of the Governor-General,) had not influence upon the Court of Directors, sufficient to make them adopt the proposition of the President of the Board of Control; and still less, the enlargement of that proposition, as suggested by Lord Wellesley; who represented, "the great advantages that would result to the Sovereign State, by encouraging the shipping and exportation of India; and, that if the capital of the merchants in India, should not supply funds sufficient for the conduct of the whole private export trade from India to Europe, no dangerous consequences could result from applying, to this branch of commerce, capital drawn directly from the British empire in Europe:" thereby taking that trade from foreign nations, whose participation in it was become "alarmingly increasing."

These distinct and concurring opinions, of the President of the Board of Control and the Governor-General, could not prevail upon the Court of Directors to "alter the opinion they had delivered." They accordingly drew up paragraphs, to be sent to the Governments in India, conveying their final resolutions and instructions." The British residents in India," they said, "aided by those who take up their cause here (viz. the King's Ministers and Merchants of London), desire to send their own ships to Britain, with private merchandise; and the principle of employing British capital in this trade, is also contended for. This trade, although it might for a time be carried on through the existing forms of the Company, would at length supersede them; the British commerce with India, instead of being, as it is now, a regulated monopoly, would deserve, more properly, the character of a regulated free trade; a title, which, it is to be feared, would not suit it long."

Such is the substance of the paragraphs which the Directors had prepared, upon the propositions we have been considering; although both the one and the other of those propositions explicitly provided," that all the private trade with India, export as well as import, should be confined to the port of London." The Board of Control, though no longer presided at by Mr. Dundas, interposed its authority; and on the 2d June, 1801, the Directors were enjoined not to send those paragraphs to India.

The language of the Court of Directors in 1813, upon the

question of the import trade, is, as has been already affirmed, feeble and languid in comparison with that which the same body employed in 1800 and 1801, with regard to the admission of India-built ships in the carrying trade between Britain and India; but Indian-built ships have, from that time to the present, been employed in that trade, and none of the alarming consequences, which the Directors had predicted, have resulted from that practice.

May it not therefore be reasonably assumed, that the alarm under which they now profess themselves to be, would prove to be equally unfounded; that the direful influence upon the constitution and empire, which, the Directors tell us, is to be apprehended, from any change in the existing system that shall admit private ships returning from India to import at the places whence they had cleared out, would be found to be as little entitled to serious consideration; and that neither the public revenue, nor the immediate interests of the Company, would be endangered by an experiment which the Government and the Company would be equally bound to watch; and which Parliament could at all times control, and if necessary, absolutely bring to a termination?

LETTER IV.

GRACCHUS.

Saturday, Jan. 16, 1813.

HAVING hitherto taken a view of those parts of the India Question, which more immediately relate to the commercial interests of this country, and to the Proprietors of East India

Stock; let us now advert to the deportment of the Directors towards the Ministers of the Crown, in their last communication made to the Court of Proprietors.

It appears, from the printed papers, that as long back as the month of April, the President of the Board of Control put the Court of Directors in full possession of the final opinion of his Majesty's ministers; concerning the privileges of trade which, they conceived, it would be their duty to submit to Parliament, as the basis of a Charter. Early in the month of December, a deputation from the Court of Directors appears to have been ádmitted, by special appointment, to a conference; in which it is known to every clerk and messenger about the offices, as well as to every member of that deputation, that the three Secretaries of State, the First Lord of the Treasury, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, attended. And it is equally notorious, that two subsequent meetings were held, between the same parties. We are warranted to infer, from the letter of Lord Buckinghamshire, that the discussions which took place at those several conferences, were declared to be open and unreserved; with a view that the Members of Government, and the Members of the Deputation, might freely, and without restraint of form, deliver their reasons for the opinions which they respectively held.

