ledge of Spainish affairs, and the great confidence General Castanos and the Junta of Seville had in him. He contended that it was a brilliant addition to the military glory of this country, to have expelled, in the course of a short campaign of three weeks, an army of 25,000 French from Portugal. The country gave itself no time for deli beration. The feelings of the people broke loose, and they neither took a large nor cool review of the subject. They knew that the French were defeated, and they were angry that they had not been reduced to unconditional submission. All the officers employed agreed, that it was expedient to grant the French the convention they obtain ed. After the Court of Inquiry, that question must be considered as completely settled on military grounds. There were parts, however, of that convention, which he felt it his painful duty, at the time, to express official disapprobation of; that in particular, in which the officer. who made it assumed to stipulate for the interests of our allies. His Lordship justified the negotiation to procure a qualified surrender of the Russian fleet, by the appre hension of famine in Lisbon, and the inconvenience of keeping a squadron upon that exposed and dangerousTM coast, for the purpose of blockading the Tagus. Upon the whole of the argument, he trusted that the House would think that the course that was pursued had furnished all the information that was necessary for coming to a decision on the subject, and that the Court of Inquiry admitted a latitude, which the narrow and technical limits of a court martial could not have afforded. If the equip ment of the expedition was maintainable, the result of the operation was such as at any other time would have sa tisfied the feelings of the country. It had expelled 25,000 men from Portugal, put the Russian flect into our possession and released from a tedious and hazardous blockade a British squadron of nine sail of the line. The resolution of the noble lord would answer no beneficial purpose. If the House would agree with him that the first proposition was unnecessary, he would hope that they would also concur with him that the second was unjust. His lordship concluded with moving the previous question; at the same time professing that he was not averse to taking the sense of the House upon either of the ques

tions.

Sir G. Nugent said a few words, but in so low a tone of voice that it was impossible to collect his meaning.

General Tarleton shewed, from the respective situation and state of the two armies, that we should have exacted better conditions from the enemy. Junot would neither have ventured to march into the country, nor would he have occupied the space between Lisbon and fort St. Julien, a distance of fourteen miles. He contended that the heavy artillery and provisions might have been obtained from the fleet, and fort St. Julien been reduced in eighteen or twenty days. He must express his disap probation of every part of the court of inquiry. He was surprized that seven British general officers could be found to sanction the possibility of the French passing to the south of the Tagus. He compared the situation of Junot at Lisbon with that of Lord Cornwallis at York town in the year 1781, and yet, though the latter had sufficient means of embarkation provided, he found it impossible to cross the river, and effect his retreat. He had a high opinion of the talents of Sir H. Dalrymple, but he could not admit that he was at all calculated for the service to which he was destined. They took him away from a situation where he could be useful, to put him into a country of which he knew nothing. He considered it very extraordinary that four superior officers should be ordered to receive their instructions from an inferior officer. He felt it his conscientious duty to vote in support of the motion, so eloquently opened by his noble friend..

Sir A. Wellesley observed there were two questions before the House; the propriety and prudence of the expedition, and the result of the military operations. For the latter, only the officers employed were responsible. In any expedition, it was necessary to obtain the concur rence and co-operation of the inhabitants, and to be guided by their wishes. On his arrival at Corunna, though his instructions were to proceed to the Tagus, he offered to the Junta to land his army, and he was told that the greatest service he could render them, would be to expel the French from Portugal. The honourable gentleman here read a letter from Sir T. Dyer, recommending it to him to land near Gijon; but he did not consider this as sufficient to induce him to deviate from his instructions. VOL. II. 1809.

