suffered severely from the intermittent fever of the place, which permanently affected his health. Notwithstanding this, however, he afterwards served with his regiment through the Peninsular war, and closed his long and active career in the army with the battle of Waterloo. He retired on a well-merited pension, and spent the remainder of his life in Dublin, where he died, Feb. 7, 1832. Besides the work already mentioned, Dr. Walsh published a small collection of poems written on various occasions, entitled Bagatelles, but most of them are of little value.]

66

AMSTERDAM.

(FROM NARRATIVE OF EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND.")

Amsterdam, like every other place of great extent, could place little dependence for its defence against a besieging army on its own particular fortifications. Its high brick wall of eleven miles in circumference, and its sixand-twenty bastions, would require an army to defend them nearly as numerous as that by which they would be invested. Besides, no great commercial city, crowded with opulent citizens, could hold out against the destructive effects of a general bombardment. It is not, therefore, to its walls that Amsterdam is, or ever was, indebted for its security;-but its admirable situation, inaccessible on every side by which it can be approached, if well defended, may be said to render it almost impregnable.

It is sufficiently evident that the shoals and intricate channels of the Zuider Zee do not admit of ships of the line, or even frigates, to act against the city itself or any of its fortified approaches. The firth of the Zuider Zee, called the Wye, runs in a crooked direction from its eastern entrance to its north-western termination for about thirty miles. On its southern side, twelve miles from the Zuider Zee, it is joined by the river Amstel. At the junction of the Amstel and the Wye the city of Amsterdam is built. Opposite the western angle of the city, and on the north side of the channel, lie the port and dockyards of Shaerdam, which may be justly termed the Chatham of Holland. The breadth of the Wye is various; in some places it is not one mile, in others it is nearly six miles over; but the approaches to its banks, through North Holland, are so difficult, and the obstacles so numerous, that mere description could convey but a faint idea of them. From the fortress of Purmerend

to the Wye the country is so completely under the power of its wonderful artificial fences that an inclosure of a few acres may be immediately flooded without permitting the water to encroach upon the adjacent lands. The channel itself is defended on each side by redoubts and batteries, erected upon every projecting headland; and the channel of the Pampus, which leads into the Wye, after several windings, takes a course under the shore of S. Holland, where it is commanded by the fortresses of Naarden and Meuden, which defend the east side of the capital.

Nothing more strongly evinces the natural strength of Amsterdam, improved from time to time by the utmost exertions of art and genius, than its having been, from its very foundation in the fifteenth century, an asylum for the oppressed of every nation, who, there protected, were enabled to brave the greatest fury of their oppressors. The most accomplished generals, commanding the finest troops in the world, have at various periods been baffled in their attempts on Amsterdam; and Don John of Austria and the Duke of Parma, as well as Marshal Luxemburg and the Prince of Condé, have alike found its capture impracticable. Even during the recent convulsions of the country the Duke of Brunswick, at the head of 20,000 Prussians, found himself stopped in his attempts to approach the city by a handful of its armed burghers; nor could he without much difficulty have taken the place, had not the republican party throughout the Seven Provinces accepted of the terms offered them.

In the late invasion by the French the city could not be said to have been taken. Pichegru indeed entered its open gates with six thousand troops, but certainly not in a hostile manner.

The surrender of Amsterdam, as connected with the plan and views of the expedition, should seem, therefore, to depend rather on the disposition of the majority of its inhabitants favouring those views than from the exterior operations of the allied army; which, after being victorious in five sanguinary battles in the course of as many weeks, had yet to attain the threshold of the enterprise by forcing the passage of Beverwyck.

RETREAT OF THE ALLIED ARMY.

On the morning after the engagement (the 7th of October) the allied forces found themselves extended over a wide tract of country.

The left wing was at Heyloo and at the villages to the south of Alkmaar. The Russians occupied Egmont-op-te-Hooff; and the right wing, with General Sir Ralph Abercrombie, Egmont-op-Zee. In the course of the morning the troops became more concentrated, the principal part of the army assembling round Egmont-op-Zee.

All the day the men were busily employed in preparing some kind of shelter on the Sandhills against the night, such as constructing sheds of rushes, and digging trenches in the sand. About seven o'clock in the evening a very unexpected order was issued for the troops to fall in, and the different brigades immediately to form. It was pitchy dark, and the clouds descended in cataracts. In this situation the arrangements were at length effected; but with how much difficulty and confusion may be easily conceived. About ten o'clock at night the whole army was in full retreat. The right wing faced towards Petten, and marched along the strand close to the tide. The rest of the army retired by Alkmaar. Fires had been previously lighted on the heights, at the advanced pickets, to deceive the enemy. Thus, by a sudden and decided measure, the retreat of a large army was effected before the face of a most vigilant and active foe, without disorder or any immediate pursuit, and with little comparative loss.

To have gained some hours' march of such an enemy was a measure of the first necessity. A retiring army, in a hostile country, under the most favourable circumstances, cannot proceed unaccompanied with distresses; but so urgent were these in the memorable night of the 7th of October, that if the enemy were not disabled by his recent defeats from attempting any enterprising operations by pressing on our rear during the darkness and horror of the night, he might have occasioned so much confusion along the whole line of march as must have been productive of very serious misfortunes. Indeed, a general consciousness of our critical situation operated as a bond of union which kept the whole army in some order until they arrived at their own lines. But then the line of march was entirely broke up, by the different regiments attempting to move off, in various directions, towards their respective stations. In the disorder which ensued numbers were thrown out who found it impossible to recover their different corps during the remainder of the march.

