Art. 13. THE COURSE OF THE WAR. AFTER the battle of Messines (June 7), there followed a period of comparative calm on the British front in the West, which was undisturbed by any important event until the end of July. It was a period of preparation on both sides for changing the scene of the principal operations, in which the capture of the Messines-Wytschaete ridge was a preliminary step. British troops and guns, withdrawn from the St Quentin-Arras front, were brought up on General Plumer's left, prolonging the line from the Menin road to the neighbourhood of Boesinghe. A French corps, under the command of General Anthoine, occupied the space between the British left flank and the inundations which cover the Belgian front from the region of Noordschote to Nieuport; while the line between Nieuport and the sea was taken over by a British force. These dispositions did not escape the observation of the Germans, who responded by drafting large reinforcements into Flanders, with the result that, by the end of July, the Allied and German armies were concentrated in great strength in the region round Ypres. In the mean time the enemy had snatched a local success in the sector adjoining the coast, where the positions held by our troops north-west of Nieuport formed a bridgehead on the further bank of the Yser, facilitating an advance along the causeway of the Dunes, between the inundations and the sea. The purpose of the German enterprise was to deprive us of this advantage, by throwing our advanced detachments back across the river. After an intense bombardment, which lasted twenty-four hours, the attack, embracing the front from Lombartzyde to the sea, was delivered at 7.45 a.m. on July 10. The defences on the Dunes, in front of the German right wing, had been completely levelled, and the bridges over the canal demolished, by the artillery fire. The defenders, consisting of two battalions, deprived of cover and cut off from support, fought with great gallantry; but they were ultimately overpowered. In front of Lombartzyde the German left wing, after gaining a momentary advantage, was driven back to its own lines by a counterattack; and subsequent attempts in this locality, on July 14 and 19, met with no better success. The partial success which attended the operation appears to have been due, in a great measure, to the weather-wind and mist having prevented our aircraft from performing their functions for the preceding three days. An undiscovered change in the disposition of the German artillery during this period would account for our counter-battery work being less effective than usual, while a strong on-shore wind appears to have prevented the monitors from taking part in the action. The position itself had certain obvious disadvantages. Entrenchments in the sand of the Dunes were especially ill-adapted to resist artillery; and, as the front trenches were only six hundred yards from the canal, the depth was insufficient either to accommodate the reserves on the north bank, or to cover the bridges. The Germans, on the other hand, had the advantage of attacking on a narrow front, with their flanks protected by the inundations and the sea, which enabled them to make the most of a comparatively small force. For some days before the opening of the new Allied offensive the Germans were aware that an attack was impending. From July 24 onwards the Berlin reports referred daily to the artillery duel, which 'raged day and night with an intensity never hitherto reached,' and to frequent reconnoitring thrusts by British troops in several sectors of the Flanders front. But, as at Messines, the varying intensity of the bombardment kept the enemy in doubt as to the time of the attack;* and they appear to have been taken by surprise when our troops sprang to the assault shortly before 4 o'clock on the morning of July 31. The front of attack extended from La Basse Ville, on the Lys, to the neighbourhood of Steenstraate, on the Yser, a distance of some fifteen miles; while the French advanced on a front of two miles, including Steenstraate. In the centre and left centre British divisions penetrated the hostile positions to a depth of two miles, and secured the crossings of the River Steenbeek, their final objectives. Two powerful defensive systems were captured, comprising the villages of Verlorenhoek, Frezenberg, St Julien, and Pilkem, as * On this subject see the 'Quarterly Review' for July, pp. 256, 257. well as many strongly defended farms, woods, and organised localities. In the right centre, obstinate resistance was encountered in the difficult country adjoining the Menin road, with the result that progress was less satisfactory; but all the first objectives were gained, including Hooge village and Sanctuary Wood, and, before evening, our troops had fought their way into Westhoek. On the right, La Basse Ville and Hollebeke were captured before noon, and all the objectives south of the Zillebeke -Zandvoorde road were attained. On the extreme left the French forced the passages of the Yser, captured Steenstraate, and, advancing rapidly, gained their appointed objectives early in the day. Not content with this achievement, they continued their advance, and, having captured Bixschoote and the positions to the south, east, and west, on a front of nearly three miles, established a strong defensive flank covering the left of the British line.* Except in the sector roughly defined by the roads to Menin and Roulers, the results of the day's fighting fulfilled, and in some parts surpassed, expectations. But the continuance of the offensive was precluded by the rain, which had begun to fall during the afternoon, and continued almost without intermission for many days. Streams overflowed their banks, shell-craters were quickly flooded, and the battlefield soon became a quagmire, in places waist-deep in mud. In these circumstances movement of any kind became well-nigh impracticable. On the other hand, the Germans, having been driven back beyond the crater-field, were on ground which was relatively little affected by the weather. Moreover, their infantry was closely supported by the artillery, whereas ours had left the guns far behind. The difficulty of entrenching, and of keeping our troops supplied with food and ammunition, enhanced the embarrassment of the situation, even from the defensive point of view. The Germans did not fail to make use of their advantages. They directed their efforts chiefly to the defence of the front east and north-east of Ypres, where, from the first, their resistance had been most obstinate. The reason for their solicitude in this quarter may readily * On July 31 the Allied army captured 6000 prisoners, and a few guns. |