he was aware of some of his doctrines beyond the limits of that work. The Timaeus of Plato was translated into Latin and commented on by Chalcidius (probably end of fifth century, al. end of the fourth), many centuries before a similar service was undertaken for Aristotle 2, or indeed for any other works of Plato. Consequently for many centuries, and until the end of the twelfth century at least, if not later, all knowledge of Plato seems to have been limited to this one treatise, and derived entirely from the work of Chalcidius. This applies (auct.

1 Apparently De Gen. Anim. II. iii. (737, a. 28 in the passage intended— · τὸ θῆλυ ὥσπερ ἄρρεν ἐστὶ πεπηρωμένον.

2

Except a fragment of the Organon attributed to Boethius (c. 500). See Rashdall's Universities of Europe, &c., i. p. 37. Also the Phaedo and Meno appear to have been translated (c. 1160), but were not generally known (ib.).