dras, where they would come into a more open country; and speaking of the artillery-horses, he says they could not keep up with the infantry to support them.

If the object of the expedition was to drive the French army out of Portugal, not one of these generals had been made acquainted with it. Even Sir A. Wellesley, who had daily conversations with the noble lord (Lord Castlereagh) previous to his leaving Ireland, never heard a word of it. Under all these circumstances-in want of instructions, cavalry, and artillery, the armistice was signed, with an army that had twice been beaten, and with 30,000 English in the field. The convention then followed, and, he thought, the House would feel it was such a convention. as deserved what his Majesty had said of it, viz. “That it had disappointed the hopes and expectations of the public.'

He then adverted to the case of the Russian fleet. Ministers had been informed by Lord Strangford that the Russian fleet was in such distress, that he thought they might be prevailed on to enter into a convention for giv ing it up to the English admiral, on certain conditions. An instruction was accordingly sent out by the Lords of the Admiralty to Sir C. Cotton, to endeavour to effect such á measure; notwithstanding which, though circumstances had afterwards so greatly changed by the existence of a rebellion in Spain, and another in Portugal, no further instructions had been forwarded to Sir C. Cotton, who heard nothing from ministers till September, and who was thereby induced to conclude a convention on the basis of his former instructions. The Admiralty afterwards wrote to Sir C. Cotton, and did not blame him for making a convention, but for concluding it on a new principle of maritime convention, by which we had seen an enemy's fleet enter our ports in such a manner as had never before been witnessed, from which circumstance it was fair to infer that the maritime convention had also " disappointed the hopes and expectations of the public."

He then adverted to the situation in which General Junot in his letter to the Grand Duke of Berg, had stated himself to be on the 7th of June, when he was applied to for assistance, in which he told the Duke of Berg that he could not, from the varions insurrections around him, spare him a single man. What had intervened between that time and the signing of the convention? General

Junot had been twice defeated by the British forces, and yet, notwithstanding a large reinforcement had arrived under Sir John Moore, the French army had, by the convention, not only been allowed to depart from Portugal, but it had also been stipulated that they should be con veyed to a port in France nearest to the scene of action, in which the French armies were engaged in Spain; the consequence of which was, they had arrived there as soon or before our own army, which had twice defeated them; and the only French officer who had been taken at the battle of Corunna was found, to the grief, shame, and disgust of our brave army, to be one who was also taken prisoner at the battle of Vimiera. Warned, as we had lately been, if we found these to be the only results from the bravery of our troops, and the skill of our officers, after the most brilliant successes and victories, he conceived that nothing less than humiliation must be the inevitable consequence; blame must lie somewhere; and it was for the House to consider on whom that humiliation ought to fall. The noble lord concluded, by moving,

"That it is the opinion of this House that the Convention of Cintra, signed on the 30th of August, and the maritime Convention off the Tagus, signed on the 3d of September, 1808, have disappointed the hopes and expectations of the public."

Lord Castlereagh expressed himself happy that this was made a ministerial question, the onus of which was thrown completely upon government, and neither he nor his colleagues would deserve the confidence of parliament nor of the country, if they could not fairly meet it. He considered, comparing the first part with the last of the noble lord's speech, that it was superfluous for him even to waste the few sentences he had upon the subject of the board of inquiry, as it seemed he did not mean to pres it farther and of course in this instance at least admitted the propriety of the conduct of ministers. He was prepared, however, to defend the course of inquiry which had been pursued. It was most consistent with the military history of the country; and he was well aware, that if ministers had recommended a court-martial instead of a board of inquiry, then the noble lord would have been ready to exclaim, that the particular officers concerned, and not the ministers, had been put upon their trial, and that a narrow ground of investigation had been chosen

for the purpose of screening the delinquency or negligence of government. It was, he thought, very unfair to say, that the swords of the country had been drawn in vain, after the events and victories we had witnessed. It was a cruel retribution indeed to the brave soldiery concerned. As to the object of ministers in sending expeditions, as had been stated, in search of employment, he would only say, that he was sure the expedition sent to Sweden, and that preparing at Cork, were fully as bneficial in their effects to the country, as those sent to Egypt or the Dardanelles. Ministers had a disposable force of 4000 men under General Spencer, at Gibraltar; of 9000 at Cork, under Sir A. Wellesley; and he would ask, was it not better to send those forces to the immediate aid of their cause, than to delay them until additional succours could be provided in England? The force under Sir John Moore could not be calculated on immediately, as its getting free of the Baltic was uncertain. The estimate of the last year's force had been referred to; and that estimate plainly shewed, that there were sufficient transports to conduct 30,000 men to the Tagus in an expedition, concerning which, he was sure the country had made up their minds, whatever might be the opinion of the noble lord on the subject. But though they had that force then, it did by no means follow that it was to be supported at a vast expence, when no such emergency occurred; it was not to be expected that the resources of the country were to be so trifled with. But it was objected that the expedition had been sent out with no definite object. Now the instruction to Sir Arthur Wellesley, dated the 30th of June, had merely a general view; but that from Sir Charles Cotton was an advice not to get to the southward of Cape Finisterre, till it could be judged how he could be employed in Portugal. Was it to be expected that government were to give definite orders to their officers before they set out, considering the circumstances of the case? The South of Spain had not moved; the North and Portugal had ; and he hoped, if blame attached any where, that it would be cast upon government, and not on the Junta of Gallicia, which had advised the expulsion of the French from Portugal. He was particularly glad that the noble lord had broached no new military plans, but had left to his right honourable friend, (Mr. Ponsonby) all the credit of his original conceptions on that subject. The question accord