He was assured by the Junta of Gallicia, that means would be taken to drive the French from St. Andero; but they thought the expulsion of the French from Portugal so much more important, that they even detached 2000 men from the remains of the army that had been defeated at Rio Seco, to co-operate with the army destined for that service. When he took the command of the expedition, he certainly did not expect that he would have to encounter so great a force as the French brought against him. The information of the admiral off the Tagus represented that the enemy had not above 4000 men at Lisbon. He justified himself from the imputation of rashness thrown out against him by the last speaker, in having fought the actions of the 17th and 21st of August. He would rather follow that honourable General's example in the field, than his advice in the senate. The force under his command he considered as much superior to any the enemy could bring against him; and so confident was he on this point, that he intended the corps of General Ackland should be employed in the siege of Peniche. If the plan of operations that he had taken the liberty of recom mending to Sir H. Burrard had been followed, he would not this night have had the mortification of hearing from the noble lord that the expedition to Portugal had dis appointed the hopes and expectations of the nation. This, however, was disapproved of, and the whole plan that he intended was entirely deranged. When he left England, he had no right to suppose that he would be conti nued in the command of the army. If the enemy had been pursued after the action of the 21st they could not have effected their retreat across the Tagus. This opinion, however, was not adopted, though he must say he thought it ought to have had weight. He could not conceive upon what principle the court of inquiry, who ap proved of every proceeding of his from his landing at Mondego, to the end of the battle of the 21st, sanctioned the resolution not to pursue a beaten enemy. After the battle of the 17th, the enemy retired in good order, but in the action of the 21st, where they were completely beaten, they were thrown into confusion, and they retired in disorder. It was too hard that the government should be blamed for the convention or armistice. Neither the equipment in the army, nor any supposed deficiency in cavalry, heavy artillery, or provisions, was ever taken

into consideration by him, or he believed any officer who was consulted respecting these arrangements. It would not have been possible to prevent the French army from crossing the Tagus. Such was the opinion of the board of inquiry, and the seven general officers who were examined before it. Nothing but the immediate pursuit of the enemy on the 21st, could have prevented it; but this was not a matter of doubt. General Loison had actually done so subsequent to the battle of Vimiera. They could not prevent Junot from doing the same. He would have taken shelter in Elvas and Almeida, from whence they could not have driven him out before the end of November, or beginning of December, when they would probably be glad to grant him the same terms he obtained by the convention of Cintra. He wished the British army to proceed, as speedily as possible, to Spain, because he knew that the Spanish armies would not pull together till so supported. The idea that the French army might afterwards proceed against Spain was not sufficient to deter them from that object. What they gave up in strength they would gain by union. A great deal had been said respecting the advantage of obliging an army, such as Junot's, to lay down their arms. But no such object had been pointed out in their instructions. It was the duty of every commanding officer to oblige the enemy to lay down their arms, and no instructions were necessary for that purpose. But the question was, whether to pro secute that object they ought to give up other material points in time and circumstances, and to abandon the adyantages they had gained. It would not be as honourable to the British arms, if after pursuing the enemy into Alantejo, and the consequent loss of time and blood, the same, or nearly as good terms were to be granted to the enemy. If it was not disgraceful to have allowed the French to evacuate Cairo and Alexandria in Egypt, the convention for the evacuation of Portugal could not be disgraceful. He allowed that the circumstances of the two cases were different, as was also the state of Europe, though he contended that the result in both was equally free from disgrace. There was one other topic which he had to touch upon, namely, the proceedings of the court of inquiry, a court which he was convinced no officer would wish to be held upon him. It had been stated that the court of inquiry had been resorted to in con

sequence of the friendship of his noble friend towards him. It was rather hard upon him to be subjected to such a reflection. If he were to have gone to trial for all for which he was responsible from his landing at Mondego bay to his departure from Portugal, he was convinced he must have been acquitted. As far as he was concerned, the court of inquiry was an injustice, and he hoped it would be the last court of that description, that would ever be summoned in this country. If he had been aware of the letter of his noblé friend, directing bis superior officers to attend to his advice, he should have felt uncomfortable. But, from the moment they landed, may even before they had landed, he perceived that he had not their confidence. Though he differed from them, he had yet done every thing in his power whilst in Portugal, as he had before done on other occasions, to forward the officer under whom he served. There was a difference between a civil and a military officer; the civil officer, if dissatisfied, may resign, but the military officer was bound to obey.

Mr. Windham, in rising after the honourable General, would be sorry that any thing he had to say should do away any part of the impression of his speech-an impression which could be but one on either side of the House. The honourable General had most clearly, forcibly, fairly, and manfully declared his sentiments, as well with respect to the persons connected with him in the campaign in Portugal, as with regard to his own conduct. So far as related to the conduct he bad pursued and held, he was happy to agree with him. He concurred not only in those points, whose success attested his ability, though not perhaps his prudence, but in those in which his suggestions had been unhappily overruled. There was something in the General's views, not only in the battle of the 21st, but the manner in which he proposed to follow them up, that marked a character of skill and judgment, which could not fail to strike even a person not acquainted with the military science; just as an observer may notice a character of good play in the management of a game of drafts or chess which always leads to success, as contradistinguished to that species of play which uniformly tends to the opposite result. But though the statement of the honourable and gallant General was satisfactory and proper with respect