better shown than by the fact that not only was the Admiral resolute in face of his severe losses, but the British gunnery improved while the German gunnery appears to have gone to pieces as soon as the four fast British battleships, under Evan-Thomas, got into action. This is not merely a testimony to the courage of the men but a proof of their faith in the leader. His losses were sustained in no dare-devil action. There is nothing to show that, in the subsequent period when the four 'Barhams' or later when the three Invincibles' joined, and the whole High Seas fleet was kept in play while waiting for the Grand Fleet under Jellicoe, any undue risk was run. The net result was that the Grand Fleet was able to come into action, if only for a short time.

How the High Seas Fleet escaped its clutches we do not know. The Admiralty communication says it was due to low visibility and mist.' It may be so, but we confess to being a little tired of Admiralty communications blaming the weather. It is alien to the spirit of the sailor. When the three Cressys were sunk, because they were unaccompanied by destroyers, the blame was put on the weather, just as was the case when the 'Hampshire' went down with Kitchener on board. The Dardanelles failure was a long-drawn tale about the weather. We had from the India Office something in the same vein about the relief which never got to Kut. After the Scarborough bombardment, the German armoured ships escaped because of the 'low visibility and mist.' In no circumstances is one allowed to blame an administrative act or defect, such as the failure to provide Zeppelin scouts-of which the Germans appear to have made considerable use-or sufficient high fuelendurance destroyers; but the clerk of the weather is fair game. Let us say plainly that the sea in all its aspects is always the ally of the best-trained and bestequipped navy.

The only discussion about naval preparations that we have had during the war was over the Zeppelins, partly because they are so big that they cannot escape attention, and because they have been very attentive to us. Mr Churchill's excuse for abandoning the intention to build them is that Parliament would not have given the money to build as many as Germany. Over two years

at the Admiralty failed to teach him the meaning of co-ordination of effort, and to show him that a few Zeppelins, basing their efforts on our superior fleets and squadrons afloat, and returning to their protection when outnumbered, would have been able to render our fleet most valuable assistance, though Germany might possess three or four times as many. We could have hampered the enemy's freedom of action by Zeppelins, possibly on May 31 as well, if we had only possessed a few of them.

We have done our best to obey Mr Balfour's counsel in this preliminary survey, and we await the despatches as to the battle itself. We have found cause for great satisfaction, but none for boasting; for the time has not yet come when we can relax in any way our preparedness, and what we already know has confirmed the belief of all our best gunners, that we have still something to learn in the art of gunnery on the material side. We have fought a foe who in this battle proved himself not only a brave but a skilful fighter. It is doubtful if this could have been said of the brave French sailors in our last great maritime war, for the skill had departed with the Royalist officers. Neither Tsushima nor Lissa can show the requisite conditions of fairly matched personnel; and one has to travel back to the time of Rodney for such battles between fleets. But the country knows that its Navy has proved itself a sure and safe defence; and its satisfaction is sweetened by the thought that the force which defeated the enterprise of the enemy was an imperial fleet in which the gift ships of New Zealand and the Malay States lay in the line of battle.

POSTSCRIPT.-As we go to press, Admiral Jellicoe's despatch has appeared. To begin with, it forms a complete vindication of Sir David Beatty, who "once again showed his fine qualities of gallant leadership, firm determination, and correct strategic insight.' His manoeuvre of forcing the enemy van to turn redressed those unfavourable conditions of light to which his ships were at first exposed. The use of a seaplane to obtain intelligence, and its return within 22 minutes with valuable information, is very suggestive, especially when we hear that it got within 3000 yards of the enemy's screen of light cruisers, and descended to a height of

900 feet so as to be below the clouds. No Zeppelin could have performed this feat, because at that height she would have offered far too easy a target. On the other hand, during the night, while our Grand Fleet lay between the enemy and Heligoland, a Zeppelin was observed at about 4 a.m. Our position was thus made known to the enemy; and to this fact he probably owes his escape. If the British fleet had possessed airships, his free use of them would, as we have suggested, been much hampered, while we should have had a good chance of discovering the enemy fleet.

