Art. 6.-EGYPT AND PALESTINE,

1. Zionism and the Jewish Future. By various writers. Edited by H. Sacher. Murray, 1916.

2. Palästina-Handbuch. By Davis Trietsch. Third edition. Berlin: Jüdischer Verlag, 1912.

3. The Anglo-Palestine Company. An Account of the Work of the Bank and its Branches during the years 1903-1913. London: 1913.

4. Diplomatic and Consular Reports: Turkey. (1) On the Trade and Commerce of Beirut and the Coast of Syria; (2) On the Trade of the Consular District of Jerusalem. Reports for the Year 1913; Nos. 5302, 5339.

5. Die Jüdische Kolonisation Palästinas. Eine Volkswirtschaftliche Untersuchung ihrer Grundlagen. By Curt Nawratzki. Munich: Reinhardt, 1914.

6. The Wilderness of Zin. By C. L. Woolley and T. E. Lawrence. Palestine Exploration Fund, 1915.

7. Fifty Years' Work in the Holy Land. A Record and a Summary, 1865-1915. By Sir C. M. Watson. Pal.

Expl. Fund, 1915.

8. Recent Jewish Progress in Palestine. By Henrietta Szold. Philadelphia: Jewish Publ. Society, 1915.

9. Palestine and the Powers. By F. G. Jannaway. Birmingham: Walker, 1915.

AT intervals during the past eighteen months the attention of the British public has been bestowed more intently than had for long previously been the case upon Egypt; and, almost for the first occasion since the Suez Canal became a British interest, its safety has been a matter of concern. In England the security of the Canal and of Egypt had been taken generally as a matter of course. This, however, was not the case on the Continent, as is shown by the following quotation from a recent work by Dr Paul Rohrbach, only one of many continental publicists who have devoted their attention to the Near East:

'A direct attack upon England across the North Sea is out of the question; the prospect of a German invasion of England is a fantastic dream. It is necessary to discover another combination in order to hit England in a vulnerable spot-and here we come to the point where the relationship of

Germany to Turkey, and the conditions prevailing in Turkey, become of decisive importance for German foreign policy, based as it now is upon watchfulness in the direction of England.... England can be attacked and mortally wounded by land from Europe only in one place-Egypt. The loss of Egypt would mean for England not only the end of her dominion over the Suez Canal and of her connexions with India and the Far East, but would probably entail the loss also of her possessions in Central and East Africa. The conquest of Egypt by a Mohammedan power, like Turkey, would also imperil England's hold over her sixty million Mohammedan subjects in India, besides prejudicing her relations with Afghanistan and Persia. Turkey, however, can never dream of recovering Egypt until she is mistress of a developed railway system in Asia Minor and Syria, and until, through the progress of the Anatolian Railway to Baghdad, she is in a position to withstand an attack by England upon Mesopotamia. The stronger Turkey grows, the more dangerous does she become for England. . . . Egypt is a prize which for Turkey would be well worth the risk of taking sides with Germany in a war with England. The policy of protecting Turkey, which is now pursued by Germany, has no other object but the desire to effect an insurance against the danger of a war with England.'

Dr Rohrbach rightly emphasises the importance to the British Empire, not so much of Egypt-although the control of this great country is an asset the value of which it is not easy to overrate―as of the Suez Canal. The principal British interest in the Eastern Mediterranean is, in fact, the safeguarding of the shortest route to India and the Far East. Egypt is of course of great value to the Empire, but the Canal is of still greater. The Empire could continue to live and to flourish without Egypt, provided that the free passage through the Canal were safeguarded. If, however, that were lost, the two halves of the Empire would be severed from one another. In these days, when time is so essential a factor in all military matters, the duration of a voyage from Gibraltar or Malta to the Persian Gulf or Bombay by way of the Cape, which would take twice as long as one from Toulon or Trieste by the Canal, must prove a

* Dr Paul Rohrbach, 'Die Bagdadbahn.' Second edition. Berlin: 1911. Pp. 18, 19. The italics are Dr Rohrbach's.

fatal handicap to British interests. The great value of Egypt to the Empire is in fact the protection it gives to the Canal on the west; and, so long as Egypt is in British hands, the Canal is safe so far as the African side is concerned.

