it may be urged that, as the law of elections stands at present, no small inconvenience must necessarily arise, in the discharge of the business of the public, from the making Parliaments triennial. Till the passing what is called the 'Grenville Act' which gave the House of Commons a power of appointing Committees to try contested elections, the mode of proceeding, which the rejected candidate was obliged to adopt, was by an Information in the Court of King's Bench, to try the legality of certain votes which he contended ought not to have been admitted; and by the admission of which, a majority was created against him, and consequently he lost his election. The House of Commons, considering this mode to be objectionable on many accounts, caused an act to be passed, generally known by the name of the Grenville Act; under which the party aggrieved may present his petition, and a Committee will be balloted for, to try the merits of such petition. Now it is very well known that many Petitions of this kind are presented on the meeting of every new Parliament :-and if any petition should occupy a large portion of time, or remain long on the table of the House before it can be decided, and both these circumstances must in the nature of things be expected,-the necessary consequence will be that no small part of the existence of a triennial Parliament will be spent in deciding whether A or B ought to sit as member for the borough of **** during all which time the said borough of ***, if it send but one member to Parliament, must either remain unrepresented, or be represented by a member who perhaps ought not to have been returned, and consequently the people of the borough are not represented by the man of their choice.-Is not this an inconvenience?-to our apprehensions, a very great one; for it will produce this effect; that as any gentleman who offers himself as a candidate may be liable to the inconvenience

and expense here alluded to, he will consider whether three years' enjoyment of a seat in the House of Commons, will be worth all the trouble and anxiety attending a contested election,-in which he may find himself involved. In many instances, the candidate must decline such a contest: his fortune, if he has a family, may not be able to bear it, or would not recover the injury it would sustain before a second contest would be necessary, that is to say, at the end of three years. And this would operate as another obstacle to good and worthy men getting admission, and tend to throw the representation of the people into the hands of a set of desperate adventurers, who, having once obtained a seat in Parliament, might look to the minister for a compensation for their losses.

For this reason, were there no other, the pretended Reform in Parliament ought to receive, from all who are anxious to maintain the real dignity of Parliament, the most decided disapprobation. And most earnestly do we hope that the majority of the nation feel thus anxious for its dignity; sensible, as they can but be, that, that once gone, Parliament, as the grand source of public security, is no

more.

How much better then is that which the law of the land has defined as the fittest term for the duration of Parlia ments, than that which is to be substituted in its stead! and what is the foundation for the alarm, in the mind of any man who does not suffer himself to be scared by phantoms and the absurd bodings of waywardness and folly, that the member is under the influence of the minister, when the minister himself is under the influence of the parliament and of the people likewise! For it is to be remembered, that though the people are represented, they are not annihilated as a body, nor are they silenced as to the expression of their sentiments. In order to make this more clear, we

will suppose the minister of the day to be corrupt, and in every respect unfit for his office. Has there been any period from the Revolution down to the present moment, when there was not some one in the house who felt it his duty, or, what is more to the purpose, his interest, to oppose such a minister? and when has there ever been such a decided opposition without its ultimately driving him from his place? If the opposing member was not remunerated in any other way, which is not very likely, the popularity he acquired has proved an ample source of gratification;—and, in such a case, what minister is there who would not feel the necessity of yielding to popular opinion?-or, if Parliament failed to exert its force by its own suggestions; the people, and here it might not be the rabble only, would soon make their sentiments known to their representatives, and give them to understand what they expected from them.— What we here state as hypothetical may be confirmed by fact. What was it that removed Lord North from his situation? The American war had been proceeded in till the nation was tired of it, but the minister was not disposed or was not able to make a peace. What was the consequence? The opposition spoke the language of the nation; and therefore was supported; and the minister resigned. Yet at this time, let it be remembered, Parliaments were septennial. This is the second instance that we have recorded where the sense of the people has prevailed, and this too, though Parliament was of such a duration as made it, according to the language of our sapient adversaries, the tool of the minister !!

Let us, however, consider how, supposing Parliaments are corrupt, and that the corruption arises from their being called for seven years, the evil is to be cured by calling them for three only; because, even though it were proved that the evil exists, it does not follow that the remedy prescribed

would cure it. To us it seems that it would only shorten the duration of the minister's influence, it would not diminish its power while that influence existed. Any bargain that may be supposed may be as binding for three years as for seven. If we are told that the responsibility of the member to his constituents is increased by the more frequent recurrence of elections, we will readily admit the fact, but deny that it follows that Parliament would be more pure from that recurrence; for every new member that might be returned might be as open to a new bargain as he that was supersed. d: the purity would, in both cases, equally depend, not only upon the Representative, but also upon the Electors, who are as likely to be factious' and corrupt as the member is to be venal and corrupt; and it would be as impure in a member to sacrifice the public good, by cajoling the people in order to secure his election, as it would be to do the same act to procure a bribe from a minister. We frankly avow ourselves of the opinion of those who contend that a member ought to go perfectly free and unshackled into the House-to recollect that he is to legislate for THE WHOLE,' and to feel himself divested of all party squabbles and brawls-the affairs of a nation cannot be conducted on the same simple principle that may regulate the politics of a vestry.-And to suppose that the people would choose upon real, substantial grounds of recommendation is scarcely to be hoped-in fact it has rarely happened, and, consequently, whenever it has been the case, it is to be considered as the exception, not the example, to the rule. Neither is there any reason to suppose, as far as history speaks on the subject, that when Parliaments were triennial they were less under the control of the minister.

And here we beg leave once more to refer to the Middlesex Elee tion,

Even at that time, improper persons were occasionally chosen, and, when chosen, would act as corruptly, as if they had reckoned on a seven years' tenure of their seats, so that, as it appears, the evil sustained by the expense, the riot, and the profligacy which attend a general election, are certain, and any good that can be supposed to ensue is problematical.

If we are asked, which we should in reason consider as the greater evil, the acting under the influence of the minister, or of a set of rabble-voters, such persons, that is to say, as would become voters under the new arrangement, we do not hesitate to affirm that we consider the latter as the greater evil. The minister, whom a member might support, has a certain degree of credit to maintain, which would, prima facie, prompt him to do his duty. In the course of that duty, he must pursue certain measures, which make it requisite that he should be supported: without that support there would be No government; and until it be plain that the minister be either corrupt or incapable, it is the duty of a member to support him. With the mob, there is no such credit; they generally act, not from judgment, but from feeling; and who ever considered the feeling manifested by the rabble as a sound principle, in which any confidence, even as to consistency, could be placed? The favorite of one day has been the exile of the next:

O thou fond many, with what loud applause

Didst thou beat Heaven with blessing Bolinbroke,
Before he was what thou would'st have him be!

Hitherto we have considered the House of Commons, in the strict sense of the phrase, as the Representatives of the people. We have considered its electors, and, as far as was necessary for our purpose, its faculties and its oper VOL. I. No. II.

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