Cochrane, whose exploits have been described in an earlier chapter of this book, the Chilean navy has followed English ideals. Under these circumstances Chile remained neutral, though before the end of the war public sentiment had shifted to the side of the Allies.15 Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Uruguay in severing relations with Germany proclaimed their adherence to the principle of American solidarity. Paraguay's neutrality was due to her isolation. Colombia, still smarting under the loss of the Isthmus, was not disposed to take sides with the United States. In Venezuela most of the government officials were under German influence. Panama and four of the five Central American republics declared war on Germany, Salvador alone remaining neutral. Cuba and Haiti also declared war on Germany, while the Dominican Republic severed consular relations. Mexico proclaimed its neutrality, but permitted its soil to become a hot-bed of German intrigue and President Carranza exhibited at times a spirit of hostility to the United States which tended to increase the tension that already existed between the two countries. In an article on "The European War and Pan Americanism" 16 Ambassador Naón of the Argentine Republic draws the following interesting conclusions, conclusions that are all the more interesting because his country was not one of those that took the course to which he gives his approval. He says: "The political action developed by the different governments of 15 Enrique Rocuant, "The Neutrality of Chile and the Grounds that Prompted and Justified It." (Valparaiso, 1919). 16 Reprinted in International Conciliation, Inter-American Division, Bulletin No. 20 (April, 1919). the continent in the presence of the European conflict, especially since the breaking out of hostilities between the United States and Germany, has not been either the best advised or the most propitious for achieving the consolidation of Pan Americanism." The situation created by the European war, he continues, “affected the entire continent in the same manner and with the same political and economic intensity as the United States, and both self-interest and moral obligations ought to have counseled the consummating of solidarity, here and now, by making common cause and endorsing the attitude of the United States to the extreme limit, until the disturbing force should be overcome. The political action of America did not take this direction, however. Some of the most important governments of the continent, going counter to the political aspirations and doubtless to the political interests of their own countries, adhered to the policy of neutrality. In America this was equivalent to a policy of isolation, and thus the solidarity of the continent was broken, with consequent prejudice to Pan Americanism. Yet even if in those countries, the action of the governments could not be counted upon, nevertheless, the sentiment, expressed in eloquent manifestations of public opinion and in complete disagreement with that attitude of the governments, persisted throughout the crisis. Thus the spirit of Pan Americanism was saved, and we are justified in believing that there will come a reaction which will restore the disturbed equilibrium and save the mighty interests involved." Ambassador Naón believes, however, that Pan Americanism has many obstacles in the way of its com plete realization. Among them he mentions "the recognition of politico-intellectual inferiorities" by the peace conference at Paris in the classification of nations as great powers and small powers. The fundamental principle of Pan Americanism he believes to be the doctrine of equality. He further points out that as long as American states remain, whether as the result of their own shortcomings or not, in these conditions of inferiority in world politics, "there will continue to exist for the United States the causes that gave rise to the Monroe Doctrine and consequently all its objections will continue to exist." Finally he says that "the idea of solidarity is being weakened or thwarted by another idea, the unwholesome one of Latin Americanism, which is a Teutonic idea in its tendencies, and which is trying to replace it, basing itself upon supposed antagonisms of interests and ideals. between the other countries of America and the United States. This purpose, which is anarchical, might cause American solidarity to fail if, in virtue of neglecting to foster this tendency, it should succeed, by pandering to paltry prejudices and flattering national vanities, in gaining a footing in the thought of the other governments of the continent to the extent of constituting itself a political force, capable of replacing the system of solidarity which Pan Americanism seeks, by a system of a continental equilibrium: a system which has just failed in the European conflict." This summary of the views of the distinguished Argentine statesman is sufficient to show that his analysis of the situation is correct. The weakness and backwardness of certain states, specifically those in the zone of the Caribbean, lies at the heart of the difficulty. As long as they remain in their present condition the United States must continue to protect them against European intervention and, when occasion arises, supervise their affairs in order to prevent them from provoking such intervention. As long as it is necessary to pursue this course the United States will have to rest under the suspicion of having imperialistic designs on its weaker neighbors, and it is this suspicion which perpetuates the spirit of Latin Americanism which in turn must be overcome before we can fully realize the ideal of Pan Americanism. CHAPTER IX THE MONROE DOCTRINE IN the foregoing chapters we have discussed the origin and the more important applications of the Monroe Doctrine. There remain, however, certain general aspects of the subject which require special consideration. In any discussion of the Monroe Doctrine it is important to bear in mind that it was in its origin and has always remained purely an executive policy. Neither house of Congress has ever expressly sanctioned the language of President Monroe or attempted to formulate a new definition of the policy. On January 20, 1824, a few weeks after Monroe's famous message, Henry Clay made an effort to get Congress to endorse the policy announced by the executive, but his resolution was tabled. In 1856 Senator Clayton, who as secretary of state had negotiated the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, declared that he would be willing to vote to assert the Monroe Doctrine and maintain it, but that he would "not expect to be sustained in such a vote by both branches of Congress. Whenever the attempt has been made to assert the Monroe Doctrine in either branch of Congress, it has failed." And he added, "You cannot prevail on a majority, and I will venture to say that you cannot prevail on one-third, of either house of Congress to sustain it." In fact, the Monroe Doc 1 Moore, 64 Digest of International Law," Vol. VI, p. 404. Ibid., p. 427. |