The impression which the Court of Directors received, from the conduct of the Ministers of the Crown, in those conferences, is manifested in the letter from the Chairman and Deputy Chairman to the President of the Board of Control, of the 30th December, in which "they return sincere acknowledgments for the attention with which their representations had been listened to, in the various interviews with which they had been honored by his Lordship, and His Majesty's Ministers, who attended.”

In conferences of this nature, and between parties thus relatively circumstanced, all that was to be expected from the Ministers of the Crown was, that they should listen with attention to the, representations made to them, and should reply to those representations, so as to command the acknowledgment of the inferior party. If, in the issue, (to use the words of Mr. Dundas to the same authorities in 1801,) "after having reviewed their opinions with the most jealous attention, and after having weighed, with

the most anxious care, the arguments brought forward, it was still their misfortune to view the subject in an opposite light" to that which presented itself to the judgment of the Directors; it was not to be expected, that they should surrender their own judgment to that of the Directors, who stood in the anomalous character of defendants and judges in their own cause.

At the time that these conferences were terminated, the Ministers appear to have entertained an expectation, that the subject would not be farther agitated, until an official communication should be made upon it from Government. The Court of Directors, however, met on the 18th December, and entered something very like a protest, by anticipation, against the measure, which they knew, (from what appears to have passed at the conferences,) would be the subject of that official communication; and they transmitted it to the India Board. By the irregularity of this proceeding; which bore upon the face of it the appearance of a design, either of intimidating Government from coming to the final decision which they had signified, or of creating a bar against future discussion; they precluded Government from going into, any detail of argument, and consequently, the reply of the President of the Board of Control appears to have been principally intended, to convey officially to the Court of Directors that result, which the Members of the Deputation were already in possession of; namely, "those conditions upon which alone, consistently with their public duty, the King's Servants could submit a proposition to Parliament for the renewal of the Charter."

To this official communication, the chairman and deputy chairman of the East India Company sent a reply, wherein they offer some explanation of the irregularity; but, in their opposition to the ultimate determination of Government, they call upon the King's confidential servants, to impart to them all the reasons which had determined them to think, that "the privilege of Eastern commerce should be extended to British merchants;' and also, the specific regulations which they may propose to adopt, for giving additional security to the revenue against smuggling.

The President of the Board of Control, thus called upon to

step out of his sphere, or to admit the Court of Directors to Cabinet discussions, was constrained to acquaint them, that "the duty of Ministers had been performed, by communicating to the Company the conditions on which they were disposed to submit the business to Parliament;" at the same time informing them, that they would find most of the reasons, which had determined: the judgment of Ministers to yield to the representations of the out-port merchants, stated "in the petitions presented by those merchants to the Houses of Parliament." And he finally referred them, with confidence, to the "justice and wisdom of Parliament, for obtaining a due regard to their interests."

!

If the Court of Directors did not entertain feelings and views very different from those of the community at large, in consequence of that peculiar position which renders them defendants, and judges, in their own cause, they could not fail to contemplate with applause, the temper, patience, and regard to public engagements, which mark the whole proceedings of Government on this arduous occasion. But, being at one and the same moment, petitioners and arbitrators, and having their judgments biassed under those clashing characters, they have not always kept themselves within the capacity, in which alone they can consistently treat with the Government of the country. In their communications with the servants of the crown, respecting the renewal of their Charter, all that they are authorised to pretend to, is to have a distinct knowledge of the conditions, on which the Government think they shall be justified in the sight of the country, in proposing to Parliament the renewal of their Charter; and, in the course of obtaining this information, they have experienced the utmost consideration, and have received the most ample and unreserved communications from his Majesty's confidential servants; who have given their attention to every argument urged by those who appeared as representatives of the Court of Directors, and have put: them in possession of all the grounds upon which they differ from them in opinion. After having done this, they have discharged their highly responsible duty to the Public; and if "they have the misfortune to view the subject in an opposite light," the Company's records will show them, that this is not the first time a radical difference of opinion had subsisted, concerning their