with the United States in the control of an Isthmian canal on which she had insisted for half a century. While the Hay-Pauncefote treaty was limited in terms to the canal question, it was in reality of much wider significance. It amounted in effect to the transference of naval supremacy in the West Indies to the United States, for since its signature Great Britain has withdrawn her squadron from this important strategic area. So marked was Great Britain's change of attitude toward the United States at this time that some writers have concluded that a secret treaty of alliance was made between the two countries in 1897. The absurdity of such a statement was pointed out by Senator Lodge several years ago. England's change of attitude is not difficult to understand. For one hundred years after the battle of Trafalgar England had pursued the policy of maintaining a navy large enough to meet all comers. With the rapid growth of the navies of Russia, Japan, and Germany during the closing years of the nineteenth century, England realized that she could no longer pursue a policy of isolation. Our acquisition of the Philippines, the Hawaiian Islands, and Porto Rico and our determination to build an Isthmian canal made a large American navy inevitable. Great Britain realized, therefore, that she would have to cast about for future allies. It was on considerations of this kind that she signed the Hay-Pauncefote treaty with the United States in 1901, and the defensive alliance with Jap in 1902. In view of the fact that the United States was bent on carrying out the long deferred canal scheme, Great Britain realized that a further insistence on her rights under the Clayton-Bulwer

treaty would lead to friction and possible conflict. She wisely decided, therefore, to recede from the position which she had held for half a century and to give us a free hand in the acquisition and control of the canal at whatever point we might choose to build it. In signing the Hay-Pauncefote treaty she gracefully recognized the fact that the United States had paramount interests in the Caribbean which it was unwise for her to contest. Since the signature of that treaty American supremacy in this area has not been seriously questioned.

The determination to build a canal not only rendered inevitable the adoption of a policy of naval supremacy in the Caribbean sea, but led to the formulation of new political policies to be applied in the zone of the Caribbean-what Admiral Chester calls the larger Panama Canal Zone-that is, the West Indies, Mexico and Central America, Colombia and Venezuela. The policies referred to included the establishment of protectorates, the supervision of finances, the control of all naval routes, the acquisition of naval stations, and the policing and administration of disorderly countries.

The advance of the United States in the Caribbean since the Spanish War has been rapid. The acquisition of Porto Rico and the establishment of a protectorate over Cuba were the natural outcome of that struggle. In 1903 we acquired the canal zone under circumstances already described. The following year President Roosevelt established financial supervision over the Dominican Republic. In 1915 the United States landed marines in Haiti and a treaty was soon drafted under which we assumed financial supervision

and administrative control over the affairs of that country. In 1916 we acquired by treaty from Nicaragua an exclusive right of way for a canal through her territory and the lease of a naval station on Fonseca bay, and in 1917 we acquired by treaty from Denmark her holdings in the West Indies known as the Virgin Islands. These successive steps will be considered in detail.

The methods employed by President Roosevelt in the acquisition of the Panama Canal Zone described in a previous chapter caused indignation and alarm throughout Latin America and created strained relations with Colombia. The Colombian government refused to recognize the independence of the Republic of Panama and demanded that her claim to Panama as well as her interests in the canal should be submitted to arbitration. Colombia claimed that President Roosevelt had misinterpreted the treaty of 1846, which established mutual obligations between the United States and Colombia with reference to the isthmus, by construing its provisions as obligations to the world at large against Colombia. As the United States had always advocated the submission to arbitration of questions involving the construction of treaties, the demand of Colombia proved embarrassing, but both Secretary Hay and his successor, Secretary Root, rejected the demand for arbitration on the ground that the questions involved were of a political nature."

In January, 1909, shortly before the close of the Roosevelt administration, Secretary Root undertook

House Doc. No. 1444. Sixty-second Cong., Third Sess., pp. 2, 3; Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 1, Sixty-fifth Cong., Special Sess., pp. 47, 48.

to reëstablish friendly relations with Colombia through the negotiation in the city of Washington of three treaties, one between the United States and the Republic of Colombia, one between the United States and the Republic of Panama, and one between Colombia and Panama. In the treaty between Colombia and Panama the Republic of Colombia recognized fully the independence of Panama, and the Republic of Panama made an assignment to Colombia of the first ten installments of $250,000, the amount due annually to the Republic of Panama from the United States as rental for the canal. According to the treaty between the United States and the Republic of Panama, concluded November 18, 1903, the payment of this annual sum was to begin nine years from date. It was now agreed that the first annual payment should be regarded as due four years from the exchange of ratifications of the said treaty, so that of the $2,500,000 to be paid to Colombia, half would be paid by the United States and half by Panama. In the new treaty between the United States and Panama the necessary modification of the treaty of 1903 was made so as to permit of this assignment of the first ten installments to Colombia. In the treaty between the United States and Colombia the most important provision was as follows:

The Republic of Colombia shall have liberty at all times to convey through the ship canal now in course of construction by the United States across the Isthmus of Panama the troops, materials for war, and ships of war of the Republic of Colombia, without paying any duty to the United States; even in the case of an international war between Colombia and another country.

It was further provided that the products of the soil and industry of Colombia should be admitted to the canal zone subject only to such duty as would be payable on similar products of the United States under similar conditions, and Colombian mails were to have free passage through the canal zone on payment of such duties or charges as were laid on the mails of the United States.3

These tripartite treaties were of course to stand or fall together. The United States and Panama promptly ratified the agreements to which they were parties, but Colombia rejected the arrangement with indignation. In fact, when the terms of the settlement were made public, the Colombian adminstration that urged their acceptance was overthrown, and the Colombian envoy who participated in the negotiation of the treaties was forced to flee from the country with an indignant mob at his heels. Colombia was not to be appeased by the paltry sum of $2,500,000.

The Taft administration made repeated efforts to placate Colombia, but without success. On September 30, 1912, Mr. Du Bois, the American minister to Colombia, submitted to Secretary Knox an interesting review of the whole question in the course of which, after referring to the friendly relations that had so long subsisted between the two countries, he said:

Nine years ago this was changed suddenly and unexpectedly when President Roosevelt denied to Colombia the right to land her troops upon her own soil to supress a threatened revolt and maintain a sovereignty guaranteed by treaty stipulations. The breach came and it has been

Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 1, Sixty-fifth Cong., Special Sess., PP. 24-34.