The security of the African shore of the Canal is, however, not the whole solution of the problem. The Asiatic shore also has to be safeguarded. Since the dawn of history until last century—one is almost justified in saying, until the present day-the struggle between Asia and Egypt has been almost continuous. The Hyksos, the Hittites, the Assyrians, the Crusaders and many another conquering race invaded Egypt; and their road always ran through Palestine. On the other hand, Asia has in the course of history been frequently invaded and partially overrun by Egyptian rulers, from the days of Amasis and Thothmes of the XVIII Dynasty until those of Mehemet Ali, eighty years ago. And the Egyptian forces also have invariably marched through the Wilderness of Zin and Palestine. In fact, the history of Palestine has been that of a shuttlecock, now under the control or influence of Egypt, now under that of one of the empires of Asia, seldom and for very brief periods free of both. In this respect, as in so many others, history does not change; she appears under different guises. The present war has shown that it is quite practicable for an Asiatic army to march from Asia to the borders of Egypt. The weakness of the Turks in the campaign of 1914–15 safeguarded the Canal from serious danger, but there can be no guarantee that the circumstances will always be similarly favourable to British interests. On the next occasion on which Egypt is threatened from the Asiatic side the threat may have far more force and skill behind it. The danger will then be great.

The Anglo-Egyptian government has recognised the unsatisfactory strategic situation in the region of the Canal by drawing its boundary, not at the natural frontier, where Asia and Africa meet, but further east, including some 37,000 square miles of Asiatic territory, more than twice the extent of Turkish Palestine, within the Egyptian dominions. This region-the El-Arish district, the Wilderness of Zin and the Sinai Peninsulais very sparsely inhabited, and is generally considered

desert. It includes not only the region that intervenes between geographical Palestine and Egypt, but also the southernmost portion of the former, stopping short within twenty miles of Gaza. This region has been held by Egypt as a buffer-state; but as a defence against an enemy of any strength it has proved inefficacious. It is therefore clear that any decision regarding Palestine, in consequence of the present war, will touch British interests to the quick; and it is essential that, in the settlement, Palestine shall come within the British sphere of influence.

Palestine, a country of about 16,000-17,000 square miles, bounded on the west by the Mediterranean, on the east by the Desert, on the north by Syria and the Lebanon, and on the south by Egypt, is a region of deep and abiding interest to every people of Europe. It includes within its limits sites which are sacred to Christian, Jew and Moslem. The thoughts of the votaries of the three great religions of the modern world turn to a land which is holy to all of them. Christian, Jew and Moslem all send pilgrims to Palestine; all have their religious representatives in the country; to all, security of person and property there, and freedom to enter and to leave the land, are matters of first importance. To this extent all the Powers of Europe, great and small, are equal. A stable and just government, whatever its complexion, would satisfy them on this head. Some of the Powers have interests greater than this; but, in estimating them, only three Powers demand detailed consideration-Germany, France and Britain. The interests of others, apart of course from those of Turkey, are insignificant, and would be safeguarded without difficulty under the rule of any strong and efficient government.

To Germany more than to any other Power is due the fact that the future of Palestine has become a matter of practical politics. Other Powers had ambitions in the Near East, and anticipations that, when at length the break-up of Turkey became an accomplished fact, their empires would thereby be enlarged. These ambitions were, however, for the most part latent. Seemingly the other Powers were willing to remain passive, pending

the time when circumstances would give them the opportunity for asserting their claims. Germany was, however, more assertive. Her ever-increasing influence at Constantinople, the power and prestige given her by concessions such as that of the Baghdad Railway, and, in an entirely different sphere, so early as 1881, the grant by the Sultan to the German Government of the ruins of Cæsarea, nominally at any rate for the purposes of archæological research; * the advertisement given her by the picturesque visit of the Emperor in 1898, on which occasion roads were specially constructed so as to increase the comfort of the imperial party and a breach was made in the medieval walls of Jerusalem so that the Emperor might enter the city in a manner befitting his dignity-all these were elements in a campaign waged for the furtherance of German interests in the Near East. Many of the principal shops, and the majority of the hotel-keepers, are German. Practically every town has at least one German physician-a subtle and efficacious method of spreading influence. Nevertheless, so far as Palestine at any rate is concerned, all these activities together would have given Germany little solid standing if it had not been for the Templist colonies, which are the one real ground for consideration when German claims in the future of the country are under discussion.

These colonies, of which there are now three-near Jaffa, at Haifa, and near Lydda †-date from 1868 and were in their origin essentially of a religious character. The settlers, simple and God-fearing men and women, had neither material nor political object in view. Almost without exception artisans or agriculturists, they or their children as a rule follow the same pursuits. Their well-ordered, beautiful yet simple settlements shine out like jewels from amid the dirty, poverty-stricken and degenerate surroundings in which they were originally placed. Other German settlers, not members of the sect,

*The considered German policy to make the most of every opportunity was shown on this occasion by the journey of Prince Frederick Charles to take possession of the ruins in the name of the German Emperor.

+ There are German settlements of townspeople at Jaffa and Jerusalem. A number of Germans, not members of the Templist sect, live in the colony at Haifa. Land acquired near Lake Tiberias for the settlement of a fourth colony was subsequently sold to Jewish settlers.