may require an absolute renunciation of our present interests; as the martyr who maintains his fidelity, sacrifices all possibility of advantage now. But these are unusual cases; and the experience of the contrary. is so general, that the truth has been reduced to a proverb. Perhaps in nineteen cases out of twenty, he best consults his present welfare, who endeavors to secure it in another world. "By the wise contrivance of the author of nature, virtue is upon all ordinary occasions, even with regard to this life, real wisdom, and the surest and readiest means of obtaining both safety and advantage."* Were it however, otherwise, the truth of our principles would not be shaken. Men's happiness, and especially the happiness of good men, does not consist merely in external things. The promise of a hundred fold in this present life may still be fulfilled in mental felicity; and if it could not be, who is the man that would exclude from his computations the prospect, in the world to come, of life everlasting?

In the endeavor to produce the greatest sum of happiness, or which is the same thing, in applying the dictates of utility to our conduct in life, there is one species of utility that is deplorably disregarded, both in private and public affairs-that which respects the religious and moral welfare of mankind. If you hear a politician expatiating upon the good tendency of a measure, he tells you how greatly it will promote the interests of commerce, or how it will enrich a colony, or how it will propitiate a powerful party, or how it will injure a nation whom he dreads; but you hear probably not one word of enquiry whether it will corrupt the character of those who execute the measure, or whether it will introduce vices into the colony, or whether it will present new temptations to the virtue * Dr. Smith: Theor. Mor. Sent.

of the public. And yet these considerations are perhaps by far the most important in the view even of enlightened expediency; for it is a desperate game to endeavor to benefit a people by means which may diminish their virtue. Even such a politician would probably assent to the unapplied proposition, "the virtue of a people is the best security for their welfare." It is the same in private life. You hear a parent who proposes to change his place of residence, or to engage in a new profession or pursuit, discussing the comparative conveniences of the proposed situation, the prospect of profit in the new profession, the pleasures which will result from the new pursuit; but you hear probably not one word of enquiry whether the change of residence will deprive his family of virtuous and beneficial society which will not be replaced-whether the contemplated profession will not tempt his own virtue or diminish his usefulness or whether his children will not be exposed to circumstances that will probably taint the purity of their minds. And yet this parent will acknowledge, in general terms, that "nothing can compensate for the loss of religious and moral character." Such persons surely make very inaccurate computations of expediency.

As to the actual conduct of political affairs, men frequently legislate as if there was no such thing as religion or morality in the world; or as if, at any rate, religion and morality had no concern with affairs of state. I believe that a sort of shame (a false and vulgar shame no doubt) would be felt by many members of senates, in directly opposing religious or moral considerations to prospects of advantage. In our own country, those who are most willing to do this receive, from vulgar persons, a name of contempt for their absurdity! How inveterate must be the impurity of a system, which teaches men to regard as ridiculous that system which only is sound !

CHAPTER IV.

THE LAW OF NATIONS.-THE LAW OF HONOR.

Although the subjects of this chapter can scarcely be regarded as constituting rules of life, yet we are induced briefly to notice them in the present Essay, partly, on account of the importance of the affairs which they regulate, and partly, because they will afford satisfactory illustration of the principles of Morality.

SECTION I.

THE LAW OF NATIONS.

Obligations and authority of the Law of Nations-Its abuses, and the limits of its authority-Treaties.

The law of nations, so far as it is founded upon the principles of morality, partakes of that authority which those principles possess; so far as it is founded merely upon the mutual conventions of states, it possesses that authority over the contracting parties which results from the rule, that men ought to abide by their engagements. The principal considerations which present themselves upon the subject, appear to be these :

That the law of nations is binding upon those states who knowingly allow themselves to be regarded as parties to it:

2-That it is wholly nugatory with respect to those states which are not parties to it:

3-That it is of no force in opposition to the moral

law.

I. The obligation of the law of nations upon those who join in the convention, is plain—that is, it rests, generally, upon all civilized communities which have intercourse with one another. A tacit engagement

:

only is, from the circumstances of the case, to be expected; and if any state did not choose to conform to the law of nations, it should publicly express its dissent. The law of nations is not wont to tighten the bonds of morality; so that probably most of its positive requisitions are enforced by the moral law and this consideration should operate as an inducement to a conscientious fulfilment of these requisitions. In time of war, the law of nations prohibits poisoning and assassination, and it is manifestly imperative upon every state to forbear them: but whilst morality thus enforces many of the requisitions of the law of nations, that law frequently stops short, instead of following on to whither morality would conduct it. This distinction between assassination and some other modes of destruction that are practised in war, is not perhaps very accurately founded in considerations of morality: nevertheless, since the distinction is made, let it be made, and let it by all means be regarded. Men need not add arsenic and the private dagger to those modes of human destruction which war allows. The obligation to avoid private murder is clear, even though it were shown that the obligation extends much further. Whatever be the reasonableness of the distinction, and of the rule that is founded upon it, it is perfidious to violate that rule.

So it is with those maxims of the law of nations which require that prisoners should not be enslaved, and that the persons of ambassadors should be respected. Not that I think the man who sat down, with only the principles of morality before him, would easily be able to show, from those principles, that the slavery was wrong whilst other things which the law of nations allows are right-but that, as these principles actually enforce the maxims, as the observance of them is agreed on by civilized states, and as they tend

to diminish the evils of war, it is imperative on states to observe them. Incoherent and inconsistent as the law of nations is, when it is examined by the moral law, it is pleasant to contemplate the good tendency of some of its requisitions. In 1702, previous to the declaration of war by this country (England), a number of the anticipated "enemy's" ships had been seized and detained. When the declaration was made, these vessels were released, "in pursuance," as the proclamation stated, "of the law of nations." Some of these vessels were perhaps shortly after captured, and irrecoverably lost to their owners: yet though it might perplex the Christian moralist to show that the release was right and that the capture was right too, still he may rejoice that men conform, even in part, to the purity of virtue.

Attempts to deduce the maxims of international law as they now obtain, from principles of morality, will always be in vain. Grotius seems as if he would countenance the attempt when he says, Some writers have advanced a doctrine which can never be admitted, maintaining that the law of nations authorizes one power to commence hostilities against another, whose increasing greatness awakens her alarms. As a matter of expediency," says Grotius, "such a measure may be adopted; but the principles of justice can never be advanced in its favor."* Alas! if principles of justice are to decide what the law of nations shall authorize, it will be needful to establish a new code to-morrow. A great part of the code arises out of the conduct of war; and the usual practices of war are so foreign to principles of justice and morality, that it is to no purpose to attempt to found the code upon them. Nevertheless, let those who refer to the law of nations, introduce morality by all possible means; and if they * Rights of War and Peace.