Sketches of Moral and Mental Philosophy: Their Connection with Each Other; and Their Bearings on Doctrinal and Practical Christianity |
From inside the book
Results 1-5 of 20
Page 19
... ment . In this way the proper and the primary topics of a Moral Philosophy class have been in a great measure overborne ; nor do we see , in the writings either of Stewart or Brown , any tendency to restore these topics to the place and ...
... ment . In this way the proper and the primary topics of a Moral Philosophy class have been in a great measure overborne ; nor do we see , in the writings either of Stewart or Brown , any tendency to restore these topics to the place and ...
Page 35
... ment of it . Yet surely it is not possible to be deluded by any over - weening estimate of a theme , which reaches upwards to the high authority of heaven , and forward to the destinies of our im- mortal nature . 24. And here it occurs ...
... ment of it . Yet surely it is not possible to be deluded by any over - weening estimate of a theme , which reaches upwards to the high authority of heaven , and forward to the destinies of our im- mortal nature . 24. And here it occurs ...
Page 53
... ment . The violence that is thus often done to the strict philosophy of the subject , is not the only evil to be deprecated , from the confusion or the misplaced interference of one science with another . There is a greater evil to be ...
... ment . The violence that is thus often done to the strict philosophy of the subject , is not the only evil to be deprecated , from the confusion or the misplaced interference of one science with another . There is a greater evil to be ...
Page 90
... ment of their own , and occupy a distinct place from the other departments of our nature . 4. Now , in like manner as in the impotency of mere definition , we must do the best we can to distinguish the emotions of the mind from the ...
... ment of their own , and occupy a distinct place from the other departments of our nature . 4. Now , in like manner as in the impotency of mere definition , we must do the best we can to distinguish the emotions of the mind from the ...
Page 119
... ment . all . If by widening , for example , our prospect over the domain of Nature , we enhance the feeling that we before had of the dignity of its architect- this is a more precious fruit of the acquirement , than the acquirement ...
... ment . all . If by widening , for example , our prospect over the domain of Nature , we enhance the feeling that we before had of the dignity of its architect- this is a more precious fruit of the acquirement , than the acquirement ...
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
action adverted affections altogether anger animal Astronomy attention awakened beneficence benevolence bidding bosom character cognizance compassion conceived conscience constitution contemplation creature delight desire distinct distress duty emotion enjoyment evil excited exhibition external faculty fear feeling felt give given gratitude hand hath heart human imagination impulse inductive philosophy inflicted influence ingra instance intellectual judgment jurisprudence justice kindness labour look ludicrous matter ment Mental Philosophy Mental Science Metaphysics mind moral character Moral Philosophy Moral Science morally right Natural Theology nature ness nought object obligation observation operation pain passion pathological pathology pathy perceive perhaps pheno phenomena Philosophy of Mind pleasure present principle question rectitude regard rendered retina scene sensation sense sensibility sentiment seraphic sight society species suffering susceptible sympathy taste term terminating object Theology thing thought tion truth uncon virtue virtuous volition voluntary wherewith whole wholly wrong
Popular passages
Page 219 - a brother, or sister, be naked, and destitute of daily " food, and one of you say unto them, Depart in peace, " be ye warmed and filled ; notwithstanding ye give them " not those things which are needful for the body, — what " doth it profit ? Even so faith, if it hath not works, is
Page 147 - an act of the mind, knowingly, exerting that dominion it takes itself to have over any part of the man, by employing it in, or withholding it from any particular action.
Page 151 - DESIRE arises from good considered simply ; and AVERSION, from evil. The WILL exerts itself, when either the presence of the good, or absence of the evil, may be attained by any action of the mind or body.
Page 151 - With regard to our own actions, we may desire what we do not will, and will what we do not desire; nay, what we have a great aversion to. " A man athirst has a strong desire to drink; but for some particular reason he determines not to gratify his desire.
Page 147 - The uneasiness a man finds in himself upon the absence of any thing, whose present enjoyment carries the idea of delight with it, is that we call desire; which is greater or less, as that uneasiness is more or less vehement.
Page 20 - His course of lectures on this subject was divided into four parts. The first contained Natural Theology; in which he considered the proofs of the being and attributes of God, and those principles of the human mind upon which religion is founded. The second comprehended Ethics, strictly so called, and consisted chiefly of the doctrines which he afterwards published in his Theory of Moral Sentiments.
Page 19 - ... useful nature than the logic and metaphysics of the schools. Accordingly, after exhibiting a general view of the powers of the mind, and explaining so much of the ancient logic as was requisite to gratify curiosity with respect to an artificial method of reasoning, which had once occupied the universal attention of the learned, he dedicated all the rest of his time to the delivery of a system of rhetoric and belles lettres.
Page 168 - That an action then be the rightful object either of moral censure or approval, it must have had the consent of the will to go along with it. It must be the fruit of a volition — else it is utterly beyond the scope, either of praise for its virtuousness or of blame for its criminality. If an action be involuntary, it is as unfit a subject for any moral reckoning as are the pulsations of the wrist.
Page 399 - A JUST man is, such as he is commanded to be— qui Leget Juraque etirvat — who observes and obeys the things laid down and commanded. 'The RIBHT hand is, that which custom and those who have brought us up have ordered or directed us to use in preference, when one hand only is employed; and the LEFT hand is, that which is leaved, leav'd, left; or, which we are taught to leave out of use on such an occasion.
Page 311 - When by natural principles we are led to advance those ends which a refined and enlightened reason would recommend to us, we are very apt to impute to that reason, as to their efficient cause, the sentiments and actions by which we advance those ends, and to imagine that to be the wisdom of man, which in reality is the wisdom of God.