actors can only be conjectured. But there is some ground for believing that it was at the instance of the Soviet, whose hostility or apprehension he had aroused, that Korniloff was proclaimed a traitor, and accused of aiming at making himself dictator.

The prospect of a military dictatorship caused more alarm than the disasters in Galicia and the fall of Riga. The Provisional Government, doubtless with the object of regularising its position, proclaimed a Republic, and placed the executive power in the hands of a council of five, in which General Verkovsky was Minister of War. The services of General Alexeieff were secured as Chief of the Staff, Kerensky retaining the nominal position of Commander-in-Chief. If Korniloff had any adherents in the army, they deserted him; and the self-appointed administrative bodies in various parts of the country declared their confidence in the new régime.

These measures seemed at first to convey at least a prospect of a firmer conduct of affairs, by an executive fortified somewhat against the malign influence of the Soviet, which had been mainly responsible for the disintegration of the army. The prospect was illusory. The Soviet is still supreme. General Verkovsky, in a report made after a visit to the front, declared himself opposed to the punishment of offences, and in favour of 'implanting ideas of discipline in the troops,' presumably by rhetorical means; and he announced his intention of removing all officers who were not in favour with the

men.

The system of soldiers' committees, devised by the Soviet, has been retained; and also that of commissioners-officials deputed by the Government to supervise the actions of the army commanders--whose presence with the army cannot be expected to conduce to the success of operations, or to enhance the prestige of the officers. Further, regulations concerning administrative matters, published by the political department of the Ministry of War, charged the commissioners with the task of 'establishing discipline in the army, on the basis of democratic revolutionary principles'; thus categorically

'Commissary' (the term commonly used in the newspapers, probably owing to mistranslation) denotes an official employed on the service of supply.

taking the duty of maintaining military discipline out of the hands of the officers, and transferring it to political theorists.

In these circumstances it is not surprising that General Alexeieff should again have tendered his resignation, having found his position intolerable. To make matters worse, nearly all the officers of note who had not resigned, together with their staffs, have been removed on account of their alleged reactionary principles. The Soviet, not content with having corrupted the body, has set itself to destroy the brain of the army; and if, by some miracle, the former should be restored to health, it would inevitably fail, when put to the test, for the want of officers experienced in the command of large forces, and of a trained staff.

The offensive in Galicia was evidently a loyal effort to give effect to a combined plan of operations which had been arranged among the Allies. The original intention was, probably, to operate along the whole front occupied by the Russian and Rumanian armies in Galicia and Moldavia. The movements on the various sections of the front, so far as they materialised, were probably carried out as intended. The first attack was made north of the Dniester, presumably with the object of threatening Lemberg, and, by drawing the German reserves in that direction, of facilitating the advance of the 8th Army, which would cut Böhm Ermolli's lines of communication. These enveloping movements, if successful, might be expected to result in the capture of Lemberg, and to open the routes over the Carpathians for the invasion of Hungary. The successive advance of the armies in Bukowina and northern Moldavia, which did not materialise, and of the Russo-Rumanian army-group south of the Trotus, would involve the German staff in serious difficulty, as their available troops would have been already set in motion to reinforce Böhm Ermolli and Terstyansky. Moreover, the most vulnerable part of the enemy's front would be attacked-it being held, for the most part, by Austrian troops-and that nearest the vital centres of Austria-Hungary, the weaker partner in the Central Alliance.

Large Russian forces, amply provided with munitions of every kind, and greatly outnumbering those opposed

to them, had been concentrated on the offensive front. They included the seasoned troops led by Brusiloff in last year's offensive, which had suffered least from the corrupting influences of the revolution and of German agents. It was doubtless hoped that their example would arouse the newly-formed units to action, and spur them to emulate their deeds; and they appear to have been detailed, with this object, to lead the attack. The initial success won by these troops was made abortive by the unsoldierly behaviour of those held in reserve, which, when ordered to reinforce the fighting line, refused to obey, or, in some cases, abandoned their positions without waiting to be attacked. Similar incidents occurred on the Riga front, where only a few isolated units attempted to resist the enemy's advance.

The misbehaviour of the bulk of the 'revolutionary army' has had other, and perhaps not less serious, results than the failure of the campaign, and the loss of the positions which had been won last year, at considerable cost, by the imperial armies. It has involved the sacrifice of the loyal nucleus, and of a vast number of officers, who fell in heroic attempts to lead their unstable troops into action-assets which would have been of incalculable value in the task of regenerating the army, if that difficult work should ever be seriously undertaken.

While the Russian army is a factor of uncertain value in the general situation, the utterances of M. Kerensky and other members of the Government leave no uncertainty as to their fixed determination to continue staunch to the Alliance. They, and, no doubt, all thinking and patriotic men in the country, not only recognise the obligation to carry Russia's part in the war to a successful conclusion, but are well aware that the ultimate victory of the Central Powers, or even a German peace,' would be no less disastrous to Russia than to her Allies. Thus, while the latter must still bear the brunt of the offensive war, Russia, by holding, with Rumania's assistance, some 140 Austro-German divisions on the eastern front, is rendering a very real service to the cause for which we and our Allies are fighting.

W. P. BLOOD.

INDEX

TO THE

TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY-EIGHTH VOLUME OF THE

QUARTERLY REVIEW.

[Titles of Articles are printed in heavier type. The names of authors of
articles are printed in italics.]