ing to him was, whether the expedition was to do nothing, or to march straight to the Pyrennees-shut the French out of Spain who were in France, and shut those into Spain who were out of France. Such was the plan of those new literary warriors, and such the alternative to which they would reduce the army. But even this plan presumed that there was only one pass in the Pyrennees, to be taken possession of, whereas there were forty-three practicable entrances into Spain through these mountains. This Quixotic scheme also would have these 25,000 heroes set at defiance 100,000 French in Spain, and, according to its author's own calculation, 490,000 in France. This, however, the noble lord had not attempted to defend, and it was plain he considered the Pyrennean expedition a forlorn hope. It was objected, however, that in the letter to Admiral Purvis Spain alone was mentioned, as if it was necessary to tell the Admiral of the alternative, when the only object of the letter was, that Sir Arthur Wellesley might get information as to the state of Spain, which per haps might have directed his views for the time from Por tugal. General Spencer, it was true, had been sent in the first instance to Cadiz, and not to Portugal; and the plain reason was, that if he had arrived in the Tagus before the main force under Sir Arthur Wellesley, it might have been a signal to the enemy to concentrate his forces, and thereby present a greater power to us than he could other wise have done. The dispatches of the 30th June had given a tone to the expedition, because it informed us of the enemy's weakness in the Tagus. Sir Charles Cotton's information on this subject, too, might have been correct at the time; for the enemy, at the particular period alluded to, might have sent some of his forces into the interior of the country. The question as to the equipment of the forces had been much narrowed since the original inquiry on the subject. An army might be very well provided on its setting off, and yet not be in possession of all its conveniences immediately on landing. This was a part of the business which required time. Every expedition, since he had any knowledge or controul, sailed with at least five months' provision on board for the attendant force. A vast number of necessaries were to accompany so great an army; and it could not be capable even of two days' march, without a consequent number of cattle to convey them, which, of course, required time. This

was an inconvenience to which every expedition, sent by a naval power, must be subject. When a want of artillery horses was complained of, the noble lord must have willingly shut his eyes to the reinforcement which was immediately to follow from England, and which made all the artillery horses to amount to 778. The badness of the Irish horses sent with Sir Arthur Wellesley had been next complained of; but he must beg leave to defend his countrymen.-A loud laugh.)-These horses had been very much admired by the French in Lisbon, and 100, of them had been actually selected to pursue the campaign in Spain, through one of the most fatiguing marches ever made by an army. Such were the feats of the so unjustly and ungratefully abused Irish horses. [4 laugh. It was, however, a question, whether an army was useless without horses at all. In Egypt, our: forces had but 150 horses, and in Holland, Sir R. Aber crombie had none at all. Even Colonel Robe's report, bowever, which said the horses were defective, admitted that they did their work efficiently. The artillery per.. formed wonders too, though drawn by his country horses. Indeed, as far as he could trace the history of these Irish horses, to the last they were most effective. We had also 1,500 cavalry in Spain, and the enemy never brought into action, it will be seen by examination, above 1200. As much cavalry had certainly been sent as there was means of equipment. He must, however, in justice say, that, if blame were to be cast on any one, it must be on himself, as he could not give sufficient praise to the Transport Board for their exertions. With respect to the question of command, it certainly was advisable, that the person who commenced the operation should bring it to a conclusion; but circumstances might arise, to render it unadvisable to adhere invariably to this principle. He recollected an instance in the Austrian campaign in the Low Countries, where the command had changed hands four times in the course of forty-eight hours. A loud laugh.] He did not, however, mean to infer that this was an advantage. He thought highly of the abilities of his honourable friend (Sir Arthur Wellesley), but it was not possible to continue him in the command, without fores going the advantages of employing many officers of great talents and experience. His lordship justified the ap pointment of Sir Hew Dalrymple on account of his know