The intense darkness was still accompanied by deluges of rain. There was no sure foot

ing; all was quagmire; but the firmest bottom, and, on the whole, the safest way, lay through pools of water, though it was impossible to guess whether the next step would be up to the knees or the neck.

Notwithstanding so many difficulties and dangers, the greater part of the troops arrived safely at their different quarters in the evening of the 8th; and those who were thrown behind dropped in the ensuing day. The medium length of this harassing march (from Egmont to Schagen) was about thirty miles.

The enemy, as soon as it was discovered that the allied army had changed its position, despatched some regiments of French chasseurs to observe its motions. These cavalry showed themselves within cannon-shot of our advanced posts, and were enabled to make prisoners of about five or six hundred stragglers. They took also some baggage waggons, and about three hundred women belonging to the British troops who had followed the army for the laudable purpose of picking up whatever they could find by the way. The women, after being detained three days at Amsterdam, were sent back; they did not complain of ill usage. The children amongst them were much caressed, and were all presented with new clothes.

The season now began to assume the aspect of an early and rigorous winter. It could not be supposed that an army of near forty thousand men could be maintained until spring within the narrow limits of a tract of country already impoverished, with an active and enterprising army in front, furnished with every necessary for undertaking a winter campaign.

It was therefore ultimately determined to withdraw the combined British and Russian troops from North Holland, and to return to England as expeditiously as possible.

To render safe and effective this resolution, there were left to choose but two practicable expedients,-either to flood the country in front of our lines, and to fortify the heights that command the Helder, in order to cover the embarkation, or to negotiate an armistice with the enemy.

The command of the waters of the Ocean and of the Zuider Zee was certainly in our power, by possessing the sluices at Colhorn, Oude-Sluys, and Petten; but to take advantage of this power would be to destroy the country, and involve the unoffending inhabitants in irretrievable ruin for whose protection and security the expedition was undertaken.

This desperate measure, therefore, was so utterly repugnant to the feelings and sentiments of his royal highness the commanderin-chief, and so contrary to the well-known generous and liberal mode of warfare exercised by a British army, that nothing but the most urgent plea of self-preservation could induce its adoption. At the same time it must be acknowledged that it would be extremely hazardous to trust entirely to any works thrown up on the heights of Heuysden or round the Helder; for should the enemy once succeed in forcing those works, he would entirely command the embarkation.

Induced by such motives the negotiation for an armistice was preferred; and on the 14th of October an overture was made, in the form of a message from his royal highness the commander-in-chief to the French general Brune, at his head-quarters, Alkmaar. The message met with all the attention to which it was so highly entitled; a favourable answer was returned, and Major-general Knox was despatched the next morning to treat on the conditions of the armistice.

The terms of the enemy, as might be naturally expected, were at first extravagant. The restitution of the Batavian fleet, and the giving up, without exchange, fifteen thousand Batavian and French prisoners, were the terms insisted upon. The first demand was peremptorily rejected by his royal highness the commander-in-chief; but as it was concluded that some loss must necessarily be sustained, in consequence of an interrupted embarkation, a reasonable number of men was consented to be given up. The number ultimately agreed upon was eight thousand, among whom was included the Dutch admiral De Winter.

It was further stipulated that the combined British and Russian armies were to embark,

tavian republic, by the last day of November; and that the ordnance and military stores, which were previously mounted on the batteries within the British lines, should remain, and be preserved for the Batavian republic. On the 18th of October the agreement was concluded at Alkmaar, which was immediately followed by a suspension of hostilities; Majorgeneral Knox being to remain with the enemy until the stipulations were fulfilled.

While preparations for embarkation were actively going forward,much hospitable civility passed between the general officers of both armies; even the men seemed to forget that they were enemies, and a salutary restraint was necessary to keep them within their respective outposts. So much more prone is the human mind to emotions of amity than of hatred! . . .

Although the expedition failed with regard to its most essential object, namely, the restoration of the stadtholder and the legitimate constitution, yet many important advantages were gained by it; a hostile navy, being the last remnant of the maritime power of a nation which once rivalled Great Britain, was drawn from a position where it was capable of exciting much alarm, and added to the already gigantic force of the British fleet;-a very considerable army, which the enemy could at no time so badly spare, was detached from the great theatre of the war; finally, the campaign in Holland was productive of additional experience and reputation to the British army. Heretofore the British troops had acted only in a subordinate and secondary rank on the continent of Europe; but in this instance they were principals; and, assuredly, their intrepid valour in the field, their moderation and humanity when victorious, and their calm fortitude under adverse circumstances, must reflect a permanent lustre on the British arms, and render even misfortune respectable.

[This prolific and popular dramatic writer was born in Dublin on the 24th of June, 1747. He attended a school kept by Father Austin, and became a good classical and French scholar. Having early shown a taste for drawing, it was decided to make him a painter, and he

was accordingly placed under the care of Mr. West of the Dublin Royal Academy. Here he made some progress, but his study of the antique soon gave place to a love of the modern comedy and the acting of private theatricals among his school-fellows. In the summer