The use of destroyers by both sides so soon (in a daylight action) as 27 minutes after its commencement is a noticeable feature. The attack of the British destroyers frustrated a similar attempt by the Germans, while our own was pressed home by seven destroyers in two groups, of which one came into action with the German battleships even before they had come to the support of their cruisers. We appear, both then and later, to have scored successes with the torpedo, whereas the only torpedoed ship on our side was the battleship Marlborough,' which subsequently fired fourteen salvos and then returned safely to port. Two other features deserve special mention, viz. the splendid work of the engine-room staffs, who brought the ships into action at record speeds, and so gained invaluable time; and the dash and determination of the destroyer flotillas. As to the gunnery, we may quote two noteworthy extracts, in one of which, dealing with the earlier part of the action, we read that 'our fire began to tell, the accuracy and rapidity of the enemy depreciating considerably'; while in the other, referring to the intermittent battleship action late in the day, the Admiral says that the enemy were 'constantly hit,' while his return fire was not effective, and the damage caused to our ships was insignificant.'

CARLYON BELLAIRS.

THE

QUARTERLY REVIEW.

No. 449.-OCTOBER, 1916.

Art. 1.-INDUSTRIAL RECONSTRUCTION.

Memorandum on the Industrial Situation after the War. The Garton Foundation. Harrison, 1916.

THIS Memorandum is the work of a group of investigators who came together, at the instance of the Garton Foundation, for the purpose of discussing the industrial situation as it is likely to be at the end of the war, the difficulties presented by a return to peace conditions, and the more permanent problems which must be solved in order to secure the future prosperity of British industry. The group included men in touch both with the capitalist and employing classes and with organised Labour, as well as with financial, economic and administrative circles. The Memorandum was discussed in draft and in proof with a still wider circle; and during the last few months it has been privately circulated amongst large employers, Trade Union officials, and recognised experts on social and economic questions. From many of these detailed criticisms have been received, with the result that the Directors of the Foundation now feel justified in sanctioning publication of the Memorandum as a contribution to public discussion. The writer of this article was a member of the original group, and, while the opinions here put forward are his own, he believes them fairly to represent the conclusions arrived at by the group, as a result of some months' active interchange of views with competent representatives of widely varied interests and standpoints.

The chief danger attending discussion of the probable developments of trade and industry after the war is that Vol. 226.-No. 449.

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we may allow our attention to become concentrated upon details of policy, to the neglect of the fundamental principles involved, and so fail to recognise the greatness of our opportunity. The questions which arise directly out of the return from war to peace conditions are so complex and important that those who have to deal with them might well be excused for failing to realise their intimate connexion with more permanent features of our industrial life. Yet, in the main, the effect of the war has been not so much to create new difficulties as to accentuate those which already existed. Such questions as the avoidance of unemployment during the period of demobilisation, the restoration of Trade Union safeguards, the right use of the new plant erected for war purposes, and the relation of wages to the increased cost of living, are closely connected with ante-bellum problems. They can be satisfactorily solved only by a policy based on a comprehensive survey of industrial conditions as a whole.

This necessity has been so far recognised that the work which is being done by both official and non-official bodies to prepare for handling the questions arising on demobilisation is accompanied by a large amount of more general discussion of trade problems and of the means whereby we may increase our national efficiency. It may be doubted, however, whether this discussion is founded upon a sufficiently clear analysis of the situation and its requirements. There is a tendency to accept too readily the permanence of ante-bellum conditions, and to ignore the profound effect of the war upon men's attitude and outlook. A large proportion of those who speak and write upon these matters confine their attention to isolated questions, such as tariffs, the encouragement of scientific research, or the regulation of wages, and consider even these questions mainly from the standpoint of a particular trade or a particular class. No such piecemeal treatment will meet the demands of the situation. While each trade and each class has its own special difficulties and requirements, the prosperity of every trade and class is bound up with the general prosperity of British Industry; and every question relating to a particular section must be considered in the light of its effects upon other sections of the business world.